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The private and social returns are high on investments  to im-
prove  women's  economic  productivity- particulary  education.
Where  women  receive  less  education  than  men,  efforts  to redress
that imbalance  deserve  priority.  Measure  to open women's
access to information, technology,  productive  resources,  and
credit  should  also be tested  far more  extensively.
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dThe contribution  of women  to ar economy  is in  childbearing  and childcare.
principle  no different  from that of men. But in
practice,  the problems  of valuation,  measure-  * For similar  reasons,  extension  or similar
ment,  and policy  inference  are more  complex-  outreach.  activities  can increase  the productivity
and the implications  for policy  and programs  of women  in home-based  production,  including
may  be more controversial  and culturally  agriculture  and the provision  and use of house-
sensitive.  nold water.
Reviewing  and integrating  several  lines  of  *  Extension  or outreach  programs  can correct
economic  research  on how women  affect  factor  market distortions,  provide  women  with
economic  and social  development,  Shultz  snore  equal agricultural  and household  technolo-
concludes  that:  gies, and expand  the effective  supply  of credit
where women  produce  for maiket.
* Private  retums  to investment  that enance
women's  market and productivity  are  high,  To give  us more firm  evidence  of how
notably  in primary  and secondary  education,  public  policies  affect women's productivity  and
especially  in regions  where  women  now receive  family  consumption  pattems,  Schultz  recom-
less education  than men.  mends  pilot programs  to:
* These  investments  shift the aBocation  of  * Increase  school  enrollment  and graduation
women's  time toward  market  work  and away  rate for girls.
from home-based  work.
A  assess the effect of equalizing  access  to
* rhese investements  benefit  the health and  agricultural  extension  services  by male and
nutrition  of the women's  children  and immediate  female  farmers  in Africa,  Southeast  Asia, and
family  members.  Lain America.
* TMese  investments  reduce  desired  ferfility  * Explore  altemative  configurations  of child
and increase  women's ability  to obtain  and use  and maternal  health  programs,  varying  the mix
family  planning  services  more effectively.  of staff by level and gender.
* These  investments  make women  more  * Evaluate  program  innovations  in the
efficient  managers  of family  resources  of land,  delivery  of credit, such as the Grameen  Bank in
fuelwood,  water,  and food.  Bangladesh.
* Family  planning  and family  health "out-  All these  pilot programs  should  be designed
reach"  progrgn-s  especially  help women,  be-  to monitor  the families' choices  that affect
cause  women's mobilty is particularly  con-  whether  they  produce  healthy  and educated  sons
strained  by culture  and the practical  realities  of  and daughters.
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6.  Conclusions  931.  Introduction
This  paper  examines  from  an  economic  perspective  women  who,  as  producers
and  consumers,  are  attached  at  varioui  stages  in  their  lifetimes  to  families
and households. Women's  contribution  to the economy  is in principle  no
different  than  men's. In  practice,  however,  the  problens  of  valuation,  meas-
urement,  and policy  inference  are  more complex. Moreover,  the  design  and
evaluation  of development  policies  to increase  women's  productivity  and  ad-
vance  other  social  objectives  are  culturally  sonsitive,  because  these  policies
may  change  customary  patterns  of  work,  specialization,  and  the  evolution  of
the  family  and  other  basic  social  institutions.
All  societies  coordinate,  in  one  way or  another,  production  and  consump-
tion  of  goods,  child  bearing,  and  investment  in  human  capital,  such  as  ectuca-
tion,  and  nonhuman capital.  This  occurs  because  such  cooperation  generates
important  economies,  including  increased  ssale  of  production,  specialization,
and  shared  consumption  of public  goods. Many  activities  that  produce  goods
and  services  and  allocace  them  among  persons  are  coordinatad  by  semi-permanent
family  groups  that  are  not  restricted  to  one  sex  or  age. These  family  groups
may  also  *hare  a  residence  and  join  in  reproduction  and  extended  periods  of
child rearing. A  comon  group is a nucleaz  family,  perhaps  with older
members,  but  of course  families  take  diverse  forms  around  the  modern  world.
It  is  difficult  and  probably  inappropricte  to  analyze  women's  contribution  to
the  development  process  without  roference  to  the  family  or  household.
Changes  in  women's  earning  power  compared  to  men's  and  children's  can
affect  what  the  family  does  better  than  othir  institutions  in  society,  such  as
12
firms  and government. Functions  where the family  retains  a comparative
advantage  ;-  also  be performed  with  a  different  mix  of labor  and  capital  as
the  economic  capabilities  of  women  approach  those  of  men.
No matter  how  overall  economic  coordination  is  achieved,  governments  are
limited  in  their  ability  to  redistribute  resources  among  persons  within  fam-
ilies.  This  is  because  families  can  compensate  for  most  government  transfers,
readjusting  the  allocation  of  private  resources  within  the  family  until  the
distribution  of total  resources  among  persons  again  reflects  the incentives
and  values  of  the  feamily  (or  its  more  poverful  members),  To  propose  sbnsible
policies  that  will afflect  womn,  it is essential  to urderstand  how family
incentives  affect  women,  children,  and  men;  how governmeut  activities  pene-
trate  the  family  and  modify  women's  economic  capabl4.  .es;  and  how  the  costs
and  results  of  such  government  activities  compare  to  .rhtr  s*cial  investments.
The family's  consumption  patterns,  &avinGs,  sind  investments  in family
members  may  all  change  when  women's  and  men's  prc4uctive  capabilities  change.
To  maximize  production  and growth,  irnterrv*  rates  of return  to investments
should  be equalized  across  the formation  of  human  capital,  the  increase  of
home-based  production,  and  the  increase  of firm  based-production.  A diverg-
ence  in  the  estimated  rates  of  return  to  investmenas  in  home,  firm,  and  human
capital  suggests  an inefficiency,  and  calls  for  an analysis  to isolate  what
institutions,  information  or incentives  could  be ksponslble  for  the  seeming
misallocation  of  resources.
Empirical  evidence  on  the  responsiveness  of  persons  and  families  to  dif-
ferent  external  influences  and  constraints  show  what  the  limits  are  on  the
decision-making  units  responsible  for  particular  forms  of  behavior,  ranging
from  a lone  individual  to  an  extended  family.  Such  specific  knowledge  about3
family  coordinatLon  and  pooling  of  economic  resources  slao  helps  to specify
general  models  of  the  family  that  better  reflect  the  conditLons  that  constrain
family  choice  in  various  cultures.  More  accurate  predictions  of  the  impact  of
socioeconomic  change  and  polLcies  should  then  be feasible  insofar  as they
affect  families  and  particular  members  of  these  famiLies.
Economics  of  the  Family  and  Development
In  more  traditional  agricultural  societies  and  In  the  early  stages  of  the
development  process,  the  fauily  and  the  simple  firm  blend  together.  As  trade
and lndustrial  specialization  develop,  technical  economies  in the  scale  of
production  emerge,  and  firms  gradually  replace  families  as  the  main  source  of
output,  except  perhaps  for  agriculture  (Kuznet;,  1957;  Schultz,  1988a). Thls
shift  in  production  from  family  enterprises  to  non-family  firms  is  associated
with  greater  participation  of  women's  in  the  work  force  on  a  more  equal  foot-
ing  with  men (Boserup,  1970;  Schultz,  1988a). Initially,  women  are often
confined  to  a broad  set  of  home  production  activities.  Later  they  move  to
participate  more  fully  in  wage  and  salary  jobs  outside  of  the  family,  to  reap
the  full  benefits  of  more  specialized  vocational  training.
It  is  often  said  that  by  obtaining  a  job  (for  wages)  outside  of  the  fam-
ily,  a  woman increases  her  control  over  the  productive  returns  to  her  labor
and hence gains  relative  influence  over  how the family  uses its economic
resources.  Women  may be  motivated  to  enter  the  wage  labor  force,  either  by
domestic  poverty,  or by the appeal  of eploymnt  opportunities  outside  the
home.  The  level  of  a  women's  productlvity  is  of  primary  importance  to  her
welfare  and  that  of  her  children,  but  the  conditions  under  which  she  works  may
also  matter.  Changes  in  women's  labor  force  participation  may be  a  good  or
ill  event,  depending  on  its  causes.  To  dlstinguish  between  such  income  and4
wage  effecti  on  a  women's  marketed  supply  of  labor,  many  factors  must  be  eval-
uated  together,  as  specified  by  a  family  model  of  decisionmaking
Moreover,  the distinctive  role of women in managing  investments  in
children  may  be  a strong  reason  for  incrtasing  women's  capabilities  and  their
control  over !amily  resources. Improving  the  productivity  of women is a
social  objective  to advance  economic  development,  and also possibly  to
channel  that development  toward  socially  desired  investments  in the food,
health  care,  and schooling  of children.  Raising  women's  productivity  often
also  leads  to  reduced  child  mortality  and,  at  approximately  the  same time,  to
a  reduction  in  fertility. If the  latter  more  than  offsets  the  former,  the
rate  of  population  growth  may  be  reduced  and  the  proportion  of  the  population
in  the  labor  force  may  be  slowly  increased,  as  the  demographic  transition  pro-
gresses.  Quantitative  confirmation  of these apparent  linkages,  however,
requires  such  study  and  replication  to  build  sound  generalizations  from  oepir-
ical  regularities  and  to  identify  the  special  features  in  society  that  affect
these  behavioral  tendencies. If these  empiricai  studies  are guided  by a
coherent  modeling  framework,  the accumulation  of useful  knowledge  can be
expected  to  occur  more  rapidly.
Concepts  of  the  Family  Guiding  Empirical  Analysis
A conceptual  and statistical  framework  is  essential  to  draw  inferences
from  notiaxperimental  data  about  how family  production,  consumption,  and  behav-
ior  respond  to  changes.  This  applies  to  experimental  pilot  programs  as  well.
It  is  hard  to  forecast  how  social  institutions,  such  as  families,  firms,  and
government  social  programs  will  evolve  over  time.  The  first  step  is  to  work
out  the  rules  for  decision-making  in  the  family  that  account  for observed
producer  and consumer  behavior. This  requires  analysis  of how individual,5
social,  and  environmental  constraints  interact  to determine  the  productivity
and  role  of  women  in  a particular  society.  Such  constraints  must  be clearly
defined,  adequately  measured,  and  beyond  the  family's  direct  control  or  exog-
enous  to  the  family.  Where  the  line  is  drawn  between  family  choice  variables
and'exogenous  constraints  depends  on  tli  question  addressed.  The  analysis  may
encompass  the  broader  extended  family,  it  its  members  pool  resources  and  share
obligations.  This  coordinating  group  is  the  elusive  starting  point  for  empir-
ical  analysis. Two  questions  are  paramount:  How  extensively  do individual
and  family  decisions  interact?  What  are  the  economic  limits  to  the  family?
Ultimately,  the  family  has  a life  cycle  perspective.  Moreover,  there  is
an  element  of  inter-generational  altruism  as  parents  spend  part  of  their  earn-
ings  to  help  their  children,  and  grandchildrern,  ad  infinitum.  However,  past
decisions.  in  the  life  cycle  of  the  family  should  not  be  viewed  thereafter  as
exogenous  constraints  on  later  behavior.  Women  who  worked  before  marriage  are
certainly  more  likely  to  work  after  marriage  than  other  women,  for  example,
and  they  may  also  have  fewer  births. But  do  the  work  decisions  influence  the
fertility  decisions,  or  do  both  instead  depend  on other  exogenous  influences
.or  unobserved  variables,  such  as  preferences,  operating  on  the  basic  sequence
of lifetime  choices?' The  latter  is  more  nearly  correct. Marital  status,
work  patterns  and  fertility  are  thus  considered  all  endogenous  and  in  need  of
explanation.  According  to  many  studies,  the  likelihood  of  being  married,  or
living  irn  a family  devrends  on the  distribution  of  endowments  and  capabilities
of  men and  women  (e.g.,  Becker,  1974,  1981;  Friedan,  1974;  Grossbard,  1976;
King  et  al.,  1986;  Montgomery  and  Sulak,  1988).  If  the  aim  is  to  estimate  the
longer-run  tendencies  of families,  and  hence  society,  to adjust  to changing
conditions  and constraints,  a  longer  sequence  of these interdfpendencies6
should  be viewed  as *ndogonous.  The  modeling  framework  should  thus  specify
the  timeframe  and the  appropriate  class  of  *ndogenous  outcomes  and  exogenous
conditions  2
To determine  what family  group  decides  on any particular  production,
consumption,  investment,  or behavioral  decision  in each  society,  it  may be
necessary  teo  design  nev sampling  procedures  to collect  data from soveral
potentially  relevant  groups  of family  members. In some  societies,  fox  *x-
ample,  men  might  be expected  to  help  pay  the  school  fies  of their  sister's
children,  in  which  case  the  schooling  decision  will  be imperfectly  understood
unless  the wage rate  and u-iearned  income  of uncles  are included  among  the
constraints  on child  enrollmnt.  A simple  empirical  test  of the  limits  to
such  a  family  decisionmaking  process'would  establish  whether  an  uncle's  endow-
ments affect  significantly  a child's  schooling  behavior.  Conversely,  if
financial  transfers  are  observed  from  the  child's  uncle  to  the  child's  mother,
they should  be  treated  as *ndogenous  variables,  potentially  identified,
perhaps,  by  information  on  the  uncle's  exogenous  endowments.
M8ny disciplines  contribute  to the empirical  literature  on linkages
within  the  family  and  offer  evidence  on  how  women's  capacities  are  increased
and  how  they  in  turn  affect  the  productivity,  welfare,  and  behavior  of  family
members. These  studies  employ  disparate  standards  for  statistical  evidence,
and  do  not  share  the  same  modeling  methodologies.  Categorizing  constraint-like
variables  into  exogenous  conditions  and  endogenous  restraints  that  evolve  over
time  because  of  past  decisions  is  therefore  an important  step  in  formalizing
an  analytical  framework  that  can  potentially  illuminate  empirically  women and
development.7
2. Conssniption  and  the  Family
"Who deserves  consumption"  involves  the  values  of  society  and  the  family,
and  is  not  necessarily  clarified  with  the  tools  of  welfaro  economics.  Econo-
mists can postulate  o  social-welfare  function  that will permit  welfare
comparisons  to  be  drawn  botween  persons  and  thus  derive  'optimal"  distributive
policy. But  such  economic  formulations  are  rarely  responsiblo  for  the  trans-
fer  sche_es  that  societios  adopt. Nor  are  they  often  a  persuasive  basis  for
designing  policies  to  intervene  in  the  economy.  Yet  it  may be  possibl*  to
describe  the  tradeoffs  made  by  society  and  by  the  family  and  thus  identify
factors  affecting  intrahousehold  consumption  patterns.  This  section  discusses
the  neoclassical  model  of  family  behavior,  suggests  its limitations,  and
explores  a more  flexible  "bargaining  nodel*  of family  deciiommaking. This
lattor  model recognizes  the different  interests  in, and control  over,
resources  that  individual  family  mombors  have.
Nodels  of  Family  Bebhwior  and  Distribution
What is responsible  for the inequality  between  men and  women  and  why
should  it  vary  in  different  countries?  Undoubtedly  a tension  exists  in the
family  between  efficiency  and  equity,  an  it  does  in  society  as  a  whole.  From
the  point  of  view  of  efficiency,  a family  membe'rs  food,  consumption,  health,
and  long  term  formation  of  skills,  such  as  education,  should  be  supported  only
so long  as  these  investments  are more  profitable  than  alternatives.  Con-
versely,  pure  parental  altruism  could  lead  parents  to consider  each  child's
satisfaction  as  important  as  their  own.  This  would  enco-arage  parents  to
invest  in  their  childrun's  endowments  until  they  are  similar  to that  of the
parents.  Egalitarian  parents  may  also  derive  satisfaction  from  leaving  their
children  equally  'well  off."  By contrast,  the  criterion  of efficiency  isd
likely  to  encourage  parents  to  invest  more  human capital  Ln  the  children  vho
,re  more  able,  aqsuming that  theme  natural  abilities  enhance  the  returns  on
parental  investment. Parental  bequests  to  less  able children  would  then
include  a  greater  proportion  of  property  who.a  market  rates  of  return  are  not
affected  by  the  child's  ibility.  In  this  mnner,  Becker  and  Tomes  (1979)  show
how parents  might  distribute  their  humn  and  physical  imvestmnts  among  their
children  of  differing  ability.  If  the marginal  returns  on  humn  capital
exceed  those  on  physical  capital  for  any  child,  the  parents'  pursult  of  effi-
ciency  would  cone.  into  conflict  vith  their  ideal  of  consumption  equal'  - ln
the  family  (Becker,  1981).  Available  *vidence  suggests  that  on  average  the
private  rates  of  return  to  investmnts  in  education  are  larger  than  the  re-
turns  on  nonhuman capital  today  in  low  income  countries  (Psacharapolos,  1973).
In  these  circumstnces,  intergenerational  mobility  ls  accomplished  by  parents
more efficiently  if  they  invest  In  the  education  of  their  children  rather  than
transfer  to  then  property  durirg  their  lives  or  through  bequests.
EmpirLcal  estimates  of  intrafamily  distribution  of  consumption  and  human
capital  investments  provide  clues  as  to  how familios  trade-off  efficiency  and
equity.  Does  this  trade-off  differ  at  different  levels  of  family  income?  Are
such  differences  comparable  in  different  societies?  Fmilies  may  balance  the
objectives  of  efficiency  and  equity  differently  when  average  incom  falls
toward  subsistence  and  the  family's  very  survival  is  at  risk.  Sex  differen-
tials  in  child  survival,  nutritlon,  and  schooling  offer  a  baxis  for  analysis
of  welfare  differences  between girls  a.  boys.  These in  turn  affect  the
economic capabilities  of  adult  womn  and  men--and  thus  influence  their  social
mobility  and  inequality,  as  well  as  on  their  productivity.
These  gender  differentials  within  the family  are analyzed  here,  first9
across  households  within  societies. Interpreting  these  differentials  and
estimating  how  policy  might  affect  them  requires  a  framework  that  accommodates
the  salient  constraints  on the  family  and  accounts  for  critical,  features  of
the  personal  distribut..on  of  family  consumption  and  human  capital  investment.
A more  complete  model  nust  also  describe  who is  found  in  a family  or,  more
precisely,  family  composition.  Adults  that  aro  observed  to  tsside  in  families
are not a  random  sample;  they aro selacted  according  to criteria that are
likely  to also influence  what they expect  to receive  from the family's
resources.  A sample  selection  bias is  thereforo  potentially  present  in  any
analysis  restricted  to  families.  The  decision  rules  that  govern  family  forma-
tion  and marriage  should  be combined  with an analyst.s  of the  constraints
doetrmining  intrafamily  resource  allocations. Though  elements  of  such  a
theor7  are at hand (McElroy,  1988),  empirical  applications  are limited  and
largely  confined  to  U.S.  data. But  the  theoretical  approach  is  wedl  suited  to
the  study  of  woaen's  productivity  in  low  income  countries.  3
Models  of  Marriage  and  Family  Behavior
Adults  presumably  maintain  their  attachment  to  their  existing  family,  or
marry,  or  go  their  separate  way,  because  there  are  net  gains  in  doing  so  as
compared  to  other  foregone  opportunities  In  marriages,  so  long  as  both  part-
ners  share  the  net  gains  in  excess  of  the  opportunity  costs  given  up from
alternative  arrangements,  the  union  has  at  least  an  economic  basis  for  contin-
uation  (Backer,  1974).  The  division  of  output  botween  partners  uight  be
studied  as it  responds  to  market  forces  (Becker,  1981:42).  But  it  has not
received  attention  because  it  is  hard  to  attribute  consumption  to  a  particular
family  member,  and  traditional  models  of  the  family  do not  prescribe  distribu-
tional  rules.10
The classical  unified  family  decision-making  framework  assumes  that  the
family  behaves  as if it is trying  to allocate  the  time  of its  members  and
other  endowments  to satisfy  a comon set of "family"  preferences  (Becker,
1965). This  process  involves  pooling  resources  and  agreeing  on the  form  of
the  family's  preferences.  Becker  (1974)  describes  conditions  under  which  this
process  could  take  place.  The  simplest  assumption  is  for  couples  to  share  the
same  preferences.  Given  the  limitations  of this  working  assumption,  Becker
describes  a dominant  family  decisionmaker,  the  husband,  who  allocates  the
gains  from  marriage  to  roward  the  other  individual  with  more  than  she  expects
to  receive  as  a  single  person  or  in  another  union. Incentives  are  also  *stab-
lished  to encourage  the  non-dominant  miember  to allocate  her time  and other
family  resources  to accomplish  the  solution  chosen  by the  dominant  individual.
If  the  gains  from  the  union  are  insufficient  to  motivate  coordinated  family
behavior,  the family  may dissolve. This  second  model,  though  it is more
realistic  than  the  first,  still  does  not  imply  any  testable  predictions  about
intrafamily  consumption.  One  way to  proceed  further  would  be to  specify  the
structure  of  household  production  and  then  estimate  the  magnitud.'of  the  gains
from  marriage  based  on  the  endowments  of  the  partners,  market  prices,  and  pro-
duction  technology  (Wallace,  1974).
How  are  such  marital  gains  actually  distributed?  The  family  demand  sys-
tem  does  not  help  in  predicting  which  lntrafadily  allocations  are  more  likely
to  occur. It  does  imply  strong  restrictions,  but  these  may not  fit  data  be-
cause  the demand  model  also  depends  on auxilliary  assumptions,  such  as the
functional  form  of  relationships,  that  are  not  central  to  the  conception  of  a
unified  family  decisionmaker.
Extending  the  family  demand model  to  accommodate  the  conflicting  inter-11
*sts  of family  members  is  a reasonable  next  step These  conflicts  of  interest
must  be resolved  by a  specific  bargaining  mechanism  to  be tractable  and  test-
able. Many  game  theoretic  models  do  not  imply  unique  solutions,  nor  do they
lend  themselves  easily  to empirical  testing.  The  cooperative  Nash-bargained
framework,  as  stated  by  McElroy  and  Horney  (1981),  is  an  interesting  possibil-
ity. It  uests  within  it  as  a special  case  the  unified  family  deoand  system.
Statistical  tests  can  be readily  implemented,  therefore,  to  determine  whether
data  on observable  family  behavior  satisfy  the  restrictions  implied  by the
unified  family  demand  model,  or instead,  suggest  that  this  systematic  form  of
bargaining  is  consistent  with  the  data. 'These tests  are  also  intuitive:  They
simply  imply  that  nonearned  income  of  the  husband  or  wife  may  influence
consumption  differently.  When the  woman controlls  physical  assets  or  streams
of  nonearned  income,  her  bargaining  power  in  the  family  to  distribute  the
family's  resources  is  increased.  If  these  tests  support  the  bargaining  model
versus  the  unified  family  demand model,  additional  more  complex  tests  of  the
extended  demand system  can  be  worked  out  (Horney  and  McElroy,  1988).
Other  approaches  to  bargaining  behavior  in  marriage  involve  making  spe-
cific  assumptions  about  asymmetric  information  available  to  spouses,  assume
differences  in  transaction  costs  within  and  outside  of the  family,  or  specify
the  form  of the  utility  function  for  the  family  (e.g.,  Fabella,  1982). For
many  reasons,  few  empirical  tests  have  been  implemented  to shov  that  any  of
these bargaining  approaches  are helpful  in  explaining  family  behavior.
Acceptance  of bargaining  models  of family  decision-making  will depend  on
comparisons  of the  model;s  capacity  to account  for  related  forms  of family
behavior  that  are  not  adequately  explained  by the  unified  family  demand  model
(Manser  and  Brown,  1980;  McElroy  and  Horney,  1981;  Pollak,  1985;  Jones,  1986;12
Peters,  1986;  Carlin,  1988;  Schultz,  1988c).
Empirical  Rvidence  an  the  Bash  Bargaining  Model  of  tho  Family
Evidence  is  slowly  accumulating  that  is  consistent  with  the  cooperative
Nash-bargaiLned  model  of  family  decisLon-makLng  but  not  with  the  strict  formu-
lation  of  the  neoclassical  unified  famLly  domand  model.  Other  models  of
bargaining  sty  be  developed  that  are  less  restrictive  and  more general  than
the  cooperative  Nash-bargained  solutlon,  and  they  may permLt  the  partners  to
know  different  infornation  and  choose  among a  wLder range  of  Pareto  alloca-
tions (Chiappori,  1968).  But the  goal  here  is  to describe  the initial
modeling  effort3  that  have  added  flexibility  to  the  neoclassical  faumly  demand
model  by  dealing  with  the  dlstinct  lnterests  and  resources  of  fauily  mewbers.
The model  should  also  allow  eventually  for  a  partial  pooling  of resources,
rather  than  the  ccmplete  pooling  assumed  ln  the  family  demand  model.
Consider,  for  example,  how  the  indivLdual  supplies  labor. It  ls  gener-
ally assumed  that increases  in nonearned  income  (not contingent  on the
individual's  allocation  of time)  increase  deoand  for  leisure  and  nonoarket
time  and  reduce  tioe  tiupplied  to  the  labor  market.  As  this  framework  was
adapted  to  analyze  the  labor  supply  behavior  of  wives  and  then  other  family
members  (Mincer,  1963;  Koster.  1966;  Heckman,  1971),  the  leisure  of  each
family  nmeber  was  added  to  the  family  utillty  function,  but the family's
nonearned  income  was  pooled.  This  approach  to  famlly  demands and  labor  supply
consequently  assumes  that  the  effect  of  nonearned  lncom would  be  identical
regardless  of the individual's  status  in the  family  or the  source  of the
nonearned  incom.  Situations  say arise  where  this  neoclassical  assumption
appears  realistic  and  others  where  it  does  not  conform  to  what  we know about
resource  pooling  of  family  members  or  coordination  of  decision-making.13
The  cooperative  Nash-bargained  model  assumoes  the  partners  cooperatively
maximize  a  product  of  the  individuals'  marital  gains  in  their  utility  compared
to  their  utility  available  outside  of  the  union. This  utility  of  the  alterna-
tive  state  represents  a  *threat  point"  beyond  vhich  the  partner  would  leave.
It  thus  limits  the  consumption  allocations  wlthin  the  family  that  are  accept-
able  to  both  spouses.  Nonearned  income  of  the  husband  or  of the  wife  will,
thus,  influence  the  "threat  point"  of  that  spouse: it  leaves  the  spouse  less
dependent  on marital  gains.  It thus  strengthens  the spouse's  bargaining
power,  and  potentially  changes  the  distribution  of  consumption  in  the  family.  4
This  would  be  most  obvious  in  its  effect  on  the  consumption  of  leisu,^,  since
this  is  thought  of  as  a  private  good. The  effect  on  other  forms  of  consump-
tion  may  be  more  ambiguous,  such  as  expenditures  on-tobacco,  alcohol,  toys  or
apparel,  for  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  wealthier  women  or  men  from  deriving
satisfaction  from  varied  consumption  activities.
Consequently,  nonearned  income  (or  its  sources)  should  be divided  into
those  elements  brought  to the  marriage  or accumulated  during  the marriage
through  distinct  individual  activities,  the  receipt  of  bequests  or  transfers,
or  other  personal  connections.  A wife's  nonearned  income,  such  as  she  might
have  inherited  or  brought  to  the  marriage  as  a  dowry,  might  be  expected  to
reduce  her  market  labor  supply  more  than  the  same amount  of  nonearned  income
5 brought  to  the  marriage  by  her  husband.  Conversely,  the  payment  of  a  bride-
price  in  many areas  of  subSaharan  Africa  by  the  groom  to  the  bride's  parents
may be  associated  with  the  bride  increasing  her  supply  of  time  to  the  labor
force. 6 This  prediction  of the  individualistic  bargaining  model  received  only
modest  support  from its first  empirical  test against  U.S. household  data
(Horney  and McElroy,  1988). Subsequent  study  of the  allocation  of time  of14
U.S.  husbands  and  wives  to  housework  provided  more  support  for  the  bargaining
approach  (Carlin,.1988).  But  data  from  Thailand  strongly  confirm  its  useful-
ness  (Schultz,  1988c).
In  the  1981  Socioeconomic  Survey  of  Ttailand,  participation  by  women  aged
25  to  54  in  the  labor  force  is  reduced  by  three  times  as  much  for  a  given  flow
of nonearned  incom (from  rentals,  interest  or dividends)  if that  nonearned
income  is  owned by  the  woman as  compared  to  the  effect  of  that  income  if  it  is
owned  by  her  husband.  Conversely,  men agegd 25  to  54  reduce  their  participa-
tion  by  three  times  the  amount  when the  family's  nonearned  income  is  owned by
the  man  rather  than  his  wife  (See  Appenlix  Tables  A-3  and  A-4).  In  Thailand
women  are frequently  in the  labor  force,  and  while  marriage  has  been  nearly
universal,  they  often  divorce  and  remarry.  It  might  be  more  difficult  in  some
other  societies  to  collect  meaningful  data  on  the  ownership  of  nonearned
income  for  each  individual  in  a  family.  For  example,  in  a  survey  of  rural
Northeast  Brazil,  few  women  report  nonearned  income,  though  the  proportion
increases  in  urban  areas.
At a more  anecdotal  level,  there  is  evidence  that  as  women's  education
and  marketable  skills  improve,  women  are treated  better  and  consume  more  of
their  family's  resources.  But  there  reomin  relatively  few  studies  of  house-
hold surveys  from  which to draw such generalizations.  The neoclassical
family  demand  model emphasizes  that the human capital  embodied  in women
affects  their  value  of  time  and  influences  the  allocation  of  time  and  invest-
ments  within  the  family  (Mincer.  1963;  Becker,  1965).  Consequently,  evidence
that  time  allocations,  consumption,  and  investment  patterns  within  the  family
respond  to  differences  in  male,  female  and  child  wages  does  not  discriminate
between  the family  demnd and  bargaining  models. But  the  cooperative  Nash-15
bargained  model  of  household  behavior  also  predicts  differential  consumption
effects  of nonearned  income  depending  on  who  controls  it.  The bargaining
framework  suggests  why  women  may  engage  in separate  jobs  from  their  husbands
to  enhance  their  control  over  resources.  Indeed,  this  pattern  is  particularly
notable  in subSaharan  Africa  and  South  East  Asia (Sct.ultz,  1988a),  although
women  are  still  mostly  wrrking  as  unpaid  family  workers.
In  parts  of  Africa  husband  and  wife  often  cooperate  in  the  joint  produc-
tion  of  scue  crops,  while  other  crops  or  parts  of  the  production  process--e.g.
marketing--are  entirely  the responsibility  of one  meber.  The  neoclassical
model of  the  family  leads  to  the  expectation  that  the  wife  allocates  her  time
between  the  joint  crops  and her  own crops  to  equalize  the  value  of  her  mar-
ginal  product  across  all  activities.  The bargaining  model,  however,  predicts
that  s  e  would  work  more  on  her  own fields,  because  the  value  of  her  marginal
product  there  is  more  under  her  control.  Jones  (1986)  confirmed  these  predic-
tions  of  the  bargainLg  -model  with  survey  data  collected  from  North  Cameroon.
Allocatl.ve  incentives  within  these Cameroon  families,  therefore,  may not
achieve  an  overall  efficient  use  of  labor  but  advance  other  individual  inter-
ests  of  family  members, 7
Another  implication  of the  deomnd  model  is that  the income-compensated
cross-substitution  effects  should  be  symetric  or  equal. This  restriction  of
the  unified  family  demand model  implies  in  allocating  labor  supplies  that  the
husband  and wife  agree  on  the  value  of each  other's  nonmarket  time.  It is
possible  to  imagine,  as  an alternative  hypothesis,  that  a husband  would  assign
a  higher  value  to  his  nonmarket  time  than  does  his  wife  to  his  time. In the
case  of  their  valuations  of  the  wife's  nonmarket  tiwe,  the  wife  might  also
value  her  own  tim  more  highly  than  does  her  spouse.  An  individualistic16
bargaining  model  should  allow  for  the  possibility  that  the  wife  and  husband
might  value  some  "goods*  differently,  such  as  their  own  1Ieisures."  Hence,  a
test  of  the  fauily  demand  model  is  the  strong  restriction  that  the  income-
compensated  effect  of  the  husband's  wage  on  the  wife  s  nonmarket  time  is  equal
to  the  income-compensated  effect  of  the  wife's  wage  on  the  husband's  nonmarket
tim.  Heckun  (1971)  tested  this  statistieally  and rejected  it  with  U.S.
data,  although  this  finding  wa  not  emphasized in  a  subsequent  paper  (Ashen-
felter  and  Heckman,  1974).8  But  the  test  is  conditional  on  many  other  aspects
of  the  demand  uodel,  including  functional-form  approximations.
To  *valuate  the  partial  effect  of  the  husband's  or  wife's  nonearned  in-
com  on  household  expenditure  patterns,  the  wage  rates  of  both  partners  must
be  hel1  contant.  If  expenditure  shares  are  analyzed,  then  an  instrumental
variable  estimate  of  the  family's  total  expenditures  might  be  included  as  a
proxy  for  the  effect  of  permanent  income.  It  is  expected  that  increases  in
the  wife's  nonearned  income  share  of  total  expenditures  will  have  the  partial
effect  of  increasing  expenditure  shares  on  children's  nutrition,  health,  and
ed,ocation  as  well  as  on  her  leisure.  This  assumos,  however,  that  the  wife's
nonearned  income  has  no  effect  on  fertility,  and  the  above  variables  repre-
sentirg  Lnvestments  in  children  are  defined  on  a  per  child  basis.  Unfortun-
ately,  most  expenditure  surveys do  not  distinguish  these  child  investment
expenditures,  e.g.  child  and  adult  health  care  are  coubined  in  a  single  coded
expenditure  category  (Schultz  and  Thomas,  1988),  and  tests  of  this  form  are
not  yet  reported.
The  neoclassical  family  demand  model,  nonetheless,  has  the  appeal  of
simplicity  and  widespread  applicability,  and  some  successful  empirical  appli-
cation  (Smith,  1980).  How much realism  should  be  sacrificed  by  a  theoretical17
paradigm  to  gain  tractability  and  testable  predictions  is  debatable.  Perhaps
in  societies  where  nearly  all  women  marry  by  age  30  and  there  is  little  disso-
lution  of  marriage,  as  was  true  until  recently  in  Korea,  China  or  Taiwan,  the
neoclassical  model  of  the  integrated  family  might  prove  satisfactory.  But  in
much  of  Subsaharan  Africa  and  South  East  Asia  where  mon  and  women  often  have
different  sources  of income  and  distinct  responsibilities  for  the  suppoxt  of
family  consumption,  individual  interests  may not  be submerged  in  a  *unified"
family. The  cooperative  Nash-bargained  model  of McElroy  and Horney  (1981)
appears  to  be  a  suitable  model  to  structure  research  on  family  and  individual
behavior  across  societies,  because  it generalizes  the neoclassical  family
demand  model. It  directs  particular  attention  to  who  controls  what  assets  and
streams  of income  in the family,  and  may lead  to new insights  about  how
women's  status  influences  the  development  process.
Measurement  of  Tntrafamily  Consumption  Patterns
It  is  hard  to  evaluate  systematically  and  comprehensively  what  individual
family  members  consume.  Many household  goods  benefit  all  members:  one  per-
son's  consumption  does  not  diminish  how  much  of  such  a  *public  good"  is
available  to  others.  This  property  of  public  goods  can  be used  to explain
family  formation  (Lam,  1988).  Children  are  often  referred  to  as  a  marriage-
specific  investment  or  public  consumption  good,  though  the  analogy  has  its
limitations  (Becker,  et  a.  1977).  Economies  in  the  scale  of  home production
and. public  consumption  are  also  difficult  to  disentangle  empirically  from  the
implications  of  public  goods  in  the  family.  Both  phenomena  contribute  to  the
gains  from  marriage.
Nonmarket  production  is  also  hard  to  track  down in  order  to  evaluate  who
in  the  family  consumes  what.  Child  rearing  is  the  primary  example  of  a  family18
nonmarket  good  that  has  some  of the  attributes  for  parents  of  a  publlc  good.
For this  reason  most  empirical  analyses  of intrafamily  distribution  of re-
sources  have  focused  on  human  capital  investments  in  children,  because  such
investments  are  largely  produced  by  the  family,  are  embodied  In  the  children,
and hence are subject  to their  future  control,  and are quantifiable  in a
survey. A  family's  investmnts  in children  account  for  a  larg"  part  of a
fasily's  savings  and  intergenerational  transfers.  Three  indicators  of  human
capital  investment  in chil-iren  are  most frequently  studied:  mortality,
anthropometric  measures  of  child  nutrition  and health,  and schooling.  However,
the  number  of  studies  examining  gender  differences  in  child  mortality,  health,
and  education  in  low  income  countries  is  still  quite  limited.  A few  econodic
studies  must  suffice  to  illustrate  how gender  differences  can  be  interpreted
within  fasilies  to  measure  regularities  in  behavior  that  should  inform  policy-
making.
Assume  that  survival  rates  of  girls  and  boys,  or  those  of  women and  men,
are  related  directly  to  the  relative  contributions  of  women and  men  to  their
familiea'  cash  and  kind  incone.  In  India,  where  female  mortality  exceeds  male
mortality  (Visaria,  1971),  as  more  women  participate  in  ethe  local  labor  market
and  are  more  productive  relative  to  adult  men,  the  survival  of  girls  compared
to  boys  is  higher. This  pattern  can  be  observed  at  the  distrLct  level  in  the
1970  Census  of  India  among rural  populations  and  also  at  the  household  level
in  parallel  studies  of  representative  rural  sample surveys  (Rosenzweig  and
Schultz,  1982a).  A  study  in  the  Punjab  (Anin  and  Pebley,  1987)  suggests,
moreover,  that  public  policies  that  increase  access  to  health  services,  with-
out affec  Ing the relative  productivity  of sen and women,  reduce  general
mortality,  but  increase  the  mortality  rate  of  girls  compared  to  boys  after  the19
first  month  of life. This  is  when  the  health  of  children  responds  primarily
to the family's  allocation  of food  and  hbalth  care.  Similar  patterns  are
noted  in Bangladesh,  Nepal  and  elsewhere  in  India  (Chen  eSt &I.  1980,  1981;
Martorell  et al.,  1984;  Bardhan,  1984;  Sen,  1988).
In  China,  where  social  pressures  have  recently  been  focuse.,  on  achieving
a  one-child  family,  the  frequency  of  infant  mortality  appears  to  have  incrioss-
ed disproportionately  for  girls  (Aird,  1983;  Zeng  Yi,  1988).  Perhaps  *us  a
consequence,  rural  families  in  China  are  allowed  increasingly  to  have  a  second
child  if the first  is a girl--the  goal  apparently  being to reduce  feuale
infant  mortality.  The  productivity  and  education  of  women  has  traditionally
been  far  below  that  of men in China  and  continues  to  be in interior  rural
areas (Freedman  at  al.,  1988).  Indirect  findings  such as  these  suggest  that
economic  productivity  of persons  in  the  family  has  a  bearing  on their  share
within  the  family  of  consumption  and  humAn  capital  investments.  But  the  cor-
respohdence  appears  to  weaken  as  the  overall  level  of  family  income  increases.
Gender  differences  in  nutritional  status  are  smaller  in  studies  of  Nicaragua,
Brazil,  Philippines,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Ivory  Coast  (Blau,  1984;  Popkin,  1980,
S$nauer  lt  al..  1986,  1988;  Strauss,  1986b;  Thomas  et  al.,  1987;  Thomas,  1989)
and  may reverse  in  some  regions  of  subSaharan  Africa  where  women take  an  ac-
tive  role  in  the  labor  force  (Svedberg,  1988).  With  increased  wealth  families
appear  to  exhibit  a  preference  for  greater  equality  in  nutritional  investments
within  the  family,  at  least  between  children  by  gendA'r.
There  is  on analogous  pattern  across  countries  in  the  Investments  fam-
ilies  make in the schooling  of girls  compared  to boys.  At low income  levels
investments  in  boy's  schooling  exceeds  that  in girl's. As  real  income  per
adult  increases,  public  expenditures  on  schools  per  child  tend  to  increase  as20
do enrollment  rates.  But  the income  related  increase  in  enrollsmnt  rates
among  girls  is  significantly  larger  than  it  is  among  boys  (Schultz,  1987)  A
catching  up for  girls  is  evident  in  both  cross  country  comparisons  at  differ-
ent stages  of development  and  within  countries  as income  increases.  Equal
educational  treatment  of  boys  and  girls  appears  to  be  a "normal  good"  within
the  family,  and  as  income  per  capita  increases  and  reproductive  goals  are
freely  chosen,  a  variety  of  indicators  of  consumption  and  investmnt  become
more  equally  distributed  between  sale  and  female  family  members.
Public  policies  sometimes  are  limited  in  their  ability  to  influence  the
family's  distribution  of  consumption  because  the  family  can,  if it wants,
compensate  for  them.  A  free  school  lunch  program  in  Brazil  or  India,  for
example,  leads  to  decreases  in  the  family's  supply  of  food  to  those  children
who benefit  from  the  school  feeding  program.  Part  of  the  family's  food  that
would  have  been  supplied  to  the  children  in  the  program  is  apparently  reallo-
cated  within  the  family  to  advance  the  family's  own  objectives.  Nutritional
intervention  programs  have  had  to  take  this  into  account  (Chernichovsky  and
Zangwill,  1988).
There  axe  more  efficient  ways  to  target  resources  transferred  by  public
programs  to  specific  uses  in  the  family.  The  state  could  train  individuals  to
accomplish  their  goal  rather  than  contribute  to  the  general  pool  of  family
resources  or  give  the  family  incone  in-kind  (i;a.  food  or  health  care)  or
transfer  selected  items  for  specific  individuals  to consume,  such  as  school
lunches.  If  public  programs  train  women for  vocational  opportunities  where
they  earn  cash  incomes  directly,  rather  than  through  integrated  (i.e.  unpaid)
family  activities,  the  gain  in  women's  productivity  may shift  consumption
patterns  toward  women's  priorities.  Recent  analyses  of  Brazilian  data  confirm21
that  nonearned  income  that  is  controlled  by  women  has  a  larger  effect  on  child
health  and nutrition  than  does  nonearned  income  reported  by  men  (Thomas,
1989). Empirical  analysis  of  programs  that  encourage  investments  in  women  is
needed to  document  what  kind  of  changes  occur  in  consumption  patterns  within
families  as  the  productivity  of  women  is  increased  (Kennedy  and  Cogill,  1986;
Blu.berg,  1988).
The Composition  of  Families
One way  that  people  express  their  demands for  consumption  patterns  is  in
the  form  of  the  families  they  create.  An  increase  in  the  proportion  of  house-
holds  headed  by women  has recently  been  observed  in  many  countries. It is
frequently  linked  to the  change  in  the  jobs  that  women take,  at  least  in  the
industrially  developed  countries  and  urban  Latin  America  (Youseff  and  Hefler,
1983;  Kniesner  et  al.,  1987).  One  explanation  is  the  increasing  productivity
of  women  compared  to  men in  the  labor  market.  Cross  sectional  patterns  imply
that  increasing  the  level  of  male  and female  productivity  and  wages  at the
same  rate  is  sufficient  to  increase  women's  participation  in  the  labor  market,
reduce  the frequency  and  onset  of marriage,  and  diminish  lifetime  fertility
(Layard  and  Mincer,  1985). These  developments  ar!  hypothesized  to  have  re-
duced  the  net gains  from  specializatton  of husbanl  and  wife in  market  and
nonmarket  production,  respectively,  within  lifetim  marriages  (Becker,  1981).
Though  it  has  not  been  replicated  in  other  U.S.  sociul  experiments,  women who
were given  independent  financial  support  for  their  children  in the Seattle
negative  income  tax experiment  opted  more often to separate  from their
husbands  (U.S.  Department  of Health  and  Human Services,  1983).  In  those
societies  where  women  earn  nearly  as  much  as  men,  there  are  fewer  marriages
and  more  female  headed  households  are  enumerated. 922
Individual  data  have  also  been  analyzed  to  estimate  the  determinants  of
age-at-marriage  among  women. More  educated  women  marry  later,  even  in  cases
where  marriage  is  sufficiently  delayed  in  the  overall  society  to  avoid  over-
lapping  with school,  as in  gast  and  much of South-East  Asia  (Montgomery  and
Sulak,  1988;  Anderson  and  Hill,  1980;  King  at  &I.,  1986). The  growing  ten-
dency  of  young  educated women to  take  paying  jobs  before  marriage,  financially
encourages  both them  and their  parents  to delay  their  entry  into  marriage.
Few studies  have yet examined  how local  market  demands  for female  workers
affect  the  timing  and length  of  marriage  for  womn.
Evidence  from  Thailand  suggests  that  the  fmily bargaining  model  may help
to  understand  variation  in  the  prevalence  of  marriage  in  low  income  countries.
Demographic  and anthropological  studies  of  Thai  society  document  that  marriage
was  until  recently  nearly  universal.  About  95  percent  of  men and women re-
ported  themselves  as  having  been  married  (once)  by age  35  (in  the  1960  Census
cited  by  Knodel  et  al.,  1987;  Table  5.1).  An informal  process  of  divorce  has
also  been  traditionally  common  with  frequent  remarriage  (Smith,  1981). In  the
1981  Socioeconomic  Survey  of  Thailand  75  and  85  percent  of the  women and  men,
respectively,  between  the  ages  of  25  and  54  are  living  in  the  same  household
with  their  spouse.  To  explain  who  is  currently  married,  the  specialization
argument  as  well  as  the  bargaining  model would  suggest  that  marital  gains
would  decrease  with  an  increase  in  women's  predicted  wages  and  increase  with
an  increase  in  men's  predicted  wages,  other  things  equal. This  pattern  is
confirmed  for  women's  wages  but  not  men's  (see  Table  A-4).  The bargaining
model of  the  family  suggests  that  the  same  pattern  holds  for  nonearned  income.
If  Thai  women  have  unearned  income  this  has  a negative  impcct  on  their  living
with  a  husband.  The  ownership  of  nonearned  income  is  associated  among Thai23
men with  a  greater  proportion  residing  with  a  wife. But  the  estimated  elfect
is  nine  times  bigger  for  women than  for  men at  similar  levels  of  nonearned
income  (Appendix  Table  A-4):  Marriage,  it  would  appear,  is  not a "normal"
good  for  womn.
Other  hypotheses  could  also  account  for  these  patterns  of marriage  and
residence  in  the  Thai  data,  and  the  available  survey  data  do  not  distinguish
among  them.  The death  of  a  spouse  could  increae an  individua  's  wealth
through  inheritance,  and  also  transfer  the individual  to  the  *single"  cate-
gory.  About  half  of  the  female  headed  households  in  Latin  America  are  widows
(e.g.  Mohan,  1986;  Rosenhouse,  1988).  Alternatively,  women might  be  more
inclined  than  men,  upon  divorce,  to  move  back  into  the  household  of  their
parents,  other  relatives,  or  children.  Marital  and  residential  histories  with
the  timing  of  inheritance  and  transfers  are  needed  to  dXscriminate  more
adequately  among  these  competing  explanations  for  family  formation  patterns.
Undoubtedly  they  will  differ  greatly  as  does  the  family  in  different
societies.
Households  Headed by  Vomen:  ultiple  Causes
Comparisons  of income  and  welfare  of  female  and-male  headed  households
are  not  very  informative.  Most  nale  headed  households  tend  to  include  wives,
while  customarily  few  female  headed  households  include  husbands  10 In some
surveys  the  husband  is  treated  as the  household  head  even  when  he is not
recently  resident  in  the  household.  Which  women  find  themselves  in  families
that  are  called  *male  headed'  or  in  female  headed  households  will  be influenc-
ed by their  resources  and other  opportunities,  as in Thailand.  Several
studies  have  found  an  associatiqn  between  wealth  of individuals  and  decreased
frequency  of divorce,  separation,  and  death  of spouse  (Becker  et &I.,  1977;24
Peters,  1986). But  the  tendency  noted  in  several  parts  of the  world  for  the
share  of  households  headed  by  vomen  to  increase  may  be traced  to  a  variety  of
sources,  not  all  of  which  imply  the  same consequences.  First,  the  increased
longevity  that  occurs  with  development  generally  favors  womon  compared  to  men.
Improved  health  is  associated,  therefore,  with  an  increasing  fraction  of  women
at  the  older  ages.  Households  headed  by  the  older  women  who have  become
widows  and  not  remrried  is  a  large  proportion  of  all  femle  headed  households
in  Latin  America  and  elsewhere.  This  group  may not  have  children  to  support,
and  though  their  consumption,  housing,  and  health  needs  are  iaportant  issues,
these groups  also may benefit  from accumulating  inheritances  and  ol&-age
support  schemes.
Another  source  of  the  increase  in  female  headed  households  in  low  income
countries  is  migration,  which  affects  women  differently  fron  one  region  to
another.  In  Latio  America,  migration  out  of  agricultuze  to  the  cities  was  led
by women,  as it was in Europe  and  North  America. Urban  job prospects  for
women  were  better  than  for  mGn,  and  the  ratio  of  women  to  men  in  some  metro-
politan  areas  of  Latin  America  was  as  high  as  1.2  in  the  19609  (e.g.  Gregory,
1986;  Mohan,  1986).  As  a result,  many  urban  women  did  not  marry,  but  they  are
not  necessarily  disadvantaged  compared  to the  conditions  they  left  behind  in
the  countryside. The  prospects  for women  advancing  in Latin  America  from
urban  domestic  jobs--given  their  education--to  ones  in  industry,  co merce, and
other  services,  appears  favorable  compared  with  men.  The  overall  productive
status  of  women relative  to  mon  is  higher  in  the  cities  than  in  the  country-
side.
Unlike  Latin  America,  migration  flows  in  Africa  were  dominated  by  sen,
drawn  (or  driven)  to  the  mines  and  plantations,  domestic  services  and  con-25
merce,  state  enterprises,  and government  bureaucracies.  Women  remained  on
the  land,  often  continuing  to  produce  traditional  food  crops  largely  without
the  aid  of  modern  agricultural  inputs  or  technologies.  African  women  suffered
from  lower  levels  of  *ducation  than  sen,  explaining  in  part  why  men  were  the
first  to  migrate  from  the  rural  sector  and  were  more  successful  in  setting
themselves  up  in  urban  businesses  (Caldwell,  1968).  In  Africa,  t-herefore,  the
high  proportion  of  famale  headed  households  (da  facto)  is  not  associated  with
offsetting  economic  benefits  for  womn.  In  both  Africa  and  Latin  America,
however,  the  divergence  of  male  and  female  migration  streams  has  probably  con-
tributed  to  the  relative  decline  in  the two  parent  household,  and to  the
growth  of  associated  social  problens.
There  is  widespread  evidence  that  women have  lncreased  their  educational
attainment  compared  to  mn  in  most  low  income  countries  in  recent  decades
(Schultz,  1986).  Associated  with  these  educational  gains  some  data  also
confirm  that  wage  rates  and  productivity  of  women have  increased  relative  to
that  of  men.  Gains  in  the  market  productivity  of  women compared  to  men
reduces  the  traditional  spheres  of  specialization  by  women and  men,  and  erodes
the  economic  advantages  cf  lifetime  marriage  (Becker,  1981).  This  development
along  with  the  increasing  participation  of  women in  the  market  labor  force  is
another  factor  contributing  to  the  increase  in  the  proportion  of  femle  headed
households.
Households  headed  by  women  gensra2ly  report  lower  per  capita  income  than
those  headed  by  men. Market  income  differencss  between  male  and  female  headed
households  may overstate  the  gap  in  welfare  unless  consideration  is  given  to  a
broader  concept  of  *full,  income  vhich  also  includes  nonmarket  production  and
time  allocated  to  hom  production  and  even  leisure.  Even  so,  differences  in26
"full"  income  between  male  and  female  headed  households  warrant  more study.
There  may  be more  children  to  support  per  adult  in  younger  households  headed
by  women  than  those  headed  by men  (Youseff  and  Hefler,  1983;  Preston,  1984).
Changes  in  family  structure  are  viewed  as  the  choices  of consenting  adults,
but society  may be involved  in the impact  on third  parties--in  this  case,
children  dependent  on their others. If  the  physical  and mental development
of children  is adversely  affected  by this  shift  in  fmily  structure,  then
society  may wish to intervene  to reverse  the trend  or compensate  for  its
adverse  consequences  on  children.  If  governimets  cannot  ensure that  fathers
pay  child  support,  whether  or  not  they  live  with  their  child's  mother,  gener-
alized  social  transfers  to poor  children  may be an attractive  alternative.
Such  transfers  might  alleviate  depressed  consumption  lovels  in  these  families
headed  by  women  and  thus  advance  the  society's  goal  of  equity.  But  direct  aid
of  this  form  also  encourages  two-parent  poor  families  to  separate  in  order  to
better  provide  for  their  members.  Targeted  transfers  to  equalize  consumption
opportunities  may  weaken,  therefore,  the  incentive  to  create  or maintain  the
family  which  is8a  long  standing  institutional  response  to  the  consumption  and
production  disparities  among  persons  of different  ages  and  sex.  Policy  to
reverse  trends  in  family  composition  can  be adequately  designed  only  with  an
understanding  of  the  fundamental  forces  that  have  motivated  more  women  and  men
to  live  apart.  Little  is  now  known about  the  magnitude,  source  or  severity  of
this  trend. Treating  the  syIptom  of  the  disease  rather  than  dealing  with  the
underlying  cause  within  the  family  economic  production-consumption  system  may
be ineffective  and  possibly  counterproductive.27
3. Production  and  the  Family
For  the  purposes  of  this  survey,  it  is  assumed  that  factor  markets  clear
sufficiently  regularly  to ensure  that  market  prices  provide  a satisfactorv
approximation  for  the  shadow  value  of  factors,  adjusted  for  transactions  costs
(Singh,  Squire,  and Strauss,  1986).  Many exceptions,  of course,  can be
imagined,  such  as  slack  agricultural  seasons  when the  labor  market  is  thin,  or
interlinked  factor  markets  where  collateral  or  bullock  power  may  permit  their
owners  differential  access  to tenancies  (Bell  end  Srinivasan,  1985). Labor
markets,  particularly  for women and children,  may not be  perfect  in all
societies,  and  the  demographic  composition  of  the  family's  labor  supply  would
then  be  expected  to  influence  household  production  decisions.  But  the  current
evidence  does  not  confirm  that  this  market  imperfectlon,  is  important  (Lopez,
1986;  Seavey,  1987;  Benjamin,  1988).
The  famlly  is  engaged  in  many interdependent  production  and  consumption
decisions.  The  simplification  that  is  widely  adopted  involves  treating  these
two  areAs  of  decisioh-making  as  sequential,  in  order  to  analyze  first  the  pro-
duction  problem  as  a  profit  maximizing  stage,  and  then  the  consumption  problem
of  what  is  consumed  and  by  whom. Having  explored  in  the  previous  section  some
aspects  of  the  consumption  and  human  capital  investment  decisions  made  within
the  family,  the  production  problem  facing  the  fmily is  now analyzed. How
does the family  allocate  its resources  and time  between  (i)  Self-managed
production  at  home  or  in  the  family  farm  or firm,  or (ii)  external  factor
markets,  such  as  renting  out  family  land  or  hiring  out  family  labor  for  wages.
If  the  family  both  sells  some  of  its  factors  to  the  market  and  also  uses  some
in  its  own  production,  the  market  price  of  the  factor  should  be  equated  to  the
factor's  return  in  self-managed  production.  For  example,  if  a  mother's  time28
is  spent  producing  food  and  clothing  for  her  family,  that  task  is  construed  by
the  family  as  of  at  least  the  value  to  what  she  might  have  earned  in  the  labor
market,  minus  the  transaction  costs  in  terms  of  time  and  goods  of  her  entering
the  labor  force  and  any  taxes  that  would  be  deducted  from  market  earnings.  If
the value of the factor  to the family's  self-managed  activity  exceeds  the
market  price,  the  profit  motive  ought  to  induce  the  family  to  hire  in  more  of
the  factor  than  it  initially  owns,  until  diinaishing  returns  set  in,  and  the
factor's  return  to  the  family  is  driven  down  to  the  market  supply  price.  Thus,
by clearing  factor  markets  across  families,  market  prices  are expected  to
signal  appropriately  the  social  value  of  factors  to  all  families.  This  value
at  the  margin  is  also  assumed  to  be  a  satisfactory  masure  of  the  contribution
of  each  factor  to  the  family's  income  or  welfare.
Occupational  Segregation  and  Discrimination
In  some  societies,  there  may  be  an  additional  cost  to  employment  of  women
outside  of  the  family  household:  customary  restrictions  on  what  is  'suitable"
work  for  women  or  the  circumstances  under  which  they  work  with  persons  outside
the  family. These  barriers  to  the  allocation  of  women's  (and  mon's)  time  may
at some stages  of development  serve  some  social  purpose  that  outweighs  the
economic  inefficiency  that such  rules  impose. But  when the  workplace  and
12 people's  work  are  changing  rapidly,  . the  new  productive  opportunities,  both
in  the  home  and  marketplace,  require  changes  in  old  rules  of  employment  Segre-
gation  of  men  and  women. Otherwise,  people  may  find  themselves  employed  where
they  are  not  most;  productive.  As  these  customary  assignment  rules  becom more
costly  to  suctain  in  terms  of  their  inefficiency  or  resulting  lost  family  pro-
duction,  they  may  be retained  only  if  preferences  for  them  arm  inflexible  or
barriers  restrain  the  development  of  alternative  institutional  arrangements.29
For example,  purdah  roquiring  women to work in only sexually  segregated
settings,  become  increasingly  inefficient  when male  and female  labor  are
complementary  in  particular  lines  of production  for  which  demand  is  growing.
Inertia  in  occupational  segregation  may prevail  in  the  short  run,  and  as  these
traditional  division-of-labor  arrangements  become  increasingly  counterproduc-
tive,  the  costs  lover  the  welfare of  families.  If  they  penalize  dispropor-
tionately  womn, it  may  be  useful  to  ask  at  what  point  does  segrogation  become
discrimination?  The  answer may be  important  but  very  hard  to  clarify  because
it involves  both  cultural  values  and  economic  efficiency  of entire  institu-
tional  systems.
However,  the  mre existence  of  sex  segrogation  in  labor  markets  does  not
necessarily  liply  that  these  patterns  are  an  important  source  of  ifefficiency
or discrimination,  though  it presumably  increasos  the costs  of production
during  modern  economic  growth.  Interventions  should  be  based  on  sound  empir-
ical  evidence  that  these  arrangements  result  in a major misallocation  of
labor.  For example,  it might  be shown  that  womsn's  productivity  in non-
traditional  work  exceeds  their  output  in  traditional  work  (e.g.  in families)
where  there  is  no joint  production  and  the  women  in  both  sets  of  activities
possess  the  same  endowments  and  capabilities.  Evtdence  of  this  form  is  hard
to  obtain,  however,  for  two  reasons.  The  product  of  women's  traditional  non-
market  activity  is  generally  consumed  directly  within  the  household,  and  does
not  enter  the  marketplace,  and  is thus  not  valued,  in  monetary  terms  that  are
comparable  to  market  wage rates. There  are  also  cases  where  women  jointly
produce  several  goods  which  are  difficult  to  monitor  and  value. For  example,
the  need  to  look  after  children  may  lead  women  to  accept  lower-paying  jobs  so
that  they  have  flexible  hours  and  informal  work  routines  that  can  be  located30
in the  home  or  occasionally  combined  with  home  duties.  Women  might  choose  a
better  paying  job  in  the  formal  wage  labor  market,  If  they  were  not  also  pro-
ductively  engaged  in nontarket  family  activities.  This argument  does  not
imply  that  women are  biologically  pre-disposed  to  look  after  children  or  even
that  nursing  of  infants  cannot,  at  a  cost,  be  rearranged  to  fit  work  routines
of  women in  the  formal  sector  (Blumberg.  1984;  Priedl,  1975;  Nerlove,  1974).
The  conclusion  of  many  observers  is,  nonetheless,  that  customary  forms  of
sex  segrogation  in  the  labor  market  in  developing  countries  lead  to  a  sisallo-
cation  of  woman's  labor.  The  reduction  of  sex  segregatioB  in  the  labor  market
should  raise  current  output  and  encourage  investment  by  families  in women
(Rosenzweig  and  Schultz,  1982a).  Devising  mechanism  that  encourage  poor
families  to  invest  more  heavily  in  the  market  oriented  skills  of  girls  is  a
ehallenge  to  policy  In  certain  parts  of  the  world.  Improving  the  operation  of
factor  markets  that  discriminate  bttwven  men  and  women as  productive  agents
can  also  involve  social  costs,  for  -interventions  use  economic  and  administra-
tive  resources  that  are  very  scarce  in  most  low  income  countries.
Comparisons  of  ProductLivty  In  the  Marke;  and  Hose
Because  of  the  difficulty  of  measuring  and  valuing  nonmarket  production,
economists  have  focussed  on  the  marketable  conpon6nt  of  income  of  families  and
Lndividuals,  includlng  the  market  value  of  products  or  factors  sold  or  ex-
changed,  not  of  purchased  inputs.  Within  thls  limited  context,  household
surveys  have  found  it  notoriously  hard  to  estimate  the  net  return  to  self-
employed  entrepreneurs.  Even  surveys  such  as  the  Current  Population  Survey  in
the  United  States  account  for  only  about  half  of the  National  Income  Account
estimates  of  the  value  added  by  self-employed  producers  such  as  farmers.  With
far less sophisticated  accounting  procedures  available  in low income  coun-31
tries,  extensive  farm  or enterprise  management  surveys  are  needed  to  measure
current  incomo  comprehensively,  along  with  changes  in  net  worth.
Beyond  these  limits,  economists  strive  to  document  the  market  value  of
goods  produced  and  conumed at home,  such  as food,  fuel,  and  housing,  for
which there  are market  priced  equivalents.  But  nobody,  to my knowledge,
ascribes  a market  value  to  the  fetching  of  water  for  family  use,  though  con-
ceptually  it is no different  from the collection  of fuel, or the home
production  of food,  all  of  which  tend  to  be  women's  work.  In  high  income
countries,  as  such  forms  of  income  in-kind  have  become  an  progressively  small-
er  share  of  income  they  have  been  neglected.  When  this  omission  is  replicated
in  low  income  countries,  where  income  in-kind  can  be  a  large  share  of  personal
income,  a  serious  distortion  is  introduced.  This  systemat!cally  affects  one's
perception  of woman's  contribution  to the  economy. It distorts  the  entire
quantitative  record  of  modern  economic  growth.  Economists  understate  sources
of income  that are proportionately  larger  for poor families,  and within
families  for  women's  earnings  relative  to men's  (Kusnic  and DaVanzo,  1980;
Evenson,  1983). This  partial  accounting  of income  reinforces  the  view  that
women  who engage  in traditional  household  activities  are less  useful  than
they  would  be  if  they  worked  in  the  market  labor  .force.  From  another  perspec-
tive,  per capita  national  income  will  appear  to grow  more  tapidly  than it
should,  if  women allocate  more  of their  time  to the market  labor  force,
because  we  make no  offsetting  debit  to  national  income  for  the  time  women
retract  from  nonmarket  production  that  would  otherwise  benefit  then  and  their
families. Thus,  statistics  interject  a subtle  but  pervasive  slant  into  our
study  of  modern  economic  growth  and  affect  the  choice  of  development  policies.
Assessments  of  technical  change  can  be distorted.  If  it  boosts  the  pro-32
ductivity  of  workers  in the  labor  market  it  will  be  encouraged.  If  it  prom-
ises  only  to raise  the  productivity  of  workers  engaged  in  undocumented  home
production  it  may  be overlooked.  Public  policies  have  probably  shifted  the
gains  arising  from  technical  change  toward  workers  in  the  market  labor  force
rather  than  nonsarket  workers,  and toward  mon rather  than  women (Boserup,
1970;  Blumberg,  1984;  Ngwira,  1987).  This oversight  and distortion  are
corrected  only when the quantitative  importance  of  nonsarket  and  in-kind
income  is estimated,  and its  bearing  on  public  sector  priorities  explicitly
evaluated. Economic-demographLc  household  surveys  in low income  countries
that  account  for the productive  use of time in both market  and nonmarket
spheres  are  beginning  to  change  how  we  view  vomen  as  a  productive  and
innovative  agent  in  the  development  process  (e.g.  Binswanger  at  l..  1980;
Birdsall  and  McGreevy,  1983;  Evenson,  1983;  Gertler  and  Newman. 1988).  Much
work  remains  to  be  undertaken  if the  assessment  of  policies  is  to  be  neutral
in  its  encouragement  of  nonmarket  and  market  productivity.
Time Allocation  and  Labor  Productivity
Hicroeconomic  analysis  of  family  behavior  assumes  that  people  allocate
physical  resources  and  time  in  response  to  the  family's  nonhuman endowments,
the  opportunity  value  of  the  time  of-  each  family  member,  and  the  relative
prices  of  the  family's  potential  market  inputs  and  outputs.  The  market  place
sets  the  wage  rate  offered  for  various  types  of  labor  and  thereby  determines
the  marginal  value  of time  for  those  working  in  the  market  or  hiring  in  simi-
lar  labor. This  framework  is  readily  extended  to  account  for  differences  in
fertility  and  human  capital  investmnts  that  add  to the  productive  capabil-
ities  of  family  members.  First  the  implications  of  the  neoclassical  unified
family  allocation  model  are  r^stated,  and  then  relaxed  to  allow  for33
differences  in  individual  preferences  within  a  more  general  bargaining  frame-
work.  Extensions  of  this approach  appear to  have promise also for
understanding  women's  changing  roles  in  the  economy.
As described  earlier,  the  simplest  representation  of the  family  is  as  a
unified  decisionaker,  like  an  individual,  but  with  several  blocks  of time  to
allocate,  associated  with  different  family  members.  This  generalization  of
the  neoclassical  model  of  consumer  demard  end  labor  supply  to  a  multiperson
household  has  evolved  in  the  contributions  of  Mincer  (1963),  Becker  (1965),
and Heckman  (1971). It has become  a suggestive  tool  for analyzing  family
economic  and demographic  behavior  and has helped  to  account  for  numerous
empirical  regularities  in  both  high  and  low  income  countries  (Schultz,  1981,
1988d):
This  framework  helps  to  explain  why  the  market  labor  supply  of  married
men is  relatively  inelastic  or  even  backward  bending.  Men,  who  are  on  average
already  working  nearly  full  time,  weigh  more  heavily  than  do  women  the  nega-
tive  "income  effect'  on labor  supply  due  to  any  increase  in  their  market  wage
rate. This  may  be  only  partially  offset  by  the  positive  *substitution  effect"
associated  with the  increase  in  men's  wages. For  women,  on the  other  hand,
many  of who  are  not  yet  in the  market  labor  force,  there  are  relatively  few
inframarginal  hours  to  weight  up the  negative  income  effect. Consequently,
the positive  substitution  effect  of an increase  in women's  waged,  is more
likely  to  prevail.  Implicit  in  this  distinction  between  a  negative  income  and
a  positive  substitution  effect  on  labor  supply  is  the  expectation  that  if  most
jobs  come  with  substantial  time  co  uitmnts, then  the  participation  rate  of
women  may  positLvely  respond  to  market  wage  offers,  while  women  who already
hold  full-time  jobs  behave  more  like  mon  and  possibly  even  exhibit  a  backward34
bending  supply  of  labor,  on  average,  in  respdnse  to  further  increases  in  thir
wag.  rate  (Schultz,  1980b).
There  are  good  reasons,  therefore,  to  analyze  separately  the  decision  to
enter  the  market  labor  force  and the  choice  of how  many  hours  to  work  when
participating.  The analysis  of  both  decisLons  together  as  though  they  were
both  generated  by a  single  truncated  process  (iLe.  Tobit  moedl)  may  supprxss
distinctive  features  of  the  two  decisLomuaking  processes  13  Svidence  of this
pattern  can  be seen for  Thailand  in  Tables  A-3 and A-4.
To this  individual  market  nonmarket  time-allocation  model  of participa-
tion  and  hours,  Mincer  (1963)  was  the  flrst  to  note  that  the  earnings  of  a
husband  should  increase  the  reservation  wage  of a  married  woman  and  thereby
reduce  her time  allocated  to  the  labor  market. Symsetric  treatment  of  both
husband  and wife  implies  that  the  wage  rates  of  both  are  appropriate  deters-
inants  of  the  labor  supply  function  of  husband  and  wif  (Heckuan,  .1971).  14
Empirical  studies  of  the  labor  supply  of  married  couples  have  found  that
the  labor  supply  of  men is  relatively  inelastic  with  respect  to  their  own-wage
rate and relatively  unresponsive  to variation  in their  wivesl  wage rate
(actual  or  predicted).  In  the  case  of  married  women,  market  labor  supply  is
elastic  with respect  to their  own-wage  and  inversely  related  to  the  wage  of
their  husbands.  Because  the  own-wage elasticity  is  generally  larger  than  that
associated  with  her  husband's  cross-wage  eiasticity  (in  absolute  terms),  the
net  effect  of  a  proportionate  increase  in  the  level  of  wages  paid  to  women  and
men  is  to  increase  women's  market  particLpation.  These  response  patterns  are
replicated  in cross  sectional  data  from  many industrially  advanced  countries
and  from  a substantial  number  of low  income  countries.  5 A general  increase
in  the  l-vel  of  both  men's  and  women's  wages  is  sufficient  to  induce  an35
increase  in  women's  labor  force  participation.  According  to these  estimates
of female  labor  supply,  it is  not  necessary  for  the  ratio  of female  to  male
wages  to increase  in order  to induce  more  woaen  to enter  the  labor  force,
thouSh  such  a  relative  advance  in  female  wages  would  of  course  accelerate  the
process.
nertility  and  Investment  in  Cblldren
In  addition  to  family  labor  supply  behavior,  the  pattern  of  consumer
demands  may be  sensitive  to  variation  in  market  wage  rates  available  to  men
and  women,  particularly  in  the  cases  of  consumption  goods  that  require  a
disproportionate  amount  of  the  time  of  either  the  husband  or  wife  to  produce.
The  care  of  children  in  many  cultures  consuoms  uch  of  their  mother's  time.
An  increase-  in  the  earnings  potential  of  women's  time  relative  to  men's  is
likely  to  increase  the  money  perceived  to  be  lost  by childbearing  and  child
care,  and  thus  to  depress  fertility,  even  though  at  the  same  time  the  woman's
earning  potential  increases  the  family's  income  opportunities.  Increases  in
wages  of  women relative  to  men,  ar  generally  associaead  not  only  with  a re-
duction  in fertility  but  also  a  reallocation  of  vromen's  time  from  nonmarket
to  market  work.  On the  other  hand,  increases  in  the  labor  productivity  and
wage  rites  of  men and particularly  childron  can  enhance  the  attractions  of  a
large  family  and  are  often  associated  with  increased  levels  of  fertility,  at
least  in  low  incom agricultural  countries  (Schultz,  1981;  Levy,  1985).
The labor  supply  and fertility  patterns  predicted  from this  economic
model  of  the  family  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  nuclear  family  pools
resources.  Consequently,  a  marriod  wommn  is  assumed  to  rely  on the  earnings
of  her  husband  for  the  purchso  of  airket  goods  consumed  by  her  children  and
hersolf.  Whero  wives  engage  intensively  in  economic  activities  oriented36
toward  market  exchange  as  well  as  family  subsistence  needs,  such  as  in  rural
subSaharan  Africa,  Thailand,  and  Malaysia,  it  is  less  clear  whether  the  pro-
ductivity  and wealth  of the husband  are pooled  with that  of the wife to
support  equally  all  members  of  the  famLly.
The  family  decLsionmaking  framework  also  addresses  how the  reproductive
choice  ls  linked  to  the  amount  of  resources  parents  lntend  to  invest  In  each
chld.  EmpLrical  evidence  suggests  that  lnvestmnts  In  chlld  qualitym  are
an  alternative  for  the  numbers  of  chlldren  parents  have,  or  more  specifically,
child  quality  is  a  substitute  for  the  quantity  of  chlldren.  This  conclusion
does  not follow  from  any general  aspects  of economlc  theory,  as shown  by
Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1980).  Economic  theory  does  not  prescrLbe  whether  any
two  goods  are  substitutes  or  complements;  this  relationship  depends  on  produc-
tion  technology  and people's  preferences.  But  thls  limitation  of  theory  does
not  diminish  the  usefulness  of investigating  how  polLcies  and  price  changes
affect  both  child  quantlty  and  aquality"  decisions  of  parents.  16
Most  models  of  family  behavior  call  attention  to  the  potentially  distinct
effects  of the  wage rates  of the  wlfe,  the  husband,  and children  on their
economic  behavior  and  on how  many  children  the  parents  are likely  to have
(Mincer,  1963;  Bocker,  1965).  Consumption  that  takes  a  large  asount  of the
women's  time  is  said  to  be  an  intensive  user  of  her  time  and  will  be  consumed
in  lesser  amounts  as  the  labor  market  opportunities  for  women increase  in
relation  to  those  for  men.  If  the  rearlng  of  children  is  such  a  femal  time-
intensive  household  Ocommodity,*  fertility  and  the market  productivity  of
women are  likely  to  be inversely  related  across  families  and  across  societies
and  within  societies  over  time.  What  we know  from  many societies  about  the
allocation  of  time  within  famliLes  and  the  relatlonship  between  market  wage37
rates of adt and women and fertility  levels  is consistent  with these
generalfzations.
Increases  in  a couple's  wealth  adds  to  its  economic  opportunities,  per-
mitting  it  to  consum more goods  that do not b."e superior  substitutes.
Children  seem  to  fall  in  this  category.  honearned  income  that  is  derived  from
nonhuman  capital  such as land  and  physical  property  tends,  therefore,  to  be
positively  related  to fertility,  at least  In traditional  rural  societies
(Mueller,  1984;  Schultz,  1988).
Land  and  physical  assets  that  can  be  employed  in  home  production  may  also
enhance  the  productivity  of  child  labor  for  parents,  and  encourage  landowners
in  particular  to  have  additional  children.  At the  frontiers  of  settlement  in
North  and South  America,  Scandinavia,  and  Africa,  people  with  more  land  and
less  labor  have  tonded  to  be relatively  fartile,  as  noted  by  Malthus  two  cen-
turies  ago and reconfirosd  in studies  of low income  countries  today  (e.g.
Nerrick,  1978). But  these  tendencies  may  be offset  if  wealthier  parents  are
inclined  to spend  more  on the  human  capital  and  property  of  their  offspring,
which  may  deter  them  from  indulging  in  a  larger  family.
A critical,  but  largely  untested,  hypothesis  is-  that  the  private  returns
on  human  capital  increased  in  the  last  century  throughout  the  world,  and  this
development  has  encouraged  parents  to  invest  more  in  the  'quality'  of  their
children  and  less  in  the  quantity  of  them  (T.  W. Schultz,  1967,  1974,  1975,
1981;  Becker,  1981).  Contamporary  evidence  does  not  contradict  this  hypothe-
sis.  But  sarious  gaps  in  our  knowledge  prevent  us  from  assessing  how =ich  of
the  observed  decline  in  fertility  can  be  attributad  to  this  factor.  Rarely  is
there  documentation  of  how private  rates  of  return  on  schooling  have  changed
over  time  during  the  full  course  of the  demographic  transition.  Nor is it38
clear  what  caused  the  productivity  of  educated  workers  to  increase  initially,
pushing  up  the  private  returns  to  schooling.  Until  such  a forcing  variable  is
isolated  and  measured,  it  is  hard  to confirm  how  it  might  have  shifted  the
aggrogate  demnd for  educated labor  and thereby  affected  fertility.  But  recent
surveys  provide  a sounder  basis  for  masuring  contemporary private  returns  to
human  capital  for  girls  and  boys.  These  measures  of  returns  for  females  and
males  may  help  to  explain  the  patterns  of  human  capital  investmnts  of  parents
in  their  children,  and  to  forecast  hov  the  pivotal  differences  in  wage  rates
between  women  and  men  will  evolve  in  the  future  in  response  to  changes  in
human  capital  lnvestments.
Wage  dlfferentials  between  groups with  different  amounts  of  schooling  are
used  to  approximate  private  returns  to  sche*ling.  Schooling  may  operate  as  a
screen  to  ldentify  innately  more productive  individuals,  or  it  may, as  assumd
in  the  himan  capital  literature,  inpart  disciplined  work  habits  and productive
skills.  The  private  returns  associated  with  schooling,  plus  any consumer  ben-
efits,  signal  the  rewards  that  individuals  and  families  can  expe4t  to  receive
by  investing  in  schooling,  regardless  of  whether  the  wage  differentials  are
due  to  screening  or  acquired  sklls  (Schultz,  1988.).
4.  Investments  in  Humn Capital  and Rates  of  Return
Labor  productivity  can  be  approximted  by  the  wage  rate  people  are  paid.
According  to  this  measure,  women  are  on  average less  productive  than  mn  in
many labor  mrkets  (e.g.  Schultz,  1986).  However,  comparisons  of  wonmn's dad
sen's  wages  may  not  be  representativo  of  the  productive  value  of  the  time  of
all  men  and  women for  several  reasons:
1. Many  men  and  two-thirds  of  women  do  not  report  a wage because  they  do39
not  work for  one (Tables  A-5  and  A-6).  How  the  sample  of wage  earners  is
nonrandomly  selected  may  bias  intergroup  comparisons,  particularly  if  avail-
able  wage data  pertain  only  to a modern  subsector  of the  economy,  such  as
large  manufacturing  firms.
A first  step  toward  a  more  accurate  comparison  of  male  and  female  wages
is  to  identify  the  productive  abilities  of  workers,  as  valued  by  what  employ-
ers  are  willing  to  pay  them. This  information  should  help  to  assess  how  much
of the gender  gap in wages  is accounted  for  by differences  in abilities,
innate  or  acquired,  and  how  much  remains  unexplained.  A large  literature  on
wage  and  earnings  differences  has developed  n the  last  25  years  to  explore
this  question.
Estimates  are  obtained  separately  for  men  and  for  women  of  how  productive
characteristics  of  workers  are  partially  associatad  with  their  wage  rates. If
the  regression  estimates  of  his  hedonic  wage  function  for  men  are  cross  multi-
plied  by the  average  characteristics  of  women  workers,  a prediction  of the
average  wage for  women is obtained  based  on the  male  wage  function. The
observed  gender  gap  in  wages  can  then  be split  up into  components  related  to
the differences  between  men and women  in each  of the measured  productive
characteristics  (Oxaca,  1973;  Birdsall  and  Fox,  1985;  Gannicott,  1986). There
is  no  obvious  reason  to  prefer  the  wage  function  coefficients  for  one  gender
as the  basis  for  such  calculations.  Consequently,  this  form  of regression
decomposition  of  group  wage  differences  yields  two,  equally  tenable,  answers,
and  hence  a  range  of  uncertainty.  17  Also,  no  matter  how  finely  one  distin-
guishes  worker  capacities,  unobserv ed  productive  characteristics  of  workers
and amenities  of jobs in addition  to statistical  ambiguities  will always
inject  substantial  uncertainty  into  such  adjusted  intergroup  wage  comparisons.40
2.  Individuals  who decide  to  work entirely  in  nonmarket  (or  nonwage)
employment  are likely  to do this  because  they  are  more  productive  than  the
average  person  at  it  or less  productive  in  market  (or  wage)  work. Thus  it
would  overstate  the  gender  gap  in  labor  productivity  to  attribute  market-wage
opportunities  to women  not in  wage  employment.  The  assessment  mlght  better
focus  on  the  shadow  value  of  their  time  in  nontage  work  (Griffin,  1987).
3.  Many individuals  specialize  during  their  lives  in  either  market  or
nonuarket  work,  and  marriage  tends  to encourage  women  to specialize  in  non-
market  activities  (Becker,  1981). This  increases  the  gap  at  later  stages  in
the  life  cycle  between  the  job opportunities  available  to  married  women  and
men  in  wage  employment,  if  on-the-job  experience  is  imperfectly  substitutabl-e
between  home and market  jobs.  Differences  in market  job qualifications
between  men and  women are  therefore  narrower  among  young  people  than  among  the
middle  aged,  although  this  tendency  may vary  from  country  to  country  as  does
the  persistence  of  women's  attachment  to  the  labor  market  (e.g.  Goldin,  1989).
Although  the unobservables  that  might  contribute  to the first  general
form  of  sample  selection  bias  could  either  widen  or  narrow  the  observed  wage
gap  between  man  and  women,  the  second  and  third  sources  of  static  and  dynamic
bias  are  likely  to  overstate  the  lifetime  productivity  gap  between  men  and
women  if  only  market  wages  are  analyzed.  Moreover,  these  problem  of  compar-
ing  the  productivity  of  women  and  men  will  not  be  easily  resolved.  The  only
direct  solution  is  to  assign  comensurate  value  to  nonmarket  work  in  the  houe.
Since  some  forms  of  nonmarket  production  are  untraded,  such  as  children,  each
family  arrives  at its own valuation,  and thxs adds to the difficulty  of
comparing  the  labor  productivity  across  groups  of  persons  who  do  not  work  at
all  in  the  market  labor  force.41
The  major  part  of th.  private  investment  cost  incurred  in  the  formation
of human capital  is the  time that  the individual  cannot  be occupied  in
Imeudiately  productive  work during  the investment  period,  whether  as a
student,  trainee,  migrant,  etc. To rank  alternative  investments  in  terms  of
their  economic  efficiency,  the  internal  rate  of  return  is  a  suitable  criter-
ion.  For  young  persons.  with  many  expected years  of  adult  work  tim ahead  of
them,  the  percentage  increase  in  average  lifetime  wages  caused  by  an  addi-
tional  full  year  of  human capital  investment  is  a first  approximation  of the
private  internal  rate  of  return  to  that  investment  of  ioregone  earnings
(Becker,  1969;  Nincer,  1974).  The  opportunity  cost  of  women's  time  to  attend
school  may be  lower  than  that  of  men's time,  while  the  wage  of  female  gradu-
ates  may still  be  lower  than  sale  graduates. But the  percentaga  gains  in
average  wages  associated  with  a  specific  year  of  schooling  are  iot  .systemat-
ically  lower  for  women  than  for  smn,  as  documented  later.  Second-order
adjustments  for  other  factors  may raise  or  lower  the  private  returns,  from
this  wage differential  without  necessarily  altering  the coupa-ison  of private
rates  of  return  to  schooling  for  men  and  women.  For  example,  if  students  work
part  time  ;at  hoe or in  jobs  when  they  are  attending  school  or during  vaca-
tions,  this  relative  wage  differential  associated  with  a  year  of  schooling  can
oerstate  the  student's  time  input  to  schooling  and  thus  understate  the  pri-
vate  rate  of  return.  Conversely,  if  school  attendance  imposes  added  co'sts  on
the  child's  household  that  exceed  the value  of  his  or  her  production  outside
of  school, such  as  for  the  purchase  of  school  clothes,  books,  and  tuition
fes  or  to  rpeat grades,  the  apparent  relative  wage  gain  associated  with  a
year of  cospleted  schooling  can  overstate  the private  rate  of  return.
Shcr  *re,  of  courc8,  any Othe2  limitations  to intergroup  comparisons42
for  estimating  returns  to  schooling  that  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper;
they are discussed  extensively  elsewhfre  (e.g.  Griliches,  1977;  Schultz,
1988.). One is the inadequacy  of staistical  controls  to take  account  of
individual  ability  (i.e.  omitted  input  bias  or  selection  by  comparative  advan-
tage)  (Willis  and  Rosen,  1979;  Heckman  and  Sedlacheck,  1985).  Another  is  the
neglect  of  school  quality  in  the  wage fLunction,  which  because  quality  tends  to
be directly  related  to the  quantity  of schooling  individuals  receive,  may
overstate  the returns  to additional  years of constant-quality  schooling
(Welch,  1966;  Behrman  and  Birdsall,  1985).  There  is  no  consensus  on  precisely
which variables  should  enter the wage function  or how to statistically
identify  individuals  who invest  in schooling  or  work  for  wages  in  the  labor
force. Different  strategies  for  constructing  the  comparison  groups  may imply
private  rates  of  return  to  schooling  that  are  subtantially  lower,  or
sometimes  higher,  than  the  simplest  logarithmic  wage  function  that  includes
only  years  of  schooling  in  linear  form  and  a  quadratic  in  years  of  post
schooling  experience  (Nincer,  1974).  Controversies  involving  the  methods'  for
estimating  returns  to  schooling  are,  hopefully,  less  germane  to  my objective
here,  which  is  to  compare  the  rates  of  return  for  women  relative  to  those  for
men, rather  than  to assess  precisely  the  absolute  level  of the  returns  to
private  and  public  resources  invested  in  the  education  of  women.  18
Labor  Supply  and  Rates  of  Return  to  Schooling
Several  studies  on  returns  to  education  by  school  level  for  smn  and  women
are  suimarized  in  Table  1.  They are  not  entirely  comparable.  Several  method-
ological  problems  and inconsistencies  arise  because  of  the  different  ways
nalysts  have  handled  the  effects  of  time  allocation  on  the  computation  of
returns,  and  the  potential  bias  due  to  sample  selection  because  analysts  can43
Table  I
leturns  to  Zducation  by lea  and  Sehoel  LOvel: 195-1385
Country  lstimation  Primary  Jeenadergy  1gb:r
(year  ot  data)  Hetbod e  male  YJoalc  hale  tooaL*  Male  Female
Uaited  States  S  17.9  5.6  14.0  13.0  3.7  4.2
(1949)
Colobia,  Desoto  IS  10.2  *11  $4.4  1.39  4.5  5.3
(1965)
memany  b  *0o  *.  4.6  5.0
(aa  1330)
Crecee  b  *  *  3*0  5.0  *
(ea  1390)
Renya  I  21.7  7.1  23.0  13.5  *  *  *
(ea  1030)
Malaysia  b  *.4  3.3  12.3  11.4  10.7  '  .*
(Ca  1360)
New Zealand  b  *  *  10.4  25.3  13.4  S3.5
(Ca  1960)
IrasiL  b  17.3  33.6  .
(1950)
Australia  - . ..  . 21.1  21.2
(ca  1060)
France  b  *1  *  14.  16.2  20.0  12.7
(1976)
United  Kingdom  b  ..  ..  10.0  0.0  3.0  12.0
(1971)
Japan  I  *  ..  5.7  5.6
(1330)
South  Korea  b  *  *  13.7  16.9  15.7  22.9
(1971)
Taiwan  b  0.4  16.0  *  *
(1032)
Puerto  Rica  b  29.5  18.4  27.3  40.4  21.9  0.0
(1050)
Andra Pradesh,  it  O.9  1l.3  3.7  11.9  6.2  5.9
India  (1977)  I  7.2  .3  6.3  2.41  5.5  5.5
Ivory  Coast  SS  10.3  5  1  17.0  33.7  21.1  13.6
(1365)
ts8tieation  Hothods: I  - Include  partitipatiom  rate  io  la.r  torgc  te  d*flate
returns,  depressing  tcmal returns  diaproportsioately;  SS - estimate  wage  rate
relationahip  wtthout  labor  totsc  ad*uatmnt.  lee  tezt  for  d4o9selsois.
blctimation  method not  known.
N  Not  teportod.
sourcoe:  Psaohbopous.  1973 (TSble  4.5),  1395  (table  A-2).  except  tor  India
(Tilak.  1907:  Table 6.5).  Average  return;  Ivory  Coast (Van  doe  easg  and
Vijvorberg 1037: Appondix  2);  and Colombia  (Schultz.  1366: Tablo  7)  hourLy
Wase.44
only  observe  differences  in  wages  for  a portion  of  the  population  receiving
different  amounts  of education. In the first  studies  of the  association
between  education  and  labor  earnings,  private  rates  of  return  were  calculated
under  the  assumption  that  the  more  educated  benefited  froo  schooling  only  to
the extent  that  they  held  a job  in  the  labor  force  and  reported  earnings.  19
Thus,  if  a  year  of  additional  schooling  raises  the  wage rates  of  mn  and  women
by the  seae  proportion  and  they  both  work  full  time  in  the  labor  force,  then
the life-cycle  internal  rate  of return  to the  opportunity  cost  of  attending
school  for that  year  is  approximately  equal  to  the  proportional  wage  incre-
ment,  and  the  returr  is then  identical  for  sen  and  women. But  if  women  worked
only half of the time  in the labor  force  after  completing  their  schooling
while  men  worked  all  of the  time,  the  conclusion  was  drawn  that  women  earn
only  half  of  men's  rate  of  return  on  their  year  of  schooling.
Becker  (1964),  in  his  seminal  contribution  on  this  subject,  observes  that
the  lower  return  to  women's  education  due  to their  lower  participation  in  the
labor force is consistent  with the smaller  proportion  of women than  men
attending  college  in the  United  States  in the  1950s  (Becker,  1964:  178).
Subsequent  empirical  studies  and surveys  of the field  that specifically
addressed  male-female  differences  in rates  of return  to education  adopted
Becker's methodology  (Hines  X  al.,  1970; Thais and  Carnoy, 1969;
Psacharopoulos,  1973;  Woodhell,  1973).  The implicit  assumption  of these
researchers  was  that  schooling  had  no  apprecLabl,  effect  on  the  productivity
of persons  working  outsLid  of the  market  labor  force. 20 But  thLs  assumption
has subsequently  been  challonged  by a large  number  of  empirical  studios  that
indicate  education  increases  the  productivity  of  time  in  nonmarket  production,
particularly  that  of  women  (summarizod  in  Eichel, 1982;  Haveman and  Wolfe,45
1984). Moreover,  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  time  of females  while  attending
school  are  not symmetrically  discounted;  girls  are  implicitly  assumed  to be
giving  up a full-time  job  in  the  labor  force  to  attend  r  hool,  which  may  not
be the case.  These  working  assumptions  for  estimating  the  rates  of return
bias  down  the  rates  of  return  to  groups,  such  as  women,  who  participate  in  the
labor  force  less  than  averfge  amounts  or  vork  more  often  as  an  unpaid  family
worker.
A second  possible  working  assumption  is that  education  affects  labor
productivity  in  market  and  nonmarket  work  to  the  same  extent,  and  consequently
the  allocation  of  an  individual's  time between  markit and nonmarket
activities  is  not  biased  by  his  or  her  education.  According  to  this  approach
the  returns  to  education  are  approximated  by estimating  a function  where  the
logarithm  ot the  wage  rate  is  the  dependent  variable.  This  approach  differs
from  that  adopted  by Becker  (1964)  and  Hincer  (1974)  which  examined  differ-
ences  in annual  earnings,  and thus  mix together  the  productivity  enhancing
effect  of  schooling  with  its  possible  effect  on  market  labor  supply.  It  is  an
empirical  fact  that  unemployment  rates  tend  to  be lower  among  more  educated
workers  once  they  have  reached  age  25,  and  a common  pattern,  though  far  from
universal,  is for  hours  worked  when  employed  to  be larger  for  more  educated
workers. Consequently,  rates  of return  to  schooling  are  sometimes  higher  if
based  on  the logarithm  of annual  earnings  as the  dependent  variable  rather
than  on  th -logarithm  of  the  hourly  wage  rate.
Becker's  neglect  of nonmarket  productivity  effects  of schooling  intro-
duces  a downward  bias  to  the  estimated  rate  of  return  to  education  for  groups
who  do not  all  participate  in  the  market  labor  force. But  the  direction  of
potential  bias  due  to the  second  approach  based  on the  estimation  of a sage46
rate  function  is  ambiguous;  it  could  overstate  or  understate  the  appropriate
rate  of return  for  the  entire  population.  Either  approach  should  deal  with
potential  sample  selection  bias  (Heckman,  1979;  1987). Statistical  techniques
have  been  videly  used  to  correct  for  this  source  of  parameter  bias. They  can
be employed  here  if  an  identifying  variable,  observed  for  all  persons,  influ-
ences  the  probability  of entering  the  labor  force  but  does  not  affect  at  the
sam  tim  th  market  wvae rate  a  person  is  offered. In  other  words,  Infor-
mation  must be known about some exogenous  determinant  of the person's
productivity  or  value  of  time  in  nonmarket  production  that  does  not  affect  her
or  his  labor  productivity  to  a  firm.  This  critical  information  permits  one  to
correct  the  estimates  of  the  market  wage-rate  function  for  the  potential  sta-
tistical  bias  introduced  because  market  wage  rates  are  only  observed  for  the
selected  sample  of  persons  for  whom the  offered  market  wage  exceeds  the  value
of  their  time  in  alternative  nonarket  activities.
Theoretically,  the  variable  needed  to  identify  the  nonmarket  productivity
(or  reservation  wage)  function  is a  household  fixed  productive.  factor  that
affects  the  individual's  nonmarket  productivity,  but  does  not  alter  his  or  her
labor  productivity  in  the  market.  In  the  short  run,  children  have  been  viewed
as such  a  variable  raising  a woman's  productivity  only  in the  home (Gronau,
1974). But  over  the  life  cycle,  this  variable  is  also  jointly  determined  and
responsive  to  labor  market  wage rates,  and  thus,  should  be  viewed  as  *ndogen-
ous  or  determined  within  the sam  framework.  Land  ownership  and  family
busines*  assets  and  the  mrket  productivity  of  one's  spouse  may be  more  satis-
factory  measures  of  fixed  household  *ndownents  that  enhance  the  value  of  an
individual's  tim  in  nonmarket  activities.  The  choice  of  this  identifying
restriction  determines  txow  the estimates  of the market  wage  function  are47
interpreted  and  hence  whether  the  implied  private  rate  of  return  to  schooling
is  a satisfactory  estimate  for  the  entire  population  or  for  only  the  nonrandom
sample  of  wage  earners.
If  more  than  one  selection  process  is  used  to  screen  the  observed  sample,
and the selection  processes  have different  determinants,  multiple  sample
selection  equations  and corrections  may  be appropriate  (e.g.  Catsiapis  and
Robinson,  1982). For  example,  participation  in  the  market  labor  force,  and
acceptance  of  wage  employment  may  respond  to  different  home  and  market  con-
straints. If the  marginal  product  of labor  is  measured  with  less  error  for
wage  and  salary  workers  than  for  self  employed  workers,  this  scheme  of  double
sample  selection  way  be  appropriate,  to  reduce  measurement  error,  despite  the
loss  in  final  sample  size  that  is  implied  by  estimating  the  market  productiv-
ity  of  all  persons  from  only  wage  earners.
Most  recent  studies  of  the  returr-  a  education  tend  to  include  only  wage
earners  and thus  to exclude  the  self-employed  and  unpaid  family  workers  for
whom  a  wage  is  difficult  to  infer  or  measure  precisely.  This  omission  repre-
sents  a relatively  small  segment  of  the  labor  force  in  high  income  cc.ntries,
but  it  is  a  major  part  in  low  income  countries.  Nonmarket  workers,  the  self-
employed,  and family  unpaid  workers  together  represent  about  half of the
adult  male  population  of  the  world,  and  two  thirds  of  the  adult  female  popula-
tion  (see  Tables  A-5  and  A-6). Thus,  any  bias  from  sample  selection  could  be
important  for  the  analysis  of  educational  returns  to  men  as  well  as  to  women.
Table  2  sumarizes  private  rates  of  returns  to  years  of  schooling  for  men
and  women  in several  Latin  American  countries.  A comion  conceptual  and  sta-
tistical  methodology  is adopted  in all of these  studies  (Schultz,  1980b).
Although  these  estimates  deal  plausibly  with  the  labor  supply  issue,  by  using48
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Internal  Rate  of  Return
Country  and/er  Year  ot  tn  Poreont  per  Yter
Metropolitan  Area  Survey  Age 2*  -44  Age 45-65
Argentina.  b
.ueoes  Aires  1360  0.3  6.6  10.  11.
(asjimatee  similar  in 1976)
Bolivia,
La  Pas  Il0  0.3  11.  3.6  6.7
(estimates  similar  in  1976)
Brazil,
Sao Paulo  1071  5.4  6.3  6.0  6.1
(estimates  higher  in  10g0)
Colombia
(estimates  lower  in 1930)  1073  is.  19.  16.  14
Paraguay.
Asuncion  1079  11.  6.0  10.  11.
(estimates  similar  In  1977)
Peru  1074  14.  14.  11.  19.
aPrivtet  returns  refer  to  the  estimated  coefficsfit  (times  100)  on  the  veri-
able  years  of  completed  education  ln  a  logarithmic  hourly  wage  rats  regression
which *lso  includes  pot-scebooling  experienee.  eperience  equared.  and  some
regional  or  migration  origin  variables.  Smples  vry  ftrom 21  to 3470,  but  all
estimates  *ae statistioslly  significantly  diffecont  from  soro  at  the .001  con-
fidence  level  (t > 2.63).  The solection  of the  sample  of  only  workers  in  the
labor  force  tot  whom  wage  rate  could  be calculated  Is  not  treated  as a  specif-
ic source  of  bies  in  these  estimatce.
bThe  available  ago  groups  in  Argentina  ar*  35-49  and  rver  49.
Source: Sehults  (l19OS).tho  hourly  wale, they do  not  attempt  to  correct  for analyzing  only  wage
*x*ors.  becouse  the  aomples  are  small,  aome  of  the  estimates  are  imprecise.
Ovorall,  howtver,  there  is  no  clear  *vildence  that  returns  to  schooling  differ
systeomtlcally  by  sex.  They do differ  considerably  across countioes,
bowever,  p:esumebly  because  of differences  in  macro  economic  conditions  and
the  lovel  of  past  imnestmnts  in  schoollng  (ichults,  19680).
An anAlysis  of  the  roturns  to  edusation  in  Andre  Pradesh.  India  illus-
trates  how sensitive  the  return  calculatlons  are  to  the  treatment  of  the  labor
force  participation  rate  of  women (Tilak,  1987). Both  the  private  and social
retur,.s  to  schooling  at  virtually  every  level  are  greater  for  women  than  mn
when the  returns  are  adjusted  only  for  uawsployment.  But  when  nonparticipa-
tiaa in the labor  force  is also  factored  into the calculation  as Becker
propasd,  the  private  rate  of  return  for  women  is  less  than  it  is  for  men  (see
vast  to  the  last  two  rows  for  Indian  study  in Table  1).  This  study  also
documnmts  the  lower  public  cost  of  female  than  male education,  and  the  lower
*pportunity  cost  of  tUim  for  female  than  r,ale  students.  However,  the  adjust-
sent  for  nonparticipation  of  vomen  is  not  Introduced  to  deflate  the  oppor-
tunity  cost  of  female  student  tim  but  only  to  deflate  the  stream  of  benefits.
A study  of Sri  Lanka  also  confirmed  that  womn's  retutn  to  schooling
that  ar  not  deflated  by nonparticipstion  rates  exceed  those  of  smn.  The
privfte  rteo  of  return  to  completing  the gennral  certificate  of  xams  at the
#ad  of  tb  aecoodtry  school  are  three  tie.  as  high  for  womn  as for  men in
urb.  areas  (36  vermU  13  peteent),  and  tiies  as  high  in  rural  areas  (14
*tt*  7 #*teftt).  At  the  ufivateaity  levi,  hwever,  the  rates  of  retur  in
WF to**  d"*a*  tae  &wtsetp bet"CtW  sen  and wmen (ahn  and  Aldermn.  1968:
I*i  i7v.50
Fixed-effect  estimation  procedures  ca-.  eliminate  bias  that  may  arise  from
certain  types  of  unobserved  or  omitted  variables  in  a  relationship.  A cross
section  is drawn  from  a number  ef distinct  localities.  for  which  price  and
quality  for market  goods  and  public  services  may differ.  If these  local
market  variables  influence  the  productivity  of  schooling  or  its  quality,  then
this  local  variable  should  be controlled  to  estimate  the  returns  to  varying
only  years  of schooling.  In  this  case  introducing  a  fixed  effect  for  every
school  district  into  the  wage  function  removes  any  bias  due to  the  omission
of  school  quality  that  might  be  correlated  with  quantity  of  schooling  receiv-
ed.  Clearly,  the effect  of other  local  market  variables  cannot  then  be
estimated  when comunity fixed-effects  are included. If the local  school
quality  changes  over  time  or individua's  in  a school  district  move  or  attend
more than  one  school,  the  community  fixed  effect  is  a less  adequate  control
for  school  quality.
It  is  also  reasonable  to  expect  that  family  background  influences  average
ability  through  genetic  and environmental  mechanisms,  instilling  motivation
and  habios,  as well  as influencing  the quality  of schooling  that  siblings
receive. If  these  family  background  characteristics  affect  productivity  and
are  correlated  with  years  of  schooling,  their  omission  from  the  wage  function
would  also  bias  upward  (in  all  likelihood)  the  estimated  rate  of return  to
schooling.  One  strategy  for  dealing  with  these  unobserved  characteristics  is
to introduce  fixed  effects  for  each  family  and  thus  base  the estimates  of
schooling  returns  on only  within-family  variation  in worker  productivity.
However,  this  procedure  may increase  the  relative  importance  of measurement
error  by eliminating  all  between-family  variation. Exaggerated  measurement
error  would bias the within  household  fixed-effect  estimates  of schooling51
returns  to  zero  (Griliches,  1977,  1979). Household  fixed  effects,  therefore,
may represent  a  lower  bound on the estimates  of the market  productivity
effects  of schooling. It has not,  to my knowledge,  been examined  how the
restriction  of  the  estimation  sample  to  those  residing  with  other  wage  earning
family  members  distorts  the  comparison  group  and  thus  potentially  biases  the
return  estimtes.
Private  rates  of return  to schooling  have  been  estimated  for  men and
women  from  a  1986  survey  of Indonesia  that  compare  ordinary  estinates  of  the
wage  function  to  those  that  include  both  community  fixed-effects  (proxy  for
school  quality,  etc.)  and  household  fixed-effects  (proxy  for  family  background
correlates)  (Behrman  and Deolalikar,  1988b). Three  increments  of ochooling
are  compared  in  Table  3: primary,  general  senior  high  school,  and'university.
Private  rates  of  returns  to  schooling  for  women  in  all  six  ctmparisons  exceed
those  for  men,  and  as  expected  the  estiuates  that  include  community  and  house-
hold  fixed-effv..ts  are  between  9 and  24  percent  smaller  than  thise  obtained
from the simple  regressions  that include  inter-family  and inter-community
variation. These  estimates  do not attempt  to control  for the  potentially
unrepresentative  character  of  the  sample  of  wage  earners,  nor  are  the  two  sets
of estimates  based  on the  same  sample,  since  16.percent  of the  wage  earners
included  in  the  first  set  of  estimates  apparently  did  not  reside  in  a house-
hold  with  another  wage  earner  and  is  therefore  excluded  from  the  fixed-effect
estimates  (Behrman  and Deolalikar,  1988b:  Table  3).  Differences  in the
private  rates of return  estimated  for women  and men in Indonesia  change
moderately  as  fixed  effects  are  added  for  the  community  and  household,  with
the  difference  decreasing  at  the  primary  school  level  and  increasing  at  the
university  level.52
*ahl I
Implied  Impeet  of  *a  Additiemel  tea  at  *  b..Lim
In Indonesia ia  1666 by  sea.  With sad Withet  Ce  .1
for  3th  CeBoth ty  md  tmily lried  3fet
Implied Privete lessra by Ueb.Lim  Uwe?
PRiMary  seinior  Nish  9mi.sity
Without  fixed-efoect  t. 12b  11 Sb  12 .1
controle  (21.1)  (43.4)  (27.6)
With  comunity and  S.Zf  .6Zb  10a 0
family  fixed-Offects  (1.32)  (35.3)  (24.?)
Hales:
Without fixed-eftect  . 7  b  *.2Xb  *.22  b
controls  (2.64)  (10.6)  (6.41)
With com_nity  and  6.12 b  .
24b  *4.t b
family  tixod-effecte  (1.43)  (10.3)  (5.23)
aA  logaritbhic  monthly  *aenin&c  function  s  *estimated  pelns  im  MA  _  _
that  includes  dumy  variables  for  nine  levels  of sehoolias  md  qyeetatle  la
age.  Parameters  are  estimated  for the differeace  between  ual  m*  femole
coefficients  for all varishbles  inluding the iatereept.  ith  ee*-  it%  *A
housebold  tixed  effecte are  believed  to  eontrol fez pooeable sael  qualty
variation  and the *ftfot of tfamiy background  an  earninas toe  test).  hft  -
tanately  the  ordinary  resrosalon  esti&ates  and  these  t  eluiima  the tfied
effects are for diftereat samples as notod ln  tbe test, raising the pesebil-
ity  that the  diffteences reported may  be  due to the different sampes  Mtd not
due to  the  introduction  of  the tixed-offtet sontsels.
bthe  absolute  value  of  t  ratios  are  repoeted  in  Parentheses  boma%th  the  coot
ficients  in  the  ease  ot tamle  returns,  and  fot  th* ditlefe  i*e  beftwe  Oh
male  and  female  a*grest"s  coe  ffcients  beneath th  maet  Reurms.  Thuas  a  fte*
siticant t  ratio  undeg  a  "a*le  &surn  e.g.  *eseadaey.  suests  that  Ut  *OItL
of return on schoolin  got mno and weme  difest by  a StetIUSU*AX&  s&isaitlet
amount  in this pooled earnings repression.
Source:  sebhsea and *eoLalihas, lobbstable  A.53
Chiswick  (1976)  develop-d  a  technique  to  include  self  employed  workers  in
the estimation  of an annual  earnings  function  along  with  wage  earners,  and
thereby  avoid  the  selection  bias  due to analyzing  only  wage earners. Her
approach  attributed  a  share  of self e*ployed  earnings  to entrepreneurial
capital  or risk taking.  Based  on an analysis  of Bangkok  from the 1971
Socioeconomic  Survey  of  Thailand,  sale  wage earners  (not  self  employed  at  all)
received  a  10.4  percent  return  on  their  years  of  schooling,  whereas  females
received  a  14.5  percent  return.  Including  partial  and  full-time  self  employed
Ln  the  sample  reduced  slightly  the  returns  to  schooling  to  9.1  percent  for  men
and to 13.0  percent  for  women. The  urban  estimtion  sample  Lncreased  by 39
percent  for  males  and  by  53  percent  for  females  with  the  inclusion  of  the  self
employed.  In  both  cases,  women's  returns  exceed  those  for  men,  but  those  who
are self  employed  report  slightly  lower  returns  on  their  schooling  than  do
wage  earners.  This  is  broadly  consistent  with  the  pattern  of  more  educated
women (beyond  primary  school)  working  more  frequently  in  wage  jobs  than  the
less  educated. It is uncertain  whether  underreporting  of incomes  by self
employed  biases  such  estimates  of  return  to  schooling  and  by  how  much.
There  are  few  studies  of  the  relationship  between  wage  rates  and  school-
ing  that  assess  how  the  selective  sample  of  wage  earners  biases  findings  (e.g.
Anderson,  1982;  Mohan,  1986;  Griffin,  1987;  King,  1986;  Schultz,.  1988c).
Moreover,  these  studies  often  deal  with  mn  alone  or  women  alone  and  thus  do
not  help  assess  whether  the  bias  due  to  sample  selection  modifies  systematic-
ally  comparLsons  of  male-female  estLiated  returns  to  education,  as  reported  in
Tables  1  and  2.  Here  is  an  important  issue  for  public  policy  that  has  receiv-
ed-surprisingly  little  empirical  study.
Griffin  (1987)  analyzes  the  earnlngs  of  marrled  women  ln  the  rmilipplnes54
in 1980  to appraise  estimates  of schooling  returns  subject  to alternative
methods  for dealing  with sample  selection  bias.  He estimates  a nonmarket
(reservation)  wage  function  and  a function  for  market  wage  offers.  The  reser-
vation  wage function  determines  the shadow value  of nonmarket  time  of the
individual,  and  hence  what  the  individual  requires  to inducc  him or  her to
enter  the  market  labor  force. The  selection-corrected  model  of  Heckman's  is
plausibly  identified  within  the  context  of  the  family  or bargaining  labor
supply  model.  A conventional  log  linear  specification  of  the  earnings  function
is estimated  where returns  to schooling  are constant  across schooling
levels.  22 The selection-corrected  maximum  likelihood  estimate  of schooling
returns  is  16  percent,  compared  with  the  conventional  estimate  of  14  percent
(based  on only  the third  of  the  sample  who  earn  wages).  In  this  case  the
estimated  returns  to schooling  increases  for  womn  with the adoption  of a
sample  selection  procedure,  and  the  selectivity  term  is  statistically  signif-
icantly  different  from  zero,  showing  that  the  sample  of  wage  earning  women  are
not  a  random  sample  of  the  population  with  regard  to  their  wage  rates.
King  (1986)  analyzed  the  earnings  of  women in  the  1985/86  Peruvian  Living
Standard  Survey.  A probit  equation  for  women participating  in  paid  employment
(i.e.  wage  earner  or  self-employed)  is  used  to  estimate  an  hourly  earnings
function  with  Heckean's  (1979)  two-stage  procedure.  When the  sample  selection
correction  is  employed,  the  rate  of  return  for  women decreased  trivially  from
12. 2  to  12. 0  percent  for  primary  schools,  from  8. 0  to  7. 8  percent  for  secon-
dary  school,  but  from  6.8  to  a  -1.7  percent  return  at  the  university  level  (if
a  diploma  is  received  after  four  years  of  study)  (King,  1986;  Table 10,  11
and  12).  As in  Griffin's  study,  the  family's  nonearned  income  and  husband's
characteristics  are  included  only  in  the  paid-participation  equation,  along55
with  the  woman's  marital  status,  plus  a  variety  of  more  controversial  identi-
fying  variables.
Khandker  (1989)  has subsequently  examined  the  returns  to schooling  for
both  men and  women  based  also  on  these  Peruvian  LSS  data. He restricts  his
analysis  to  wage  earners  and  identifies  the  sample  selection  probit  equation
by  the  fauily's  land  holdings,  unearned  income,  as  well  as  possibly  the  indi-
vidual's  marital  status  and.  the  education  of  his or  her mother  and father.
The  return  estimw"tes  appear  to  be  relatively  robust  to  variations  in  this  list
of identifying  variables  includod  only  in  the  sample  selection  equation.  For
the  country  as  a  whole,  women's  returns  increase  when  controls  are  introduced
for  sample  selection,  and returns  are  then  marginally  higher  for  women  than
for  men  at the  secondary  and  higher  schooling  levels.  At the  primary  school
level  in  the  metropolitan  area  of  Lima,  however,  the  returns  are  low,  and  low-
er  for  women  than  for  mon,  2  percent  compared  to  5  percent.  This  low  level  of
private  returns  to  women  at the  primary  level  is  perhaps  related  to  the  fre-
quency  of  domestic  servants  in  this  group,  preponderantly  women,  whose  income
in  kind  (food  and  lodging)  is  difficult  to  evaulate  and  is  often  omitted  from
survey  reports  of  wages. The  same  pattern  has  been  noted  elsewhere  in  metro-
politan  Latin  America  (see  Schultz,  1968)  and  has led some  researchers  to
exclude  domestic  servants  from  samples  in estimating  wage  functions  (Mohan,
1986).
The  1981  Socioeconomic  Survey  of  Thailand  provides  another  basis  to  oval-
ute  the  effect  of sample  selection  bias  on  the  estimates  of  private  rates  of
return  4o schooling  for both  women  and mon.  In this  case  two selection
correction  terms  are  incorporated  into  the  analysis  representing  the  probabil-
ity  of being  in the  labor  force  and  being  a wage  earner. These  selection56
equations  include  family  nonearned  income,  hectares  of land owned  by the
family  that  are  irrigated  or  unirrigated,  plus  the  standard  market  wage  rate
determinants,  including  years  of schooling  completed  at the  primary,  second-
ary,  and  higher  education  level.  23  Land  and  nonearned  income  are  assumed  to
raise  the  nonnarket  reservation  wage  of  workers  and  thereby  reduce  the  likeli-
hood  that  they  will  take  a  wage  job  or  work  at  all  in  the  market  labor  force.
Education  does  not  exert  a  monotonic  effect  on  the  labor  force  and  wage  earner
status  of  Thai  men  or  women  (see  Appendix  Tables  A-7  and  A-8). An individual
with primary  schooling  is less  likely  to be a landless  laborer. The  more
years  of secondary  schooling  an individual  has,  the  higher  are  the  chances
that  she or he is  working  for  a  wage.  Each  year  of university  education
strongly  increases  the  likelihood  of  working  in  a  wage  or  salary  job. Herein
is the clue why the sample  selection  bias can also  be nonoonotonic  with
respect  to level  of schooling.  Many  landowners  are  also  wage  earners. If
they  have  enough  land,  however,  they  presumably  withdraw  from  the  wage  market.
The controversial  issue  is whether  land  is exogenous  or merely  a proxy  for
self-employment,  in  other  words,  is  land  a legitimate  variable  to use to
identify  the  selection  model.
A  final  problem  in  specifying  a  wage function  to  estimate  returns  to
education  is  how to  model  regional  labor  markets. If there  were  no inter-
regional  migration,  wage functions  should  be estimated  separately  for  each
region.  The  wage  differences  related  to  education  within  a region  would  then
be  the  appropriate  parameter  determining  private  investment  in  schooling  in
that  closed  regional  population.  But  interregional  migration  occurs  and  more
educated  persons  migrate  more  frequently.  On  balance,  they  move  from  lower  to
hlgher  wage  markets,  and  from  rural  to  urban  areas  (Schultz,  1982). In  Latin57
America,  for  example,  as  such  as  half  of  the  lifetime  returns  to  schooling  for
the  children  of rural  residents  is  realized  by the  increased  likelihood  that
the  children  will  migrate  from  the  rural  to the  urban  labor  market  (Schultz,
1988e). One could  analyze  this  process  lf one  knew  whore  poople  migrated
fron,  the  costs  they  incurred  in  moving  and  where  they  received  their  school-
ing.  Alternatively,  if the  individualVs  current  residential  regional  labor
mnrket  is  held statistically  constant  in estinating  a  wage  function,  this
procedure  purges  from  the  estimate  of the  return  to schoolLng  that  component
due  to  migration,  to  the  extent  that  interregional  migration  toward  higher
wage  regions  occurs  with  increasing  frequency  for  the  better  educated,  as  it
clearly  does  in  Latin  America  and  the  United  States  (Schwartz,  1976).
Finally,  regional  labor  market  nominal  wage differences  may reflect  com-
pensating  variation  in  price  levels  and  reinforclng  variation  in  the  quality
of  subsidized  public  services,  and  thus  not  measure  accurately  real  wage
differences.  Urban  high  wage regions  havo  more  and better  schooling,  and
regional  shift  variables  in  a  wage  function  may also  reflect  this  difference
in  the  quality  of  schooling  across  workers  (Behrman  and  Birdsall,  1983).
Other  than  school  and  health  services,  most  other  prices  ar%  generally  higher
in  urban  high  wage  reglons,  particularly  housing.  On balance,  nominal  region-
al  wage  dlfferences  may exceed  real  wage  differences,  if  public  services  are
unimportant.  Estimating  the  participation  and  wage  functions  with  and  without
regions  as  explanatory  variables  should  at  least  help  to  assess the  impdrtance
of  migration  ir.  the  estimation  of  school  returns.  The lack  of  information  on
migration  in  the  Thailand  survey  data  does  not  permit  any  further  analysis  of
this  issue  here.
The  selection-corrected  private  rate  of  return  estimates  are  contrasted58
Table 4
Istimat*9  of  Private ates,  ef  Return
to  Scheoling  in  Thailand  in  l001  by Sax.
With  and  Without  Smple Selection  Cereetien
Private  Internal  Rate  of  Returns  by  Sbeeooling  LOevl
tt  stet4stiss  beneatb  coot.foeent)
Primary  Seceodcry  ligher
Females:
without  Correction
for samPle  selection  3.22  34.22  1.62
of wage  earners  (OLS)  (2.70)  (22.1)  (-55)
with  correction  for
sample  selection  of  10.02  24.73  10.6l
wage earners  (5.00)  (6.77)  (M.04
(two  *tage  Beckman)
males:
Without  Correction  523.2  5.42
for  sample  selection  15.95)  2.)(.6
of  wage  earners  (OLS)  (5.56)  20.3)  (2.16)
With  correction  for
sample  selection  of  14.3S  13.12  4.12
wage  *arneras  (8.05)  (9.04)  (1.66)
(two  stage  Beckman)
&The privte  trate of return  is approximated  by the coefficient  estimotod  on
the years of schooling  variable  in a logarithmic  wage rate regression  that
also  includes  as  regressorc  the individual's  years  of postecbooling  experience
and  *xperience  squared,  and  four  regional  dumy  variables,  The  sample  includes
all  persons  15 to  49 in  the  1901  Socieoaonomic  Survey  of  Thailand.  The  Beekman
(1979)  lambda  correction  terms are included  from  probit  equations  for labor
force  porticipation  and  for  wage earner  status.  identified  by the inclusion  of
own  nonearned  incme and  irriasted  and  sonirrigatod  land.
Source: See Appendix  Tables  A-7 end  A-S.59
in  Table  4  with  those  based  on the  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) estimates  for
wage  earners  that  ignore  the  potential  bias  due  to  the  selection  of  the  sample
of only  wage  earners.  The  two-step  estimation  procedure  proposed  by Heckman
(1979)  for  dealing  with  selection  bias  is  identified  by the  inclusion  of  non-
earned  income  and  hectares  of irrigated  and  unirrigated  land  owned  in  the  two
selection  probit  equations  that  predict  the  probability  that  the  individual  is
in  the  labor  force  and  is  a  wage  earner.  Both  the  wage  function  and  the  two
selection  equations  differ  in level  across  five  regions  of Thailand: the
least  developed  Northeast  region,  the  rural  population,  the  suburban  sanitary
districts,  the  urban  municipal  areas,  and  finally Bangkok. The  gains  that
accrue  to education  through  the more frequent  migration  of more educated
persons  from regions  of lower  wages  to ones  with higher  wages are, thus,
excluded  in these  estimates  of the private  returns  to education,  be-ause
regional  shifters  are  specified  in  the  wage  function.
Thailand  has for  most  of this  century  invested  heavily  in  primary  edu-
cation.  Still,  it  enrolls  a  smaller  proportion  of  its  population  in  secondary
schools  than  do  other  countries  at  a  similar  stage  in  their  development,  such
as South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Philippines  and  Malaysia  or the  two  city  states  of
Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  (Sussangkarn,  1988). On the  other  hand,  the  propor-
tion  of  the  Thai  population  enrolled  in  higher  educstion  is  relatively  large
for  a country  at its  income  level. The  relative  supply  of  workers  by educa-
tional  level  would  lead  to the  expectation  that  in  Thailand  the  returns to
education  would  b. relatively  high  at  the  secondary  level  and  relatively  low
of the  university  levels,  coopared  to  other  countries  at  Thailand's  stage  of
development  (Sussangkarn,  1988).
Table  4 shows  that  if  one  ignores  the  potential  problem  of  sample  selec-60
tion,  because  analysis  of labor  productivity  relies  on analyses  of  only  wage
earners,  the private  rate  of return  to primary  education  is  5 percent  per
year for women,  34 percent  to attend  secondary  school,  and 2 percent  to
university  education.  For  men  the  OLS  primary  school  returns  are  16  percent,
secondary  school  24 percent,  and  university  education  5 percent. The sta-
tistical  correction  for  the  two  sample  selection  processes  that  might  render
these  estimates  biased  modifies  the  estimates  markedly  in  four  out  of  the  six
cases. Three  out  of four  selection  terms  are  statistically  highly  signifi-
cant (Appendix  Tables  A-7 and  A-8).  The returns  to  primary  education  for
women  doubles  to 10  percent,  whereas  the  returns  to secondary  school  declinte
for  both  women (to  25 percent)  and  men (to  13 percent). Higher  education
private  returns  increase  to 11 percent  for  women  and  decline  for  men  to 4
percent. Although  much  more  work  is  needed  to  assess  the  effect  of  alterna-
tive  methods  to  deal  with  sample  selection  bia  as  it  impacts  on  the  returns
to  education  of  women compared  to  men,  these  data  from  Thailand  suggests  the
levels  of  returns  to  schooling  may be  sensitive  to  this  source  of  bias.  In
this  instance,  returns  to  women's  schooling,  increaso  compared  to  the  returns
to  men's  schooling.
In concluding  this  section  on  measuring  labor  productivity  and  the  re-
turns  to investing  in  the  economic  capabilities  of  either  women  or men,  I
should  stress  the  need  first  to  understand  what  underlies  the individual's
allocation  of  tim.  This  is  required  to  correct  analyses  of  wage  earners
from  which  one  seeks  to  infer  the  effect  of  investmnts  in  schooling  on  the
productivity  of  all  workers.  A potential  bias  is  introduced  by  the  process.
This  sample  selection  correction  procedure  depends  on  the  relevant  family  unit
and  how  family  behavior  is  modeled.  The bargaining  model  implies  a  few,  pos-61
sibly  useful,  differences  in the  empirical  specifLcation  of the  family  labor
supply  model  from  that  implied  by  the  unified  family  demand  framework.  But  on
the  whole,  both  models  require  similar  variables  for  inclusion  in  the  wage
function  and for identification  of the  sample  selection  rule.  Conclusions
drawn  from  this  section  are  likely  to  be  robust  to  changes  in  how  we  model  the
family  decisiotsaking  process.
Social  and  Nonasrket  Returns  to  Schooling
Social  returns  to  schooling  are trAditionally  calculated  by including
public  expenditures  on  edacation  in  addition  to  the  private  opportunity  costs
of the time of students. Hence,  social  returns  are lower than  private
returns,  often  by  between  one-third  and  one-fifth.  This  adjustment  should  not
affect  comparisons  between  returns  to women and men, unless  the public
resources  employed  in  teaching  women  and  men  differ. In  Latin  America,  this
may be  the  case.  Much of  the  higher  education  received  by  women is  in  prepar-
ation  to  be school  teachers  in  'normal  schools,"  for  which  student  costs  per
year  are less  than  in  regular  academic  universities  (e.g.  Birdsall  and  Fox,
1985). This  is  also  noted  in  India  (Tilak,  1987). In this  case,  including
public  costs  of  education  could  decrease  the  social  returns  from  schooling  by
a  greater  amount  for  men  than  for  women.
If  governments  tax  labor  earnings  and  hence  the  returns  to  human capital,
som of  the  public  expenditures  on  education,  health.  *tc  ,  will  be  recovered.
Only  market  returns,  however,  are  taxable,  and  of  them  only  the  returns  to
wage  and  salary  workers  are  effectively  taxed  in  most  low-income  countries.  24
The tendency  for  more  men than  women  to work for a wage  might appear  to
provide  a  differential  social  return  via  taxes  that  would  favor  social  invest-
ments  in  the  schooling  of  males  over  females  (Tables  A-5  and  A-6).  But  a  more62
complete  answer  to this  question  requires  an  analysis  of  how  labor  supply  to
wage employment  responds  to a  change  in  market  wage  offers  (after  taxes).
Most  empirical  labor  supply  studies  in  high-  and  lo-income  countries  indicate
that  women  respond  positively  to  an increase  in their  own  market  wage,  and
negatively  to a wage increase  of their  husband. Consequently,  the  taxable
supply  of  women's  labor  increases  with  an  investmnt  in  women's  capabilities
and  decreases  with  a conparable  investment  in  sen's capabilities.  Moreuver,
male  labor  supply  estimates  often  reveal  a tendency  for  men  to  reduce  their
labor  supply  as their  own  wages  rise. 25 Thus,  to  the  extent  that  governments
recoup  public  expenditures  on  human  capital  investments,  the  social  return  to
investing  in  women  should  increase  relative  to  those  from  investing  in  men.  26
A more  generally  accepted  rationale  for  public  expenditures  on education
of  both  mon  and  women  is  that  there  are  social  benefits  to  an  educated  popula-
tion  that  increase  welfare  in  a  manner  that  cannot  be readily  captured  by  the
more  educated  individual  or  their  families.  This  argument  for  public  support
of  education  suggests  that  a  more  educated  society  is  more  capable  of  managing
a political  system  that  protects  individuals'  rights  and  facilitates  efficient
and equitable  growth..  Though  these  claims  are difficult  to substantiate,
there  are  more  concrete  examples  that  have  been  empirically  confirmed.  Most
of  them  favor  the  schooling  of  females.63
Determinants  of  Chlld  Nutrition  and  NortalLty
Studies  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  in  demography,  ecotiomics,  anthropology  and
sociology  came  to the  conclusion  that  there  was  a  strong,  probably  causal,
relationship  between  increases  in mother's  schooling  and decreases  in the
Incldence  of mortality  among  her own children,  particularly  in low income
countries  (e.g.  Basu,  1987).  Many  hypotheses  are offered  as  to why thls
correlation  is  observed,  some  of which  Are discussed  below (e.g.  Ran and
Schultz,  1979;  Barrera,  1988).  The  patterns  is  widely  replicated  because  many
fertility  surveys  provide  the  minium data  on women:  their  age,  education,
children  ever born and children  stlll living.  The universality  of the
relationship  is  reminiscent  of  the  discovery  in  the  1960s  of  relative  (logar-
ithmic)  wage  differentials  associated  with  the  years  of  sctooling.  The  human
capital  interpretation  of these  latter  wage-education  differentials  as an
approximation  of  the  private  rate  of  return  to  schooling  has  gradually  gained
acceptance  (Schultz,  1988e).
In the  case  of  child  mortality,  an  added  year  of  maternal  education  is
associated  with  a 5  to  10  percent  reduction  in  child  mortality.  Although  the
level  of mortality  tends  to  be  higher  in  rural  than  in  urban  populations  of
low income  countries,  the  proportionate  reduction  in  child  mortality  associ-
ated  with  an additional  year  of  mother's  schoolin&  Is  of a roughly  similar
magnltude  in  both  urban  and  rural  areas of  many countries  (Cochran  at  al.,
1980).  The  proportionate  mortality  reducing  effect  is  tauller  for the
father's  schooling  than  the  mother's,  especially  in  rural  populations  (Mensch
et  al., 1986). Studies  in  Latin  America  have  also  noted  that  the  child  mor-
tality  differentials  associated  with  maternal  education  are  more  moderate  in
Costa  Rica  end  Cuba.  The  hypothesis  advanced  to  explain  these  exceptions  is64
that  these  country's  strong  egalitarian  public-health  programs  could  improve
access  and use of health  care  even  among  the  least  educated  mother*  (Bohn,
1980).  Other  economic hypotheses  for  the  differences  in  the  relative  magni-
tude of schooling  effects  on child mortality  are analyzed  in  Colombia
(Rosenzweig  and Schultz,  1982b),  and  discussod  generally  elsewhere  (Schultz,
1984;  Thomas  at  *1..  1987).
Is  education  simply  correlated  with  the  use  of  more health  inputs,  or
does  education  provide  a  mother  with  the  capacity  to  cope  with  health  risks
and  better  manage  her child's  environment?  In Colombia  an analysis  of the
1973  census  indicated  that  controlling  for  household  incom or  husband's  edu-
cation  or the  marital  status  of the  mother did  not  eliminate  or  even greatly
reduce  the  indepondent  role  of  mother's  education  as  a  partial  explanation  for
her  children's  survival  (Schultz,  1980a). Studios  elsewhero  showed  that  it
ws  possible  to  control  for  many  lifetime  events  and  changes  in  socioeconouic
status  in  relation  to  child  mortality  rates  and  still  mother's  education  had
its effect  (Farah  and Preston,  1982).  In Brazil  a third  of the  mother's
education  effect  seems  to  operate  through  family  income  (Thomaz  sat  al, 1987).
However,  in addition  to influencing  child mortality,  mother'p  education
undoubtedly  influences  many  of  these  intercorrelated  variables,  such  as  migra-
tion,  labor  market  behavior,  use of health  care, and modern  attitudes.
Therefore,  to  control  statistically  for  all  these  types  of  variables  is  likely
to  understate  the  net  effcet  of  schooling  (Kensch  atAl.,  1986).
The  puzzle  rnmains  why mother's  education  explains  more of  the  variation
in  child  mortality  than  other  variablos  describing  the  individual  's  access  to
health  care,  or  prices,  or  even  totoil  family  income  that  could  be spent  on
health  care?  Three  competing  hypotheses  are  (1)  that  the  more educated mother65
uses  a  different  mix  of  observable  health  inputs,  or (2)  that  she  uses  these
inputs  more  effectively,  or (3)  that  her education  is  positively  correlated
with  the  use  of unobserved  health  inputs  and  her  education  is  credited  with
the  effect  of  these  unobserved  inputs  on  child  health  (Schultz,  1984).
Clearly,  the  mother  is  the  most  important  health  worker  for  her  children.
How well  she  performs  this  task  appears  to  depend  "on  her  schooling,  which
*quips  her  with  general  and  specific  knowledge,  and  the  mans  and  confidence
to seek  new ideas'  (Barrera,  1988b:  p.  4). The  challenge  is  to  discover  how
education  influences  the  use  of health  inputs  to reduce  the  probability  of
child  mortality.  Because  relatively  few  children  die  in  middle  and  high  income
countries,  a  more  widely  distributed  or  continuous  indicator  of child  health
status  is  sought  to  extend  and  broaden  the  analysis.  Weight  of  a  child  is
often  recorded  at  birth  and  provides  a  sensitive  predictor  of  child  mortality
as  well  as  lifetime  health  problem  and  mental  and  physical  developmental
handicaps.  The  self-selected  health  inputs  of  pregnant  women  Mst  be
analyzed  as  endogenous  variables  if  one  is  to  estimate  the  unbiased  effect  of
these  inputs  on  the  production  of  child  health  (Schultz,  1984).  Selection  of
some health  inputs  occurs  in  response  to  the  mother's  expectation  of  a  goodl Or
poor  birth  outcome,  and  consequently  the  simple  correlation  between  these
self-selected  inputs  and  health  outcomes  may be  misleading.  Seeing  a  doctor
early  into  the  pregnancy  is  correlated  with  having  a  lower  birthweight  child,
whereas  administering  the  same health  input  to  an  average  woman exerts  a  posi-
tive  effect,  holding  constant  the  initial  (but  generally  unobserved)  health
condition  of  the  mother  and  child.  In  a  U.S.  study,  the  effect  of  mother's
education  on  birthweight  in  1967-69  and  in  1980  appeared  to  be  transmitted
largely  through  the  variation  in  the  same  four  measured  prenatal  inputs66
(Rosenzweig  and  Schultz,  1988).
It is  probably  a more  difficult  task  to  measure  all  or even  the  major
inputs  that play a role in producing  good  nutrition,  good health,  sound
development,  and  survival  in  an older  child. A statistical  explanation  must
also  be found  for  which  mother  use  each  of  these  health  inputs,  if  the  effect
of these  inputs  on the  production  of  child  health  is  to  be  estimated  without
input  self-selection  bias.  It  is simpler  to  exasine  directly  the  impact  on
child  health  of  interactions  between  mother's  education  and  her  constraints  in
caring  for  her  children's  health.  Estimates  of  these  interaction  effects  show
how  maternal  education  exerts  its  elusive  effect  on  child  health.  For  example,
Caldwell  (1979)  hypothesized  that  the  education  of the  mother  enables  her  to
e- 1 ploit  local  public  health  care  more  effectively.  His  view  sugiv*sts  that  the
interaction  between  mother's  education  and  local  public  health  infrastructure
as  it determines  child  health  is  complementary  or  positive.  But  Rosenzweig
and  Schultz  (1982b)  found  the  opposite  to  be  true  in  1973  in  Colombia,  where
differences  in  maternal  education  have  a smaller  impact  on  child  mortality  in
urban  populations  that  receive  more  public  and  private  hospital  and  clinic
services  per  capita.  Their  findings  are  consistent  with  the  aggrelipe  patterns
.reported  elsewhere  in  Latin  America  by Behn  (1980)  and  Palloni  (1981)  and  in
Sri  Lanka  by  Reegama  (1981).  If  the  effectiveness  of  health  care  of  children
associated  with the  education  of mothers  is a substitute  for local  public
health  expenditures  in  the  production  of  child  health,  as  these  studies  imply,
additional  outlays  on  public  health  should  have  the  greatest  impact  improving
child  health  among the  least  educated  segoents  of  the  population.  Although
more  research  is  needed  on the  personal  distribution  of  the  benefits  of  many
forms  of public  expenditure  programs,  these  initial  investigations  suggest67
that  public  health  programs  distribute  their  benefits  progressively  across  low
income  populations,  according  to  levels  of  adult  education.
Other  studies  examine  interactions  of health  input  choices  themselves
and  environmental  constraints  on  child  mortality.  Where  household  water  and
sanitation  facilities  are  poor  in  Malaysia,  breast-feeding  is  associated  with
larger  reductions  in infant  mortality  (Butz,  St al., 1984).  Estrey  and
Habicht  (1987)  found  that  safe  water  supplies  reduced  child  mortality  by a
greater  amount  for  more  educated  mothers,  whereas  access  to toilets  in the
household  is less  effective  in reducing  child  rortality  for  more educated
mothers.  In  Costa  Rica,  Haines  and  Avery  (1982)  found  the  effect  of  a  year  of
education  for  the  mother  is to reduce  her child  mortality  between  6 and  7
percent,  holding  constant  for  household  sanitation  and dwelling  quality  and
local  levels  of  child  mortality  and  health  care  facilities.  Haines  and  Avery
confirm  that  the  child  hea,lth  gains  related  to  mother's  education  are  smaller
in  urban  areas,  a  result  also  noted  by Schultz  (1980a)  in  Colombia  and  Behm
(1976)  in  several  Latin  American  capital  cities.
But  the  studies  of  Malaysia  and  Costa  Rica  treat  the  household's  water
and sanitation  infrastructure  'as well as the mother's  breast-feeding  as
mg&2SM  or,  in  other  words,  as  not  affected  by  maternal  education  or  unob-
served  variables  that  might  themselves  influence  child  health  outcomes.
Barrara's  (1988b)  study  of  household  and  community  data  from  the Bicol
Province  of  the  Philippines  extends  these  earlier  studies.  He assumes  that
water  and  sanitary  facilities  of  the  household  are  andooMus,  choice  variables
and  may be  thus  potentially  correlated  with  unexplained  variation  in  child
health.  Consequently,  he  first  analyzes  the  relation  between  maternal  educa-
tion  and  child  health  conditional  on  comantiZ  averagg  levels  of  water  and68
sanitation,  not the household's  actual  variables  that  are affected  by the
family's  own choices. Barrera  then  finds  m ther's  schooling  has  a larger
protective  effect  on child  health in unsanitary  io  u  jtias  where there are
visible  signs  of  excreta  and  in comunities  that  are  further  (in  time)  from
out-patient  health  care  facilities.  In  a  com_unity  where  piped  water  is  the
predominant  source  of  supply,  the  impact  of  mother's  education  is  diminished.
Where  water sealed  toilets  are  more coi_on  in  the  community,  there  are  larger
maternal  education  differences  in child health.  larrera's  shift from
household-level  measures  of water  and toilet  facilities  to comunity-level
variables  representing  the local  availability  of these  facilities,  reverses
the  conclusions  drawn  by Estrey  and  Habicht  (1987).  Comunity  water  supply
appears  to substitute  for  mother's  education,  but the  modern  toilet  comple-
ments  it (Barrera,  1988b:  Table  16).  At the *ame  time,  higher  income  and
mother's  education  are  shown by  Barrera  to  increase  the  chance  that  a  house-
hold  has  acquired  piped  water  and  water-sealed  toilets.
Another  important  input  to  child  health,  the  duration  of  breast-feeding,
is  inversely  related  to  mother's  education  in  many  countries  (e.g.  Blau,  1984;
Wolfe  and  Behrman,  1982;  Sirilaksana,  1986)..  Breastf  eding is a beneficial
input  for  child  health  primarily  if  it  is  supplemented  by  other  foods  before
the  end  of the  baby's  first  year. tn  Barrera  s rural  Philipplne  population,
the  mother's  educatiou  shortens  only  the  duration  of  un  laf  mmntga  breast-
feeding (1988b:  Table  23).  Moreover,  he  estimates  that the  duration  of
unsupplemented  breast-feeding  is  a Opositiveo  child  health  input  only  up to
six  months  of  age. The  more  educated  mother  is  more  able  to  replace  mother's
milk  with  sanitary  substi-tutes.  For  the  less  educated,  Barrera  hypothesizes,
the  supplementation  of  breastfe*ding  at  less  than  six  months  is  more harmful.69
Thus,  th  measurement  of  the  optimal  duration  of  breastf  eding  and  time  to
introduce  supplementary  foods  in  the  child's  diet  depend  on  the  education  of
the  *sther  who must manage  to  provide  sanitary  substitutes  for  her  own supply
of  ilk.  In  other  words.  the  duration  of  unsupplemented  breastfeeding  and
education  appears  to  be  substitutes  in  producing  child  health.  This  fihding
may partially  account  for  why more  *ducated  mothers  breastfeed  less  (larrera,
1988b:  Table  25).
Nutrition  and  labor  productivity  are  positively  related  at  the  individual
or  household  level.  With  the  recent  use  of  simultaneous  equation  estimation
techniques  (Strauss,  1986)  it has  been shown  convincingly  in three  studies
that nutrition  raises  labor  productivity,  at least  at very low levels  of
income  (Strauss  (1986)  in  Sierra  Leone;  DeolaliLar  (1988)  in  India;  and  Sahn
and  Alderman  (1988)  in  Sri  Lanka).  Since  the  demand  for  nutrition  is also
influenced  by prices  and incoms, the standard  assumption  that  production
decisions  and  consumption  decisions  can  be  sequentially  and  separately  solved
by the  farm  household  may  need  to  be studied  further  (Singh,  n;  al  1986).
.o  analyze  intrahousehold  allocation  of  nutrition,  data  are  needed  either  on
individual  food  intakes  or  on  measures  of  nutritional  status. Most  analysis
has  beon  based  on the  latter  anthropometric  indicators  of  nutritional  status,
such  as height  for age,  or  weight  for  height,  thickness  of skinfolds,  etc.
that  can  be readily  measured  in a single  survey.  But  these  anthropometric
indicators  of  nutrition  reflect  more  than  the  adequacy  of  curront  nutritional
inputs.  They  also  incorporate  the  past  pattern  of  nutrition,  as  modified  by
individual  differences  in  metabolism,  absorption  rates  possibly  related  to
infectious  and'  parasitic  diseases,  and  activity  lovels.  Studies  such  as
Barrera  (1988),  Struass  (1987)  and  Thomas,  Qt_al.  (1987)  analyze  such70
accumulative  indicators  of  nutrition.
Much  less  economic  analysis  has  focused  on  actual  individual  consumption
patterns  by gender  within  the  family,  because  (1)  they  appear  to  be  accurate
only  over a short  recall  period,  of say 24  hours,  and (2)  they  should  be
repeated  at least  several  times  over  a year  to  reflect  the  variation  associ-
ated  with  seasonal  changes  in  food  availability  and  activities,  and  (3)  they
appear  to  embody more  measurement  errors  than  do  anthropometric  indicators.
In  the  available  studies  of  individual  nutrient  intakes  ib  low  income
countries,  small  working  samples  also  weaken  the  evidence.  One  suggestive
study  of  Central  India  finds  that  calorie  intakes  are  not  significantly  biased
in  favor  of  boys  compared  to  girls,  *xcept  during  the  lean  season,  when  house-
holds  have  lower  overall  consumption  levels  (Behrman,  1988).  Further  studies
of  actual  nutrient  intakes  within  the  family  should  be  encouraged  along  with
the  demand  for  health  care  and  time  allocation  within  the  family  (e.g.  Pitt
and  Rosenzweig,  1985,  1988).
Determinants  of  Child  Achievements  In  School
There are surprisingly  few  studies  of  the  household  determinants  of
school  enrollment  and  attendance  rates  by  gender  in  low  income  countries,
though  this  may be  changing.  In  an  analysis  of  district-level  data  from  the
Indian  Census  of 1961,  Rosenzweig  and  Evenson  (1977)  found  that  where  child
wages  were  higher,  children  supplied  more labor  to  the  market  and  enrolled
less  in  school.  Male  wage  rates  were  negatively  associated  with  child  school-
ing  levels,  while  female  wages  were  positively  associated  with  the  enrollment
rates.  These  partial  effects  of  wage  rates  on  schooling  were  implied  by their
model,  but  only  after  a  number  of  cross-comoodity  substitution  patterns  were
imposed  and  price  (wage)  effects  were  assumed  to  outweigh  income  effects.71
More  generally,  individual  level  data  often  show  father's  education  is  also  a
stimulus  to  the  child's  achievements  in  school.
King  at  al.  (1986)  estimated  from  several  Asian  surveys  the  determinants
of parents'  investing  in the schooling  for their  children,  and how they
respond  differently  toward  the schooling  of girls  and  boys.  Analysis  of
schooling  decisions  from  a Peruvian  survey  permitted  the  analysis  of  whether
the  parents  invest  by  sending  their  children  away  to  continue  their  schooling,
generally  at  a  private  versus  local  public  school.  Aialysis  of  the  schooling
decision  suggests  that  community  school  access  and  family  income  both  increase
enrollments,  particularly  for girls (King  and Bellew,  1988;  Gertler  and
Gleewe,  1988).
In  most  studies  of schooling  of children  in  high  income  countries,  the
mother's  schooling  has a larger  effect  than  the father's,  even  though  the
father's  education  implies  a larger  market  income  effect,  because  he tends  to
receive  a  higher  wage  and  work  more  hours  in  the  labor  force  (Leibowitz,  1974;
King et al., 1986). The  evidence  that  mothers'  schooling  exerts  a greater
effect  on  the  schooling  of  their  daughters  than  their  sons  is  less  well  estab-
lished  (e.g.  DeTray,  1988):  Table  5).  It  is  a  hypothesis  that  needs  further
study.
Determinants  of  Fertility
Fertility  is generally  observed  to decrease  as women's  education  in-
creases. Occasionally,  however,  fertillity  of  imnschooled  women  is  lower  than
that  of women  with a few years  of primary  education  (Cochrane,  1979).  A
husband  with  more  schooling  (or  income)  in  traditional  agricultural  societies
is frequently  observed  to have a larger  family  as noted  previously. But
spouses  of similar  education  tend  to  marry. Because  of  the  general  positive72
association  between  education  of  spouses,  the  evaluation  of  the  partial  effect
of  women's  schooling  on  fertility  becomes  more negative  and more likely  to  be
monotonic  when  the  positive  effect  of  men's  education  or incomo  on  fertillty
is  controlled.  Economic  models  of fmily decision-making  direct  attention  to
the  distinctive  effects  of  mnu's  and  women's  schooling  on  demands  for  children
and  resulting  fertility.  Simple  correlations  can  be  misleading  in  this  area.
Woen's education  not  only  decreases  desired  fertility,  it  also  permits
couples  to  come  closer  to  reaching  their  reproductive  goals. Their  increased
reproductive  control  is partially  achieved  by delaying  marriage,  but more
educated  wives  also  have  fever  unwanted  conceptions  (and  births). Though  the
husband's  education  also  enhances  contraceptive  effectiveness,  the  wife's  *du-
cation  has  a  stronger  effect  on these  forms  of  reproductive  behavior,  whother
inferred  from  a  respondent's  own  classification  of  conceptiorm  as unplanned  or
from econometric  analyses  of the reproduction  function  and lts residual
(Rosenzweig  and Schultz,  1985,  1987).  This  may be yet another  sphere  of
nonmarket  production  where the education  of women generates  an important
spillover  that  may  be  valued  by  society--avoidance  of  unwanted  births.
All  of  these  routes  by  which  women's  education  may benefit  society--
reducing  child  mortalLty,  improving  child  nutrition,  lncreasing  child  school-
ing,  and  reducing  unwanted  fertLlity--lnvolve  benefits  that are partly
captured  by the  woman's  own  children.  If parents  are  entirely  Ialtruisticm
toward  their  offspring,  and  view  their  children's  utility  as their  own,  these
activities  would  be  allocated  investments  and be  produced  in an efficient
manner within  the  family.  In  other  words,  most  of  the  mexternalities"  from
women's  education  that  accrue  from  her  nonmarket  production  activities  are
internalized  in  the  altruistic  nuclear  family.  Nevertheless,  there  are73
numerous  instances  where society  has strengthened  the rights  of children
relative  to the  economic  claims  of  parents,  such  as  when the  conditions  of
child  labor  are  restricted  or school  attendance  legally  mandated. Improve-
monts  in  a  woman's  education  are  linked  in  many  societies  to  increases  in  the
level  of  investments  in the  human  capital  of  her children. A subsidy  that
favored  women's  schooling  would  help to shift  private  household  resources
toward  investments  in the quality  of the younger  generation. Empirical
stuuies  have  not  yet  sought  to  appraise  the  responsiveness  of  family  resources
to  practical  interventions  of  this  form.
Pollcy  Implications  of  the  Empirical  Evidence
The  available  evidence  indicates  that  primary  and  secondary  schooling  for
women can  be  defended  on  the  grounds  of  efficiency  (high  market  social  re-
turns),  equity  (increasee.  capabilities  of  the  poor),  and  intergenerational
redistribution  that  improves  the  health  and  education  of children. In  con-
trast,  direct  transfers  of  consumption  to  women and  children,  for  exsmple  by
food  programs,  are  likely  to  be  only  marginally  effective  because  these  public
transfers  are  readily  redirected  within  the  family  to  conform  to  its  tradi-
tional  goals. Invostments  in  women's  traditional  vocational  skills  may  not
help  much,  because  they  may  limit  their  future  employment  opportunities.
Restricting  women's  work  to  traditional  sectors  may  compel  them  to  compete  in
less profitable  and  possibly  declining  sectors  of  the  economy.  Anti-
discrimination  laws afe of uncertain  value  oven in high-income  countries,
while  in  low-income  countries  these  policies  appear  to  penalize  primarily
large  firms  that  cannot  avoid  the  resulting  buroaucratic  red  tape. Innovative
institution  building  to  advance  the  rights  and  welfare  of  women is  appealing
in  principle,  but  in  practice  requires  a  deeper  understanding  of  social73 (a)
engineering  than  is  commonly  encountered.
It  would  be  useful  to  develop  alternative  measures  of  women's  status  that
can  be  quantified  for  comparative  purposes  across  societies.  This  would  be
particularly  valuable  in  those  cases  where  there  is insufficient  data  to  fit
sample  selection-corrected  wage  functions,  as  in  rural  Bangladesh  (Khandkar,
1988),  or  as a check  on  these  indirect  statistical  procedures.  The  voman's
age-at-marriage  is  often  used  to  approximate  the  economic  influence  she  con-
mands  in  the  family  (e.g.  Acharya  and  Bennett,  1983).  The  bargaining  model
of  the  family  could  also  be  used  to  interpret  the  difference  between  her  hus-
band's  cge  and  her  own as  a  relative  measure  of  their  economic  powers.  But  as
the  earlier  discussion  of  marriage  patterns  implied,  these  outcomes  are  con-
ditioned  by the woman's  family's  resources,  her parents'  education,  their
investments  in  her  schooling,  the  number  of  her  siblings,  and  so  on (King  j1
Al. ,  1986).  We need  to know  how these  parental  constraints  interact  with
conmunity  infrastructure  (e.g.  schools),  and  with  the  local  social  norms  of
marriage.  This  should  be  high  on  the  research  agenda  if  public  policy  is  to
increase  the  economic  capabilities  of  women  and  provide  them  with  the-oppor-
tunity  to  manage  more of  what  the  family  spends.
From  another  perspective,  the  difference  between  a  wife's  education  and
that  of  her  husband  can  proxy  for  the  balance  of  economic  capacities.  This
line  of  analysis  can  be  further  refined  by  imputing  to  both  a  market  wage  rate
that  is  corrected  for  sample  selection  bias  or  the  shadow  value  of  nonmarket
time for nonparticipants.  But for the same  reason  that age differences
between  spouses  is best viewed  as an endogenous  indicator  of relative
female-male  authority  and economic  influence  in the  family,  the  educational'
difference  between  spouses  is  an  even  clearer  reflection  of  the  opportunities74
provided  by the parental  families  to girls  and boys intermediated  by the
marriage  matching  institutions  of  a specific  society.  To treat  these  spousal
differences  in education  or age  as  an exogenous  constraint  on the  family's
subsequent  behavior  is to truncate  the analysis  before  it is possible  to
understand  how the  parent  resources  and investments  in children  along  with
community  policy  variables  work their  effect  on the balance  of economic
capabilities  acquired  by young  men and vomen.  Th. potential  leverage  of
policy  on  'this  process  is  thus  suppressed  from  empirical  analysis  by in-
cluding  measures  of  spouse  matching,  as though  they  were  exogenous  variables.
In  the  short  run  these  spousal  differences  are  given,  but in the  longer  run
they  should  adapt  to  policy  interventions.
No  studies  have  assessed,  to  my  knowledge.  the  impact  of  legislation  that
sets  a minimum  age for  marriage  for  women,  prohibits  dowries,  or specifies
women's  rights  in  divorce  and  inheritance.  If  most  members  of  society  to  not
see  these  laws  as in their  interest,  are  the  laws  still  treated  as symbolic
social  goals  but  merely  left  unenforced?  What  are  the  real  consequences  for
women  and  society  of  such  changes  in  legal  code  in  low  income  countries?  The
topic  could  benefit  from  research,  but  the  task  will  not  be  easy.
There  is  a consensus  among  anthropologists,  sociologists,  and  economists
that  women  generally  achieve  a  higher  status  in  society  if  they  are  more  pro-
ductive  economically  in  relation  to  men  (Blumberg,  1984,  1988;  Marini,  1987).
Targeting  consumption  resources  to  women  is likely  to  be an ineffective  and
transitory  means  to  increase  the  productivity  of  women and  improve  their  life-
time  welfare.  Legislating  changes  in  labor  markets,  prescribing  employment
practices,  and  modifying  sectoral  priorities  to  expand  and  improve  women's
employment  opportunities  appear  to  be  blunt  and  probably  ineffective  policies75
in  a low  incone  country. Investing  in  the  human  capital  of  women  to  perform
market and nonmarket  work more productively  is a more promising  way to
increase  women's  economic  capabilities.  Formal  education.  is  the  most  widely
documented  way to  achieve  this  goal  efficiently.  With  better  education  of
women,  household  spending  is likely  to go increasingly  for child  health,
nutrition,  and  schooling.  Basic  schooling  appears  to  ba th most  efficient
and  equitable  investment  option,  and  one  that  is  often  now  allocated  dispro-
portionately  to  mn.  This  allocation  of  human  capital  requires  more  study;
its  justification  on "cultural'  grounds  should  be  reckoned  carefully  in  terms
of  economic  costs  reflected  in  shorter  lifetimes,  higher  fertility,  and  lower
per  capita  productivity.
Regional  Patterns  of  Investment  in  Women  and  Men
The largest  investments  in human  capital  are in schooling  and  health.
Differences  in  education  between  women and  men can  be  inferred  from  two  sets
of  data: school  attainment  as  reported  by individuals  in  a  census  and  enroll-
ment  rates  as  reported  by  schools  to  UNESCO. Although  both  types  of  data  have
their  shortcomings,  and  probably  overstate  the  human  capital  received  by  women
in  relation  to  men,  the  patterns  across  countries  in  both  are  similar.
Today  in the industrially  advanced  high  income  countries  women  receive
nearly  the  same number of  years  of  schooling  as  do  men,  and  woen  often  report
higher  enrollment  rates  than  men until  secondary  school.  Latin  America  and
East  Asia  are  quite  similar  to  the  developed  countries  in  this  regard.  At  the
other  extreme  are  most  of  the  countries  of  South  and  West  Asia  and  North  and
subSaharan  Africa  where  women receive  between  half  and  three-fourths  the  years
of  schooling  as  do  oen.  This  regional  pattorn  is  illuatrated  in  column  1  of
Table  5 using  estimates  of  years  of  completed  schooling  from  a  recent  census,76
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and in  columns  3 and  4 based  on official  enrollment  rates  accumulated  across
school  levels  (see  Table  A-1).  27 The  estimates  of  educational  attainment  are
for  persons  age  20 to  24  in  a  simple  of  censuses  in  about  1970,  and  approxi-
mate  the  distribut  3n of  educational  investmnts  made  around  1960. The  1960
accumu'ated  enrollment  rates  are  estimated  by  UNESCO  to  represent  averages  for
all countries  in each  region. The  figures  in  column  3 are slightly  higher
than  those  in column  1 for  Asia and  Africa. From  1960  to 1980  enrollment
ratas  increased,  slowly  converging  between  women and  men.  But differences
remain  large.  Are  these  differences  in  fmale  and  male  educational  invest-
ments  explained  by  the  diverse  economic  conditions  in  these  countries?
An  analysis  of  educational  systems  from  80  countries  for  the  period
between  1960  and  1980  sought  to  account  for  differences  in  public  expenditures
on  education  and  enrollment  rates  on  the  basis  of  household  demand and  produc-
tion  theory.  More  than  90  percent  of  the  intercountry  variation  in  public
school  expenditures  per  school  aged  child  and  40  to  70  percent  of  the  varia-
tion  in  primary  and  secondary  school  enrollment  rates  are  explained  by  real
income  per  adult,  the  relative  price  of  teachers,  the  school-aged  share  of  the
population,  and  urbanization.  The  proportionate  increase  in  girl's  enrollment
rates associated  with a proportionate  increase  in income  is significantly
larger  than the analogous  incom elasticity  for boy's enrollment. Price
elasticities  are  also  larger  in  absolute  value  (negative)  for  female  enroll-
ment rates  than  for male.  Eponomic  growth  and long  run expansion  of the
educational  system  that  contributes  to  the  decline  in the  relative  price  of
teachers  appear  to  increase  women's  schooling  in  comparison  to  men,s. Witain
countries  over  time  this'  gap  between  the  educational  attainment  of  wonmn and
men has  also  narrowed,  but  more  slowly  than  forecasted  from  this  relationship78
acro"s  countries  at  different  levels  of  development  (Schultz,  1987).
Unless  special  measures  are  adopted,  female  enrollments  may  decrease  by  a
larger  proportion  than  male  enrollmonts  in periods  of declining  income  per
adult.  Public  sector  retrenchments  since  1975  in  Africa  and  Latin  America
have  cut  real  expenditures  on  public  education,  while  private  schools  are  also
contracting  (Schultz,  1987). Research  is  nnoded  to  determine  whether  female
enrollments  are  indeed  falling  relativ  to  male  enrollmnts  in  those  countries
that  are undergoing  more difficult  periods  of macroeconomic  adjustment,  or
whether  the  forward  momentum in investments  in  women  has  offset  the  current
decline  in  income  in  Latin  America  and  Africa.
This regression  model  is then  employed  to hold constant  for national
income,  prices,  and demographic  structure,  while  the reomining  unexplained
variation  in enrollment  rates  and  public  school  expenditures  per child  are
summarized  in  Table  6 by region.  The  pattern  in  these  residuals  is  somewhat
different  from that  in Table  5.  Africa  is an over-achiever  in scnooling,
given  its  low  income  and  high  cost  of teachers.  These  conditions  in  Africa
also account  for the tower  female  to male  enrollments  in that continent.
South  and  West  Asia,  however,  continues  to  invest  less  in  primary  and  secon-
dary  schools  than  can  be  explained,  and  the  shortfall  is  significantly  larger
for  females  than  for  males.  Latin  America  reports  lower  than  expected
enrollment  rates,  but  its  shortfall  is  greater  for  males  than  for  females.
In  the  high  incomo  countries,  there  is  a  small  positive  deviation  in  enroll-
ment  rates  for  those  predicted  by  the  model,  and  they  tend  to  be slightly
larger  for  women  than  for  mon  at  the  secondary  school  level.
There  are  no analogous  indicators  of the  gender  differential  in invest-
ments  in  health  or  use  of  health  services.  TherL  is  even  little  agreement  on79
Table  6
Percenatge  Deviatione  in National  Sducetlenel.  Invavotuota
Adjusting  ter  the  tffecta  ot Iceae. Teacher  Selaries.
and  Demographic  Composition:  1960-1930
Prsiary  Sebol System  Secondary  School  Syatem
Number  of  ZarelLent  srpenditures  Number  f  o  morelLment Izpenditures*
CountryfYear  Rates  per  Scbool  Country/Tear  Rates  per  School
Region  Observed  Terele Hale  Ag*d Child  Observed  emnal- Hale  Aged Child
lurop. Ocea3nic  +6  +  21  +3  +7  -t
and  North  America  +  6  - 1+  7  --
Latin  America  43  -10  -15  -5  35  -30  -39  -16
last  Aila  21  +22  +12  +9  16  +27  +19  +2
Sauth  and  24  -49  -24  -21  16  -49  -7  -4
Atrics  62  +26  +16  +15  49  +43  +34  +17
aDependent  variables  are  t1) the  logerithm  of  jhe  number  of children  *nrolled  in primary  schools
divided  by tho  number  ot ehildren  age 6  to 11, and (2)  the logarithm  of the secondary  enrollSent
divided  by the number  of  ehildren  age  12 to 17; and  the local  publie  ezponditures  on thb  school
level  divided  by the cbildren  in the  respective  benetiting  age clasa  erpreased  in real  1970  local
currency and converted  to 1970  U.S. dollare  on the basis of 'M  *achange  rates prevailing  on
average  for  1960  to 1971.  See source  for  more  detail.
Source: T. P.  Sehults  (1967: Table  13).so
measures  of adult  morbidity  or  what  constitutes  functional  good  health  that
could  be applied  to  men and  women  comparatively  across  societies.  Hortality
by age  is  therefore  used  as  the  preferred  measure  of  health  for  men  and  women.
It is typically  summarized  as  life  expectancy  at  birth,  but infancy  is the
most  vulnerable  period,  and  infant  mortality  by  sex  is  particularly  sensitive
to  differential  care  in  the  family,  as  noted  earlier.
Life  expectancy  appears  to  be  greater  for  women compared  to  mon  in  popu-
lations  where  schooling  is  more  equally  distributed  by gender,  as shown  by
WHO  estimates  by region  shown  in  Table  7.  biological  evidence  suggests  that
women  are  genetically  more  viable  than  oen.  Given similar  consumption  and
self-investment  opportunities,  women  have-  lower  death  rates  than  men at  all
ages,  except  perhaps  during  the  years  women  bear  children  if they  have  not
had  any  education. Death  due to  bearing  a child  is  twenty  times  higher  in
South and West Asia and North and subSaharan  Africa than in developed
countries,  and  women  in these  regions  also  bear  two  to three  times  as many
children  as do their  counterparts  in  high  income  countries  (column  7,  Table
7).  Nonetheless,  infant  and  childhood  mortality  is quantitatively  a larger
factor  io the  low life  expectancy  of females  in these  low income  regions.
Differences  in  child  mortality  by  sex  are  rarely  known  with  great  precision  in
poor  populations,  and  tho  official  figures  as  averaged  in  columns  5  and  6  of
Table  7 are not necessarily  reliable. Greater  confidence  can  probably  be
placed  in  the  infant  and  childhood  mortality  estinates  derived  retrospectively
from  the  recent  round  of  World  Fertility  Surveys  (Rutstein,  1983;  Hobcraft  It
Al.  1985).  Only  two  out  of 29 surveys,  those  for  Jordan  and  Syria,  revealed
greater  female  than  male  infant  mortality,  while  three  reported  higher  female
than  male  child  mortality  between  the ages  of  2  and  5  years--Bangladesh,81
Table 7
Life Expectancy at Uittb *ad lafeat  Nrtality.
Ratie  by Sax  ed  Maternal  Mortality  feo  Regimes  In  1360  ead  1350
Life  Expectancy  at  birth  latest Mortality  Maternal  mortality
Female  ?Male  pot
to Mele  Male  Level  to  Male  ablo  Level  100.000 Live Birtbs
1960-65 1960-a5  1960 - 1360  a  1360  ea 1960  ca 1963
(1)  t2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
High Income  1.09  1.11  66.6  60.5  .0  *  17.4  30
Zurepo  1.05  1.09  67.0  69.7  (22)  (22)  30
Oceania  1.07  1.06  61.7  64.6
North America  1.10  1.12  66.9  69.4
Japan  1.00  1.07  66.5  73.6
Israel  1.04  1.05  66.1  71.0
&outh Africa  1.07  1.05  52.1  60.9
Latin America  1.06  1.07  54.9  62.1  .03  44.09  270
(11)  Cli)
Zast  Asia  1.06  1.05  51.0  64S  .79  34.2  167
(excluding  Japan)
South lEst Asic  1.06  1.06  43.2  533.
Other Zest Asie
(e.g. Hong  tons,  1.07  1.06  54.2  63.4
Korea)
China  1.06  1.04  53.4  66.5
South Asia  .97  .96  43.3  50.7
(middle)  .62  51.0  616
(4)  (4)
West Asia  1.05  1.06  43.2  56 2
Africa  1.07  1.06  40.6  49.3  --  --
North Africa  1.05  1.05  45.5  54.7  90  58.1  500
SublSheran Africa  1.08  1.07  39.1  47.7  .01  $6.4  676
Cexculding S.Africa)  (4)  (4)
World  1.05  1.04  50.9  57.  9 
*Nubier of countrio  avered  in parenthesoe:  Not necessarily representative of region because of
data limitations.
Sour0ss:  Fizst tour colunra weighted by populations.  Zetimates fro  United Netions. D-caarscje
Indicators oas.  New  York. 1962; Colums  5  and 6 are  unweiiibted  averages  of countries re-
porting in 1903iUDlls  nh  I  Yo;rbook. Table 16; Colum  7  are  *ftimates  weighted  by  population
of reoisons  from  Rosec  alt.,  1930. Toble 34.  For country lovel *ptimates  that are  probably mrc
reliable for Attica  ead Asia.  see  Appendix  Table  S.82
Pakistan,  and  Egypt. All  of  these  countries  fall  in  the  South  and  West  Auian
and  North  African  regions.
Analyses  of  mortality  trends  by sex  confirm,  as  with  education,  that  in
most regions  of the world the prospects  for survival  are improving  more
rapidly  by  women  than  for  men  (United  Nations,  1982).  Most  countries  are  con-
verging  toward  the  sex  differences  in  mortality  schqdules  that  are  observed  in
the  industrially  advanced  countries,  but  the  pace  of  progress  differs  markedly
by  region.  Women's  education  is  the  best  predictor  of  the  level  and sex
differences  in mortality  schedules;  female  enrollment  rates are used in
50-year  forecasts  of national  mortality  schedules  (Zachariah  and  Vu, 1988:
xv). Until  life  expectancy  at  birth  for  women  exceeds  60  years,  the  rate  of
increase  in longevity  is greater  in  countries  where  more  than  70  percent  of
girls  are  enrolled  in  primary  school  (as  1956-59).'  Thus,  studies  of  national
mortality  patterns  confirm  the  critical  role  of  women's  education  in  the  rate
of  health  improvement  of  national  populations,  extending  the  evidence  beyond
the survival  of a woman's  own children  that is documented  from  household
studies  (Cochrane  gt  &I.,  1980;  Mensch  *al_.,  1986).
In conclusion,  women  are especially  poor in relation  to  men in their
acquired  capabilities,  such  as  schooling,  in the  world's  poorest  countries,
and.  in these  same  countries  women's  low  health  status  is  reflected  in  their
shorter  lives  in  comparison  to  men's.  This  deficit  is  particularly  pronounced
in  South  and  West  &sia  and  North  antd  subSaharan  Africa. Increasing  the  pro-
ductive  capabilities  of  women in  these  poor  countries  through  investment  in
their  schooling  appears to  be  an  efficient  use  of  social  and  private  individ-
ual  investment  resources.  Beyond  schooling,  other  public  policies  have  been
proposed  to  help  women realize  more efficiently  their  productive  potentiai  and83
contribute  more  to  the  growth  of their  societies.  Thoughp  these  policies  have
not  been  empirically  evaluated  as  extensively  as  investment  in  education,  some
appear  promising.
5.  Factor  Markets,  Information.  Diffusion,  and  Equipping  Interventions
There  is  much evidence  that  the  long-run  individual  and  social  benefits
from  increased  human  capital  investments  in  women  are  attractive  compared  to
alternative  uses  of  public  resources.  But  are  there  other  avenues  for  devel-
opment  programs  that could  also enhance  women's  productivity,  given  their
current  stocks  of human  capital. There  are  indications  that  women  could  be
more  productive  in  the  short  run,  if  they  had  greater  access  to  new  technical
knowledge,  had more instruction  on how to use  effectively  new  and existing
productive  inputs,  had means to acquire  credit  to respond  to economic
opportunities,  and  had  greater  control  over  their  own  assets  and,  livelihood.
The  public  sector  subsidizes  and/or  manages  many  activities  and  services
because  the  private  market  fails  to  produce  them  in  sufficient  amounts.  The
most  commonly  cited  reason  for  the  underproduction  of these  services  is  be-
cause  market  structure  does  not  provide  private  firms  with  the  means  to  charge
the  consumer  or  producer  for  what  they  produce.  Alternatively,  there  may  be
internal  economies  of scale  that  encoulage  natural  monopolies  uiith  their  ex-
ploitative  pricing.  Arguments  of  basic  needs,  social  externalities  and-equity
are  also  made  to  justify  these  interventions  of the  public  sector. Individ-
uals  may  benefit  as consumers  or  producers  because  the  public  sector  reduces
time  and  monetary  prices  of  such  goods  and  services.
The  provision  of  public  services  frequently  complements  the  capabilities
of  some  people  more  than  others,  adding  to  their  economic  productivity.  Some84
public  services  are  associated  more  with female  than  male  productivity,  and
vice versa.  But administrative  records,  and hence  quantitative  analys  iS,
rarely  consider  the  gender  of the  recipient  of  a  public  service  or for  that
matter  the  gender  of  the  administrative  staff  who  provides  the  service  to  the
public  It  has  been  observed  that  public  services  that  favor  female  produc-
tivity  are  given  relatively  low  priority  in  m*Ot  low  income  countries.  This
may  be traced  to  our  undervaluation  of  home  production.  For  example,  priority
is often  given  to  supporting  cash  crops,  which  are  often  managed  by males,
because  of  the  commercial  and  governmental  interests  in  these  potential  export
crops  that  provide  tax revenue. Regardless  of  why private  markets  fail  to
meet  social  needs,  the  economic  issues  of effectiveness  and  distribution  of
benefits  tend  to  be  hard  to  evaluate  empirically.  They  involve  measuring  the
substitutability  between  male  and  female  labor  in  many  production  processes,
the  interaction  of  modern  productive  inputs  and  extension  with  male  and  female
labor,  and  the  functioning  of  interconnected  factor  markets  as  they  impinge  on
the  marginal  product  of  both  types  of  labor.
Home Production  and  Nev  Technologies
Women  stand  to  gain  from  the  development  and  spread  of  new  technologies
that  improve  their  efficiency  in  home  production.  There  is  relatively  little
systematic  investment  by  the  public  sector  in  low-income  countries  designed  to
improve  labor  productivity  in  the  home,  yet  this  is a large  share  of  total
production  in  these  countries.  Only  a few  international  assistance  agencies
have  encouraged  research  and  development  projects  that  seek  small  scale  tech-
nologies  that  would  enhance  production  possibilities  in  the  home. Systematic
evaluation  of  these  undertakings  is  rarely  attempted.
Women  in  the  lowest  incone  countries  spend  much  tiLe  fetching  water  and85
fuel,  preparing  family  food,  and  caring  for  children.  Innovations  developed
to relieve  these  female  tasks  can  also  allow  women  to  transfer  some  of  their
production  from  the  home to the  market,  as in  the  case  of rice  milling  in
Indonesia  (Timmer,  1973)  or the production  of boer in Africa  (Haggblade,
1987). Reductions  in  consuuer  prices  should  distribute  widely  the  benefits
from  such  new technology  in  the  long  run. If  this  process  is  monitored  more
frequently,  policymakers  will  be alerted  to  the  home  and  price  mnvironm&nt  in
which technical  change  will permit  women  to capture  more  of the  resulting
economic  opportunities.  Technical  change  will  undoubtedly  continue  to  trans-
fer  production  from  the family  to market-oriented  firms.  Instigation  and
guidance  of this  complex  process  will require  empirical  evaluation  studies
that  distinguish  between  the  repercussions  for  men,  women,  and  children.
Agricultural  Exteusion  and  Research
Studies  of the  effectiveness  of agricultural  extension  programs  do not
provide  a stron3g  foundation  for  policy  although  $5  billion  a  year  is  now  spent
on it,  according  to  recent  world  estimates  (Birkhaeuser  et  al.  , -1988). Most
studies  are  from  India  and  the  United  States,  and  do  not  necessarily  agree  on
why some  programs  are  more  effective  than  others. To  determine  the  environ-
ment  in  which  extension  is  either  more  or  less  cost  effective  requires  more
comparable  studies  in  a  broader  range  of  countries,  with  different  management
structures,  staff  training,  technological  infrastructure,  price  policies  and,
most  of  all,  the  extent  of the  knowledge  to  be taught  that  is  profitable  for
farmers  to  use.
A  number  of  studies  suggest  that  extension,  by  increasing  farmer  pro-
ductivity,  narrows  the  difference  between  more  and  less  educated  farmers.
This  parallels  family  plannlng,  where  contraceptive  adoption  and  fertility86
differentials  between  more  and  less  educated  women  are  narrowed  by extension
work  (Schultz,  1988b).  Agricultural  and  family  planning  extension  appears  to
be a  substitute  for formal  education. Extension  particularly  benefits  the
recipient  who  is  less  wvel trained  to  decipher  and  evaluate  new  technologies,
adopt  novel  techniques,  and  obtain  combinations  of inputs  that  are  likely  to
be more profitable  or cost-effective.  It has been argued  for  nearly  two
decades  (Boserup,  1970)  that some  agricultural  extension  agents  should  be
women,  and  that  contacts  with  female  as  well  as  male  farmers  should  be  moni-
tored  in  areas  of the  world  where  farms  are  often  managed  be  women.  Extension
programs  in the  United  States  have  generally  included  fenale  agents  to  work
with  women  in  nutrition  and  homo  health  measures,  as  well  as  farn  management.
Still  there  are  no strong  evaluation  studies  that  distinguish  how  the  gender
of extension  staff  or of the  person  contacted  at the  farm  level  affects  the,
productivity  of  farm  labor.  Farm-management  and  household-production  studies
have shown  the  levels  of  productivity  of  female  farm  managers  and  how  it
increases  with  education  (Moock,  1976,  1981).  But  these  approaches  have  not
been  used  to  evaluate  extension  or  credit  policies  or  to  provide  a  basis  for
replication  studies  (Spring  at  I.,a  1983;  Ngwira,  1987;  Herz,  1988;
Birkhaeuser,  1988).
Agricultural  extension  systems  are  often  criticized  as  not  serving  women,
particularly  in  subSaharan  Africa,  where  women predominate  in  the  farm  work-
force  (Boserup,  1965;  Lele,  1975,  Ber,!e*  rt1.A.,  1984; MRI,  1985;  Ngwira,
1987;  Herz,  1988). 28  Women  tend  to  concentrate  on  food  staples  eaten  by  the
family  and  men on  cash  crops  in  Africa  and  in  other  parts  of  the  developing
world.  But  agricultural  research  to  improve  yields  initially  focused  on
export  crops  and  consequently  faised  the  productivity  of  men more  rapidly  than87
that  of  wonen. ;n  the  last  decade,  sowe  of  this  bias  has  been  corrected;  more
research  has been allocated  to staple  foods  consmed by the  poor,  such  as
cassava,  pulses,  and  sorghum  (Judd  a& al.,  1986). Nonetheless,  there  is  evi-
dence  that  the  direction  agricultural  technology  has evolved  in Africa  has
placed  women  at a growing  disadvantage  relative  to oen. The  recent  relative
decline  in  prices  of  some export  crops  in  Africa  compared  to  staple  crops,  may
enhance  vomen  s  productivity.  But  growing  agricultural  productivity  is  likely
to continue  the  trend  of slowly  declining  prices  of rice,  wheat,  maize,  and
traded  staples.  If  women's  productivity  in  local  foods  does  not  keep  pace,  or
they  fail to diversify  (e.g.,  into  aquaculture  or vegetables),  their  real
income  vill  continue  to  be  eroded  (Kennedy  and  Cogill,  1986).
There is debate  today on how to stimulate  African  food production
(Gladwin  and  McMillan,  1989). Some  would  encourage  larger  scale  production
units  that  can  introduce  more  sophisticated  technologies  with  greater  capital
intensLty.  Others  would  increase  the  productivity  of  existing  small-scale
farm,s  though  the  effect  on  marketed  surplus  might  be  smaller.  The  former
direction  would lead  rapidly  to fewer  female  farmers,  if the larger  scale
units  proved  to'  be  cost-effective.  The  latter  course  would  entail  programs  to
increase  the  productivity  of  peasant  farms,  most  of  which  are  currently  uanag-
ed  in  Africa  by  women.  But  perhaps  ln  the  longer  sweep  of  history  increasing
lntensification  of  African  agriculture  vill  nonetheless  displace  women,  as
expected  by  Boserup  (1965,  1970).  But  this  form  of  displacemnt  would  occur
ore  gradually  and  at  very  different  rates  throughout  subSaharan  Africa,  since
some  areas  have  not  yet  expanded  to  the  linits  of  cultivation.  Among the
benefits  and  costs  of  these  alternative  forms  of  subSaharan  agricultural
development  are  the  likely  changes  that  they  would  imply  for  family88
consuption  and  human  capital  investment  patterns. The studies  reviewed  in
Sections  3 and 4 suggest  that  changing  the  balance  of productivity  between
women  and  men  could  have  long-run  consequences  for  the  level  of  child  mortal-
ity,  nutrition,  schooling  and  fertility  in  the  continent,  as  well  as  rates  of
economic  growth.  The  current  policy  debate  should  weigh  these  connections  by
evaluating  carefully  the consequences  of existing  programs  that  have  been
successful  in  promoting  agricultural  developmnt  in  either  direction.
Land  Ownership,  Credit,  and  Labor  Narkets
Along  with  extension  services,  farmers  also  need  credit  to  pay  for  new
seeds  (HYV),  irrigation  wells,  fertilizers,  pesticides,  etc.  Although  there
are few experimentally  designed  studies,  casual  evidence  suggests  strongly
that  women  are  at  a  serious  disadvantage  in  getting  credit.  Land  ownership  is
the  usual  collateral  for  farm  credit,  but  women  seldom  own  land. Even  where
religious-  law  refers  to the  equality  of  men and  women,  actual  practices  of
inheritance  and  the  control  of property  in  marriage,  strongly  suggests  that
women  do  not  have  equal  access  to  loan  collateral  and  thus  are  denied  credit
(Davision,  1988;  Moock,  1986;  Hossain  and  Afsar,  1988).  Women  working  on  con-
munal  land  have  no  marketable  property  rights  to  mortgage. If this  form  of
market  failure  leads  to an inefficient  allocation  of credit,  institutional
innovations  may  b. needed--perhaps  by replacing  loans  based  on  collateral  by
loans  based  on  closely  knit  groups  which  are  identified  with  their  comeunity.
The community's  future  credit  thereby  depends  on the repayment  of current
individual  loans.
The  most  extensive  and  best  documented  program  providing  credit  to the
poor  is  that  of the  Grameen  Bank  of  Bangladesh.  As  of  August  1988,  its  453
branches  operated  in  about  9,000  villages,  about  ten  percent  of  all  villages89
in  Bangladesh.  It  had  lent  to  some  413,000  "members"  and  84  percent  of  these
were  womon,  and  they  received  70  percent  of  the  loans.  Groups  of  members  bor-
row  with  no collateral  and  complete  their  repayment  within  one  year  or lose
the  group's  rights  to  borrow  in  the  future.  Membership  is  restricted  to  only
persons  with  less  than  .5  acres  of cultivatable  land  or  assets  not  exceeding
the  valu,  of  one  acre  of  medium  quality  land. Repayment rates  have  been  fav-
orable  compared  to  other  commercial  banks,  but  the  cost  for  loan  placement
and  monitoring  of  assets  is not  easily  derived  from  reports.  Evaluation
studies  of the  Bank  are favorable  but  not  sufficiently  analytical.  They  do
suggest,  however,  that  here  is  an institutional  innovation  that  mitigates  the
disadvantages  of poor  womon in expanding  their  means  of production.  Com-
parisons  of the consequences  of the Bank  being  in  a  village  on average
productivity  and earnings  of village  women  and  men would  strongthen  future
evaluation  studies. Is  economic  progress  more  rapid  in  "bank  villages"  than
control  villages  without  access  to  Grameen  Bank  resources?  (Hossain  and  Afsar,
1988;  Hossain,  1987).
To promote  the  more efficient  allocation  of talent  across  the entire
economy,  women  should  be helped  to  compete  in  male-dominated  professions  and
industries  as  men should  be encouraged  to  enter  female  dominated  segments  of
the economy.  Women  may work in declining  sectors,  where  modern  emerging
technologies  are likely  to depress  their  incomes  by the generation  of new
man-made substitutes.  These  wonen need  opportunities  to  enter  more  favorably
situated  sectors. If  they  do  not  have  as  much  education  as  men,  women  will
need  more  specific  training  and  assistance  to redeploy  their  skills. None-
theless,  general  education  remains  the most reliable  means  to improve  the
mobility  of  women  in  the  long  run. Women  have  fared  poorly  relative  to  men  in90
those  regions  -South  and  West  Asia  and  Africa--where  they  have  had  the  l.Bast
education  compared  to  mon. The  jobs  they  cati  compete  for  are  limited  by  their
schooling  and  vocational  skills,  and  the  hallmark  of  modern  economic growth  Is
relatively  rapid  changes  in  the  structure  of  employment  that  rewards  mobility
(Kuznets,  1957,  1966).
Educated  women are  scarce relat,lve  to  educated  men  in  some  countries,  and
they  are  in  equal  numbers  to  men in  other  countries.  It  might  be  expected
that  where  educated  women were  relatively  scarce  their  wage  advantaf,e  over
less  educated women would  be  greater  than  that  for  men.  But  private  returns
to  schooling  are  roughly  comparable  for  men and women across  a  wide  range  of
countries.  Perhaps  the  apparent  rigidity  of  sex  segregation  by  occupation  and
industries  does  not  preclude  the  substitution  of  male  for  female  labor  of  con-
parable  education  across  a  sufficient  range  of  activities  to  equalize  relative
returns  at  each  level  of  schooling  for  men  and  women.
There  is little  evidence  that  families  in  all  regions  of the  world  are
guided  in  theie  investments  in  female  and  male  chlIdren  by the  private  rates
of  return  to  schooling  received  by the  chlld. The  puzzle  is  why  families  are
not  efficiently  allocating  their  investments  among  their  offspring?  Parental
claims  on  the  adult  productivity  of  boys  may be  more  secure,  given  some
family-cultural  systems,  than  their  future  claims  on  girls.  If  the  parent's
crlterion  for allocating  school  investments  between  boys  and girls  does  not
lead  to  a  socially  optimal  intergenerational  pattern  of imvestment  in  human
capital  in  som  countries,  what  should  be the  role  of public  policy? The
inefficient  allocation  of  resources,  even if we do not know  precisely  the
cause,  can frequently  be corrected  by a judicious  application  of taxes  and
subsidies.91
In  the  classic  textbook  example  of  the  apple  grower  and  bee  keeper,  the
external  social  economies linking  these  two  activities  lead  to  an  underproduc-
tion  of  both  because  of  the  market  failure.  A  subsidy  to  both  independent
producers  could  maximize  social  product,  or  both  activities  could  be  under-
taken  by  the  same  producer  to  internalize  the  e*onomy. In  the  case  of  the
parents,  unless  they  are  appropriately  rewarded  by  the  groom  for  their  *du-
cated  daughter,  the parents  may underinvest  in  their  daughter. Research
should  focus  on  why families  invest  different  aounts  in  their  girls  and  boys.
It  was noted  above  that  this  disparity  in  investment  in  mun  nd  women  has  a
tendency  to  be  smaller  in  high  income  industrially  advanced countries  and  to
diminish  over  tim  as  countries  develop  (Schultz,  1987).  Public  policy  can
probably  speed  up  this  process  with  incentives  that  would  motivate  the  family
to  invest  more in  females.  But  the  costs  of  and  responses  to  such  interven-
tions  are  unknown.  The  family's  schooling  behavior  by  gender  must be  studied
to  identlfy  promislng  policies  that  could  be  justified.given  the  scarcity  of
administrative  talent  and  severely  strained  social-welfare  budgets.  Analysis
would  then  be  needed  of  pilot  programs  to  evaluate  precisoly  the  capacity  of
such  policies  to  produce  the  desired  changes  in  intrafamily  investment:  and  to
assess  whether  the  policies  induced  any  undesirable  side-effects.92
Family  Planning  and  Maternal  lealth
Family  planning  programs  subsidize  contraueptive  supplies  and employ
field  workers  to explain  birth  control  techniques  to potentlal  users  and
inform  them  how these  methods  may be obtained.  Some  programs  do offer  male
contraceptlves,  such  as  the  condom  or  vasectomy.  But  the  technological  break-
throughs  of  the 1960's-1970's  that  were disseminated  by the first  wave of
family  planniLng  programs  were  female  methods,  such  as  the  IUD and  oral  steroid
(pill).  These  and  female  sterilization  are  still  the  most  widely  used  contra-
ceptives.  Experience  in  East  Asia  suggested  that  female  field  workers  were
more  successful  in recruiting  contraceptive  users  (e.g.  Rogers  and Solomon,
1975;  Repetto,  1977).  Older  married  women  or  midwives  with  av educational
level  on a  par  with  their  community  appeared  to  be  most  effective.  Similar
evidence  has  been  collected  in  Mexico  and  elsewhere  (Azcona  atal..  1980). It
would  be  desirable  to  analyze  actual  fertility  declines  induced  by  the  differ-
ent  types  of  field  workers  and  not  simply  the  acceptor  rate  (Schultz,  1988c).
But  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  where  the  mothods  offered  by  the  program
are  for  women, female  field  workers  should  have  an  rAvantage.;
The  same  reasoning  has  not  been  transferred,  to  my  knowledge,  to  the  de-
livery  of prenatal,  maternal,  and  child  health  care. These  kinds  of  health
care  are  also  received  by  women  who,  if  adsquately  instructed,  would  use  it  at
home.  Women doctors  and paramedic  staff  might  prove  better  than  men in
delivering  many  forms  of  health  care  oriented  toward  women  and  infants. I
could  not  find  reports  on  the  design  of  pilot  or  experimental  programs  to  test
such  a  plausible  hypothesis.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  agricultural  extension
programs,  the  predominance  of  male  health  program  administrators  may  have
contributed  to  the  allocation  of  a  large  proportion  of  government  jobs  to93
males,  even  though  women  might  do some  of them  better  and  probably  at less
cost.  29  Entirely  new public  policies  may  bo appropriate  to deal  with the
health  problems  of women and children.  Nutritional  supplementation  in
conjunction  with child  and maternal  health  is one such  option  (Winikoff,
1988).  The large  gap from  region  to region  in maternal  mortality  rates
Lllustrated  in Table  7 shows  that  this  serious  health  problem  is  not  being
resolved  by traditional  public  policies  (Herz  and  Measham,  1987). Some  have
even  concluded  that  in subSaharan  Africa,  public  health  is  unlikely  to  make
any progress  until the level of women's  education  improves  (Anonymous
editorial,  Lancet,  1987).
6.  ConclusLons
Reliance  on traditional  market-oriented  national  income  accounts  has
introduced  a systematic  bias in  development  economics  that  has  asxigned  too
low  a  value  to  the  economic  contribution  of  women  in  the  development  process.
In reorganizing  our approach  to economic  development,  and refocusing  our
analysis  of women  and development,  it is essential  that  a  family  economic
framework  incorporate  both  rsonmarket  and  market  activities  of the  members  of
the  household. In  what  way  would  such  a reappraisal  of  women's  contribution
to  society  clarify  aeglected  opportunities  for  public  policies?
Women are  usually  enmeshed  in  a  family  that  trades  off  the  competing
interests  of  its  members  and  coordinates  the  uses  of  its  members'  tim  and
resources  in  market  and  nonmarket  production.  To  affect  women's  status  one
must  generally  work  through  the  family.  Society  can  transfer  resources  to
families  to  raise  current  consumption  levels,  but  the  family  can  reallocate
its  resources  In  a  compensatory  manner.  Thus,  this  intervention  vill  not94
necessarily  raise  the  efficiency  of the  family  as  a production  unit  or even
influence  how it  allocates  its  resources  among ommbers.  The  effect  o~`  public
transfers  on intrahousehold  consumption  patterns  is  thus  likely  to  be greatly
reduced.
More  promising  are social  interventions  that  work to change  the con-
straints  impinging  on the  family  and  thereby  to  motivate  it to achieve  its
goals  by investing  more  human  capital  resources  in  its  female  members. The
private  and social  rates  of return  to  wooen's  education  at the  primary  and
secondary  level  are  at least  equal  to  those  of oen. Thus,  a more  equal  dis-
tribution  of  education  between  sen  and  women  would  not  slow  economic  growth.
In  fact,  because  female  education  has  greater  effects  on  health,  nutrition  and
fertility,  it  might actually  accelerate  development.  This possibility
warrants  more study,  particularly  in South  and  West  Asia  and Africa  where
female  education  levels  are  especially  low.
There  is evidence  to suggest  that  the  economic  bias  of  accounting  only
for  market  income  has  led  to  a  misallazation  of  public  development  resources
in  favor  of  market  vis-a-vis  nonmarket  sativities,  and  consequently  men's
rather  than  women's  work.  A reevaluation  of  women's  nonmarket  work  has  begun
to  show  the  pervasiveness  of  this  bias. But  this  has  not  yet  affected  devel-
opment  planning.  The  rhetoric  on  "women and  development"  has  been  substantial
in  the  last  decade,  but  progress  toward  establishing  an analytical  framework
free  of  the  traditional  market  bias  has  been  slow. This  framework  must  be
used  to  guide  the  collection  of  data  from  households  and  communities  tltat  will
show where investments  enhance  women's  productivity,  broadly  defined  to
include  nonmarket  or  home  production.
The  traditional  economic  approach  to  modeling  family  decision-making  as95
the outcome  of a  unified  demand  system  needs  to  be relaxed  to accommodate
bargaining  over  conflicting  individual  interests.  This  will  not  entail  weak-
oning  the  emphasis  it  has  assigned  to  the  separate  prices  of  women's,  men's,
and  children's  time  as  critical  factors  explaining  the  family's  allocation  of
time,  determination  of fertility,  and  demand  for  market  goods.  But  the  bar-
gaining  model  also  emphasizes  the  ownership  and  control  of  nonearned  income
and the  context  in  which  individual  members  of the family  work and are
compensated  for  their  labor.  New data  are  needed  to  test  and to  exploit  the
distinctive  features  of  this  cooperative  Nash-bargained  framework,  such  as
who  owns  and  controls  nonearned  income  in  the  householl.
Labor  supply  studies  will  be needed  to  categorize  "job  types"  in  which
women's  "control"  of their  output  varies,  ruch  as wage  jobs,  own  account  wora
at  home  or outside  of the  hQme,  and  unpaid  family  work. This  classification
process  may  be  aided  by  parallel  studtes  of  family  human  capital  investment  in
children  and  other  intrahousehold  resource  allocations  for  which  society  has  a
vested  interest.  Research  could  then  assess  whether  the  intrafamily  distribu-
tion  of  resources  varies  depending  on  whether  women  are  engaged  in  different
"job  types.'
A clearer  distinction  is  needed  as to  what  is  the  approprlate  model  for
studying  family  behavior  in  various  regions  of  the  vorld. What  are  the m-
pirical  consequences  of female  control  of resources  for  hor  production  and
consumption  decisions? Evaluation  of public  policies  affecting  households
will then  be  more  sharply  focused  and precise.  This  should  lead  to  sound
policies  that  increase  she  output  of  market  and  nonmarket  goods  while  raising
the  productive  capabillties  of  women.
Anthropological  studies  of gender  differencesi  in family  production  and96
consumption  should  be integrated  with  economic  studies  of household  p.oduc-
tin, labor  supply,  and  expenditure  patterns.  The  family  bargaining  framework
for evaluating  public  policies  in low income  countries  should  lead  to new
policy  insights. Sinc&  not  much  work  has  yet  been  undertaken,  one  can  only
identify  where  the  payoffs  are  likely  to  be  1arge  and  the  direction  in  which
they  may move development  policy.  In thls  tentative  form,  directions  are
offered  for  research  and  policy.
First,  statistical  methods  have  been  outlined  and  the  family  bargaining
framework  has been mentioned  as a useful  basis  for  ostimat'ng  private  and
social  rates  of return  to  schooling  for  women  and  men. Labor  force  partici-
pation  and  choice  of  wage  employmnt  both  influence  the  selection  of  samples
on  which  market  wage  functions  are  estimated.  Procedures  should  correct  for
these  sources  of sample  selection  bias.  Few  studies  have  used comparable
identification  restrictions.  What  evidence  is  available  suggests  that  primary
and  secondary  schooling  is  a high  return  activity,  and  no less  so  for  women
than  for  men.  It  would  seem  inefficient  to  maintain  much lower  schooling  in-
vestments  in  females  than  in  males,  as  evident  now in  South  and  West  Asia  and
in  North  and  subSaharan  Africa.  Development  agencies  have  a  clear  mandate  to
emphasize  this  investment  gap  and  encourage  cour.trios  to  raise  female  school-
ing  rates  toward  those  of  males.
How thls  is  to  be  accomplished  at  least  cost  has  not  yet  been  addressed
by  practical  policy  makers nor  studied  extensively  by  researchers.  How do  the
constraints  of  institutions,  household  resource  endowments,  prices  and  wages
determine  school  enrollmnt  rates  for  boys  and  girls  in  various  cultural
regions  of  the  world?  The  family  controls  this  decision  and  mUst be  motivated
to  adopt  the  view  that  Sirts  are  as  good  an  investmnt  of  parent  resources  as97
are  boys. This  is  apparently  not  now  the  case,  and  consequently  social  inter-
ests  would  appear  to  diverge  from  parental  private  interests Persuasion  and
propaganda  are probably  not the answer. Regulations  such as quotas  that
require  schools  to  increase  the  fraction  of  girls  enrolled,  are  also  readily
circumvented,  if the regulations  are not viewed  as in the parents'  own
interests.
Variable  user  fees  for  boys  and  girls  is  one  possibility  that  destrves
study  as  more  public  sector  activities  are  financed  through  user  fees. Lower
school  fees  for  girls  than  for  boys  might  be  effective.  One  planning  minister
of  Nigeria  proposed  to  do  just  this. Until  maternal  mortality  rates  of  Asia
and  Africa  are  brought  down  to  the  current  levels  in  Latin  America  (Table  7),
an  argument  cQuld  also  be  made  to  waive  fees  for  prenatal  and  maternal  health
care  at  least  for  poorer  rural  populations.
Second,  budgetary  allocations  of  the  International  Agricultural  Research
Centers  should  be  reviertd  according  to  where  each  project  can  be  linked  to  a
particular  crop  and  region  (e.g.  IRRI,  1985). These  expenditures  on a crop
and  region  should  then  be  categorized  as  benefiting  primarily  either  female  or
male agricultural  productivity,  or both.  If expenditures  are imbalanced
according  to  this  accounting  exercise,  the  international  centers  could  plan  to
change  their  priorities  gradually  or explore  policies  that  would  erode  sex
segregation  of  labor  for  speciflc  high  payoff  crops.
Third,  governments  should  publish  data  on the gender  of staff  and of
recipients  of their  extension  and service  programs. If these  data  were
available  by region,  program  evaluation  of the  consequences  of these  varia-
tions  could  be undertaken.  These  data  should  cover  agricultural  extension
programs,  family  planning  extension  and  services,  public  health  extension  andg8
services,  academic  and vocational  education,  home Iconomics  and community
health  programs,  informal  and  adult  education,  agricultural  credit  and  small
business  loans,  etc. Analysis  of  these  data  may  perhaps  show  that  employment
of more  women  doctors  in the  public  health  clinics  or  more  midwives  in the
family  planning  outreach  program  would be more effective  than existing
programs.  Data  are  rarely  collected  now  in  a  form  that  enable  hypotheses  such
as these  to  be tested. TLe  cost  of  collecting  such  dat&,  geared  to explore
plausible  trade-offs  in  the  mix  of  staffing  and  recipients,  should  be  quickly
recovered  fron  improvements  in  the  implementation  of  the  programs.  Althougn
it would  require  more administratfve  effort,  a  parallel  goal  should  be to
collect  the  data  on  public  sector  salary  and  fringa  benefit  costs  for  all  male
and  fesale  staff  by professional  level,  not  only  to  promote  wage  parity  for
those  performing  comparable  jobs,  but also  to  permit  *valuation  studies  to
estimate  the cost-effectiveness  of  alcornative  staffing  and management
structures.
Fourth,  employment  logislation  and effective  protection  of some  indus-
tries  can  generate  large  benefits  (rents)  for  some  workers  and  impose  costs  on
others. Data  on the  distribution  of  these  benefits  and  costs  within  families
might  show  wvhch  public  policies  place  a disproportionate  burden  on  nonmarket
production,  and  which  policies  benefit  better  educatd  workers,  or those  whc
work  ln  cities  or  capital-intensive  sectors.  Ron  and  women  are  not  necessar-
ily  helped  equally  by such  policies.  Evidence  suggests,  for  example,  that
fewer  women participate  in  the  modern  labor  force  in  low  lncome  countries  when
minimum wages  are  relatively  high  (Schultz,  1988a).  Minimum wages  discoura&%
employment  of  persons  whose  productivity  is  below  the  minimum vage.  A larger
proportion  of  female  workers  than  male  workers  fall  in  this  category.99
Finally,  uncertainty  and  risk  havo  led  individuals  to insure  themselves
against  future  variations  in  their  income  by  risk  pooling  across  the  extended
family  (Rosenzweig,  1988;  Rosenzweig  and  Stark,  1988). The  public  sector  may
try  to  provide  alternative  institutions  to assist  individuals  when  the fam-
ily's  mechanisms  for  coping  with  risk  generate  negative  social  externalities.
What  are  the  consequences  for  women's  economic  status  if parent-arranged
marriages  for  daughters  are  designed  primAriiy  to  mitigate  the  family's  risks
from  local  crop  failurw?  Crop  insurance  programs  might  provide  an  alternative
worth  exploring,  where  'he  variation  of  weather  can  be  easily  monitored  to
simplify  administration.
Social  insurance  is  also  relied  on  to  meet  the  costs  of  illness  and  old
age.  These  forms  of  insurance  influence  how  the  extended  family  behaves.
Women and  young  girls  tend  to  withdraw  their  time  from  the  labor  force  when
there  is  a  family  need to care  for  the  sick  or  elderly  (e. g. Pitt  and
Rosenzweig,  1988). Consequently,  these  fontw  of  social  insurance  undoubtedly
affect  women's  market  participation  and  productivity,  and  may  thus  influence
the  willingness  of  parents  to  invest  in  the  market  skills  of  their  daughters.
Can poor countries  afford  to provide  parents  with  a public  sector  old-age
support  scheme  that substitutes  for having  many surviving  sons?  Little
empirical  research  is  focussed  on  the  family  as  an  institution  for  mitigating
risk in order  to discover  how fanily  decision-makino  adapts  to government
social  policies.
Without  much  firm  evidence  of  how  public  policLes  affect  women's  produc-
tivity  or  family  consumption  patterns,  it  would  be useful  to design  and
implement  a  series  of  pilot  programs  based  on  current  knowledge  of  more  prom-
islng  inierventions.  Accurately  measured  indicators  of program  objectives100
must  be  selectod  and  the  program  and  control  groups  should  be  iarge  enough  and
diverse  enough  to  confidently  assess  whether  tho  program  was effective.  Be-
cause  there  are  .auy constraints  on the family's  decisionmaking  that  will
also  influence  women's  productivity,  and these  constraints  may differ  in
unmeasured  ways  across  communities,  a dispersed  sample  of  comunities  for  the
pilot  programs  and  for  the  control  cox  unities  Is  desirable.  A  theoretical
nodel  of  family  behavior  should  prescribe  the  primry  factors  systematically
influencing  the  indicators  of  program  success.  Tnese  control  factors  would  be
monitorod  in the base-line  and follow-up  surveys  of the  pilot  and control
community  households.  Evidence  on  the  prograu's  impact  will  be sore  convinc-
ing  if  a  rindom  design  of  the  counity  sample  is  adopted.
Pilot  programs  might  fir5t  be  designed  around  the  objective  of  Increasing
school  enrollment  and  graduation  rates  for  girls.  A second  series  of  monitor-
ed  pilot  programs  could  assess  the  effect  of  equalizing  access  to  agricultural
extension  services  by male  and  female  farmers  in  Africa,  South-East  Asia  and
Latin  America. Measures-of  "farmer  contacts"  as  an indicator  of extension
output  has  serious  problems  (Birkhaeuser  i".jJ  ,  1988),  and  therefore  measures
of productivity  of men and  women  across  distinct  program  regions  should  be
analyzed.  A third  set  of  pilot  programs  might  explore  alternative  configura-
tions  of  child  and  maternal  health  progrims,  where  the  mix  of  staff  by level
and  gender  would  vary.  Finally,  program  innovations  in  the  delivery  of  credit,
such  as  the  Grameen  Bank  in  Bangladesh,  should  be  evaluated.  Not  only  in
terms  of  the  gender  of  the  loar  recipient,  but  also  the  program's  consequences
for  community-wide  productivity  of  womev,  and  men.  Data  should  also  be  sought
on  investments  of  famil'es  in  the  education  and  health  of  males  and  females  in
the  program  and  control  coomunities.  An  intergenerational  consequence  of101
raising  the  productivity  of  women  should  be to sncourag  parents  to invest
more in their  daughters.  All of the  above  pilot  programs  should  therefore
monitor  the choices  made  by families  in producing  healthy  and  educated
daughters  and  sons.10'
Footnotes
l/This  unobserved  variable  enters  into  the  statistical  error  in  these  outcome
equations,  as  would  idiosyncratic  but  individually  persistent  tastes.
2/Statistical  specification  tests  of  endogeneity  are  only  feasible  when  there
is  agreement  on model  identification,  which  in the  analysis  of  household  be-
havior  frequently  rests  on  controversial  distinctions  that  need  more  explicit
discussion.
aAny  mechanism  that  converts  "compensating  variationw  in  family  composition
and  specific  consumption  patterns  into  measures  of  the  "cost  of  a  child"  or
adult  equivalence  scales  are  ambiguous,  Intercorrelations  among  endogenous
variables  are tricky  to interpret.  The emphasis  here  on disaggregation  of
family  nunearned  income  by who  controls  it  adds  another  complication  to  this
time  honored,  but  unsatisfactory,  practice  of  conditioning  demands  on  family
composition  (see  Deaton,  1986;  Gronau,  1988).
i/Of  course,  the  bargaining  could  occur  at the  outset,  when  the  family  is
formed,  which  suggests  that  members  use  their  initial  resource  endowments  to
agree  on  the  weights  for  individual  goals  in  the  'family's  utility  function'u
If  these  resources  change  unexpectedly,  because  of  a  bequest  or  inheritance  or
alternative  marriage  proposition,  the  'threat  points"  would  shift  and  a new
bargain  and  agreed-upon  family  utility  function  would  be  adopted  as  a  guide  to
subsequent  intrafamily  allocations.103
In  principle,  the  measurement  of  nonearned  incom is  to  capture  an  exogenous
difference  across  persons  in  their  budget  constraint  that  does  not  also  induce
a  change  in  money  or  time  prices  of  various  types  of  consumption  or  behavior.
In  practice,  nonearned  income  (rents,  dividends,  interest,  and  capital  gains)
could  arise  from  inheritances  that  are  similar  to  schooling,  in  that  they  are
largely  financed  by  parents  and  family  and  can  be  viewed  as  *xogenous  at  the
start  of  adult  life.  But  nonearned  income  also  represents  returns  on  a  per-
son's life cycle  accumulation  of savings,  and hence  captures  in part the
person's  behavior. It then  becomes,  for  some  purposes,  an  endogenous  choice
variable. Hence,  it is desirable  for survey  questionnaireni  to pursue  the
source  of  current  nonearaed  incom,  current  ssets,  and  the  date  of  receipt  of
bequests  that  led to these  current  assets,  and  whether  they  came  from  the
husband's  or  wife's  side  of  the  family.  The Rand Malaysian  family  life  survey
comes  closest  to asking  these  questions,  but  I know  of  no analysis  of  these
data  from  the  perspective  outlined  in  this  raper  (Butz  and  DaVanzo,  1978).
L/JEidence  compiled  by Svedberg  (1988)  indicates  that female  nutritional
status  and survival  prospects  in subSaharan  Africa  are superior  overall  to
male,  possibly  because  women  are  economically  more  productive  in converting
calories  into  work than oen. As a consequence,  perhaps,  parents  are paid
brideprices  for  their  daughters  and  have  a  stronger  incentive  to  invest  in
their  health.  The  one  region  of  subSaharan  Africa  vhere  Svedberg's  anthro-
pometric  indicators  of nutrition  and  mortality  do not indicate  as  strong  a
bias  in favor  of females  is in  Nigeria  and  perhaps  Senegal. Both  of these
countries  contain  a significant  Islamic  element  and  women's  productive  roles
are more circumscribed  in these  segments  of the population  (Caldwell  and104
Caldwell,  1987).
1/In  principle  there  might  be a superior  Pareto  efficient  allocation  of  hus-
band  and  wife  labor  that  would  yield  a larger  output  for  both  members  of the
family. But in practice,  thero  are  costs  in monitoring  labor  ivputs  over
scattered  plots  and  transaction  costs  In  exchange of  inputs  and outputs  that
mig)ht  be required  to provide  both persons  with the incentivos  needed  to
achieve  Pareto  efficiency.  These  transaction  costs  might  absorb  most  of  the
output  gain.
A/The  overall  determinant-condition  of  maximization  theory  in  the  fmily  de-
imnd  model  is  also  rejected  by  Hecl=tan  in  the  staiLc  case  (1971:  Chapter  2,
pp.  32-33). Both  the  static  and 'life  cycle'  estimation  approachos  pursued
by  Heckman lead  to  rejection  of  the  syoetry  condition.  Ultimateoly,  however,
he imposed  the  restriction  to  obtain  his  preferred  estimates  (Chapter  2,  p.
37-38).  One  possible  explanation  for  the  rejection  of  the  domand  systeu  par-
ameter  restrictions  is the difference  in spouse-specific  nonearned  income
effects  that  may  be  used  to  infer  individual  compensated  cross-wage  effects.
2/Aggregate  data  were  analyzed,  for  example,  in  Chilo  (DaVanzo,  1972),  rela-
tive  education  in Thailand  (Maurer  at  &I..  1973),  the  U.S. (Frieden,  1974;
Becker  at  al.,  1977),  and  in  Puerto  Rico  (Nerlove  and  Schultz,  1970).
/For  example,  Rosenhouse  (1988)  illustrates  from  the 1985  LSMS  from  Peru
that  90 percent  of  the  male  headed  households  are  currently  married,  while105
only  5 percent  of the  fe2ale  headed  households  are  in  such  unions.  Her  data
also  show  that  in Peru  half  of the  fwmale  household  heads  are  widowed,  and
they  are  older  than  the  male  heads. These  groups  are  really  quite  incompar-
able  and not  particularly  well  structured  to analyze  particular  sources  of
poverty  in  society.  As  discussed  in  the  text,  t  ere  are  many  possible  causes
for  the  increase  in  female  headed  households.  The  greater  longevity  of  women
then  men  is  one  possible  source.  Another  source  would  be vhe  lower  frequency
of  remarriage  by  women  then  men. Female  household  heads  also  work  fewer  hour
than  do male  heads,  even  ignoring  the  contribution  of  wives  to  their  hous&
holds,  and the  higher  average  wages  received  by men than  womon.  Multiple
earner  households  are also the rule,  not  the exception,  in Peru,  and the
sources  of  behavioral  and  biological  selection  of  individuals  into  bouseholds
of  very  different  compositions.  It  is  simply  difficult  to  infer  anything  from
the  widely  reported  characteristics  of  households  with  male end female  heads.
:9/It  is easy  to fault  definitions  of 'head  of  household,"  when  there  is  no
consensus  on  the  concept  being  measured or  its  use. There  is  a  need  to  dis-
tinguish  one individual  around  which  to relate  other  household  members,  for
the  purposes  of  establishing  kinship.  There  is  alio  the  idea  of  dominant
economic  provider  or  family  elder  whose  authorlty  is  respected.  But  in  the
LSNS in  Cote  d'Ivoire  the  customary  approach is  to  count  females  in  the  rural
sector  as belonging  to  a  male headed  household  even  though  the  head  resided
in  a distant  clty,  more  or less  permanently.  the  increasing  documentation  oa
short-term  seasonal  or circulating  migration  in many low income  countries
underscores  the  need  to  measure household  membership according  to  a  variety  of
rules  depending  on  how  the  data  are  to  be  used.  For  a list  of some  of  the106
problems  with  the  current  data  collection  practices  see Rosenhouse  (1988).
121Obvious  changes  involve  the  decline  in  child  and  adult  mortality,  the  in-
crease  in age  at first  marriage,  the  decrease  in  marital  fortility,  and  the
redistribution  of  population  toward  urban  areas. All  of these  changes  might
plausibly  lead  women  to  take  on  more  economic  activities  outside  the  family/
household.
t 3 /This  is  empirically  illustrated  by Schultz  (1980b).  though  the  noted  dif-
ferences  between  the  responsiveness  of participation  and  hours  can also  be
explained  by other  hypotheses,  such as  fixed  costs  of entering  the labor
force  (Cogan,  1980b).
2 Cross-equation  restrictions  are  also  implied  by th*  family  model  of labor
supply,  because  the income-compensated  cross-wage  effect  of the husband's
wage  on the  wife's  labor  supply  should  be the  same  as  the  income-compensated
cross-wage  effect  of the  wife's  wage  on  the  husband's  labor  supply. Heckman
(1981)  reported  a test  of this  parameter  restriction  and  rojectod  it in  the
case of a sample  of married  U.S. couples,  both of whom were  working  and
reported  a wage  rate. This  is  one  way  to  test  the  restrictive  nature  of  the
neoclassical  family  labor  supply  model,  though  lt  is  rarely  attempted.  Other
estimatos  for  U.S.  married  couples  by  'ag and  race  groups  also  confirm  that
the  symmetry  of  the  compensated  cross-wage  effects  does  nqt  appear  consistent
with  the  unrestricted  reduced  form  estimates  (Schultz,  1981;  Table  7.4).107
L"Layard  and  M4incer  (1985)  compares  estimates  of  female  labor  supply  param-
eters  from  various  industrially  advanced  countries.  A comparative  study  of
seven  Latin  American  countriec  (ECIEL,  1982)  in the 1970s  replicated  the
family  labor  supply  model  specification  proposed  by Schultz  (1980b)  and  re-
ported  large  positive  own-wage  labor  supply  elasticities  for  married  women
and  smaller  negative  husband  cross-wage  elasticities.  The  estimates  of  labor
supply  behavior  for  women living  without  husbands  were  less  elastic,  as  one
would  expect  because  they  tend  to  already  be  ore  fully  in  the  labor  market
and  more  self-sufficient.  Man without  wives,  particularly  at  young  and  old
ages,  exhibit  more  positive  labor  supply  responses  to  their  own market  wage
rate,  as  do  single  women.  Cogan  (1980a)  shows  evidence  that  the  lack  of
adjustment  for sample  selection  appears  to  change  very little  the  parameter
estimates  of  the  labor  supply  model  for  U.S.  married  women,  tho  deographic
group  for  which  the  bias  might  be  thought  a  Lrgori  to  be  most  serious.
Returns  to  education  for  this  group  is  changed  from  8.5  to  8.8  percent,  when
corrected  for  sample  selection  bias  (Cogan,  1980a:  Tablo  2.1).
i/For  example,  do  subsidized  birth  control  information,  services  and  supplies
reduce  the  lifetime  fertilLty  of  couples  and  also  increasa  the  "quality*  of
their  offspring?  Are  more  accessible  and  higher  quality  (i.e.,  lower  priced)
public  schools  an effective  means  of increasing  school  enrollments  (quality)
and  also  reducing  fertility?  The  answer  to  both  related  questions  appears  to
be a qualified  'yes'  in  the  few  studies  we  have  to date (Roscnzweig  and
Uolpin,  1982). Both  types  of  policies  are  also  likely  to  be  associated  with
women  taking  on  more  market  production  activities  and  gradually  increasing  the
market  wage  opportunities  of  women  relative  to  men (Rosenzweig,  and Schultz,108
1985;  Rosenzweig,  1988).
/yHeck1an  and Polachek  (1974)  confirmed  that  the  logarithmic  wage  equation
fit  US male  earnings  data  somewhat  better  than  did  the  linear  age  equatlon.
They  also  show  statistically  that  Nincer's  (1974)  specification  of  the  qua-
dratic  in  post-schooling  ye#:s  of  potential  experience  explains  more  of  the
variance  in log-wages  or log-earnings  than  does  a quadratic  in  age.  Rarely
has  a  theoretically  based  empirical  regularity  such  as this  specification  of
the  vage  function  been  replicated  so  widely,  in  so  many  parts  of  the  world,
and  had such  an effect  on  economic  thinking  about  a  diverse  range  of  socLal
issues.
2WFor  example,  if  more  able  students  self-select  theselves into  the  more
educated  comparison  group,  the  returns  to  education  could  be  overstated  until
a  selection-corrected  measure  of  the  private  returns  to  schooling  is  computed
(Willis  and Rosen,  1979).  But this  form  of  selection  might  not necessarily
bias  the  comt-irison  of  the  directly  measured  returns  of  men  relative  to  women,
if  ability  operates  in  an  analogous  way  to  influence  who  goes  to  school  among
both  girls  and  boys. The  next  section  examines  evidence  on  this  issue.
1/From the  perspective  of the  early  1960s,  this  empirical  strategy  may  have
reflected  a desire  to not overstate  the  returns  tc s1hooling,  because  the
concept  was  novel  and  controversial.  But  as  indicted  below,  the resulting
differences  in empirical  methods  practiced  in the literature  has led to
reports  of  women's  school  returns  being  deflated  for  honparticipation  in  some
cases  by  half  or  more,  and  in  other  reports  the  estimates  are  drawn  directly109
from  wage  functionw  without  deflation  or  sample  selection  correction.
aQ/The  analysis  of  educational  returns  is  complicated  if  education  influences
the  supply  of  labor  (Schultz,  1968).  When a  worker's  human  capital  is  in-
creased,  it  is  expected  to  exert  an  income  effect  reducing  market  labor  supply
and  a  substitution  effect  increas  ing  sarket  labor  supply.  If the  costs  of
acquiring  the  humn  capital  are  fully  borne  by  the  individual  or  family  and
they  exactly  offset  the  market  discountod  gaLn  in  earnings,  then  the  income
effect  of  the  human capital  is  zero.  This  is  the  implicit  assumption  in  the
equilibrium  investment  model  of  Decker  (1964)  and  MLncer (1974)  and  elaborated
by Lindsay  (1971). If there  is  no  income  effect  associated  with  education,
the  more  educated  should  work  more  hours,  because  the  rmaining  substitution
effect  on labor  supply.  must  be  positive.  But  empirical  exceptions  can be
readily  found,  such  as  in Colombia  where  the  university  educated  worked  in
Bogota  less than those  with only secondary  schooling  (Schultz,  1968)  and
Thailand  where  in  1981  the  more  educated  worked  fewer  hours  por  month,  or  in
Indonesia  in  1986  where  men with  more  unlversity  training  worked  fewer  hours
(Behrman  and  Doolalikar,  1988b).  Thus,  in  reality,  both  an  income  and  substi-
tution  effect  may  be  associated  with  the  acquisition  of  schooling,  and  it  can
be argued  that  the  return  to schooling  should  include  the  incoe  sffect  but
exclude  the  labor  supply  effect  induced  by  the  substitution  effect.  In  prac-
tice,  if the  dependent  variable  of  the  earningp  function  is  the  logarithm  of
the  hourly  wage  rate,  the  coefficient  on  years  of schooling  approximates  the
private  rate  of return,  holding  labor  supply  constant. This  procedure  is
correct  if the income  effect  is negligible,  as  assumed  in the  equilibrium
investment  model.  It is an  underestimate  of the  private  rate  of rpturn  to110
schooling  if  the  more  educated'work  fewer  hours.
22 Becker  (1964)  used  the  average  earnings  (of  those  with  earnings)  from  tab-
ulations  of  the  1950  Census  and  apparently  then  deflated  these  benefit  streams
by  participation  rates. This  approach  ignored  the  sample  selection  of  those
who  had  positive  earnings,  as  well  as the  problem  of  mixing  productivity  per
hour and labor  supply  responses  associated  with education. Mincer  (1974)
examined  the  1960  Census  public  use  sample,  and  fit  the  individual's  logarithm
of annual  earnings  to education  and  other  variables.  He could  only  include
individuals  with  positive  earnings  and  no  correction  for  the  potential  bias  is
discussed  from  his analysis  of a  selected  sample. However,  Hincer's  and
Becker's  analysis  is  focused  on  males  and  not  females.
A shortcoming  of the  sample  selection  correction  methodology,  as it is
commonly  applied,  is  that  it  can  lead  one  to  conclude  incorrectly  that  there
is  no sample  selection  bias,  because  the  sample  selection  rule  is  not vwell"
identified.  The only  basis  for identification  can  be the functional  form
assumed  for  the  error  in  the  selection  rule  equation,  e.g.  normally  distribut-
,ed  (Heckman,  1979). More  confidence  can  be  placed  in  the  estimates  if  theory
prescribes  conditioning  variables  that enter  significantly  in the sample
selection  rule  equation,  but  ars  excluded  a  priori  from  the  market  wage  equa-
tion.  Thus,  an insignificant  sample  selection  term (i.e.  Heckman's  lambda)
may  become  statistically  significant  when  the  exclusionary  restrictions  of  the
model  are selected  with  more  care. As a consequence,  the  sample  selection
correction  procedure  may then change  the estimated  returns  to schooling.
Agreement  on  acceptable  criteria  for  identification  would  accelerate  advance-
ment  of  empirical  research  on  this  topic.111
The nonmarket  reservation  wage of the  wife is affected  by the fnmily's
land,  ownership  of a business,  assets,  nonearned  income,  and the  husband's
educatioui  and  experience.  These  variables  are  added  to  the  wage-status  probit
equation.  The  Heckaan  (1979)  two  stage  estimate  that  is  less  efficient  yields
an  estimate  of  returns  of .16  (Griffin,  1987;  Table  3).
'/Alternative  specifications  can  include  the  age  and  education  of  the  spouse
or the  predicted  wage  of the  spouse  and  a marital  status  duiy variable  if
these  characteristics  of  the  spouse  are  missing.  These  identifying  variables
are  believed  to be more  likely  to  be endogenous  than  the  land  and  nonearned
income  variables.  But  their  inclusion  in the  model  does  not  change  appreci-
ably the estimates  of the private  rates of return  reported  in Table 3
(Schultz,  1988c).
L  Taxes  on  personal  income  are  a relatively  small  portion  of  government  rev-
enues  in low income  countries. The exception  may  be Latin  America  if  one
includes  'social  securityw  taxes  (World  Bank,  1988:  84).  In the  case  of
Thailand  in 1981,  direct  taxes  on personal  incomes  amounted  to less  than  5
percent  of  household  expenditures  and  only  10 percent  of  wage  recipients  in
Bangkok  (National  Statistical  Office,  undated).  Most  of government  revenues
in low income  countries  are  from  taxes  on companies  and  conmodities  (excise
and  trade). This  adjustment  may  therefore  be of  secondary  importance  in  low
income  countries  but could be quite important  in industrially  advanced
countries.112
'VThe marginal  revenue  generated  by the  expansion  of education  for  women,
Ew  and  men Em  ,  can  be  expressed:
dR/dEw  -twalw(lw  +  2)
dR/dE m-  twlu a(plm  +  P2w3
where  1i  0lw  are  the  private  rates  of return  to schooling  of men and
women which  ar*  Assumed equal,  P1w >  0  is  the  wife's  uncompensated  own vage
effect,  P2w  <  0  in  the  wife's  uncompensated  husband's  wage  effect,  0 i  0
is  the  husband's  uncompensate.  own wage  effect,  and  p23 0  is  the  husband's
uncompenaated  wife's  wage  effect.  The  above  indicated  signs  are  those  common-
ly  obtained  in  static  instrumented  family  labor  supply  models  (Cogan,  1980a;
Schultz,  1981).
A parallel  public  finance  argument  can  be  made  for  taxing  more  heavily  in-
elastically  supplied  factors,  if  the  goal  is  not  to  distort  the  optimal  (i.e.
untaxed)  allocation  of factors. This  tax  criterion  implies  that  given  the
labor  supply  parameters  outlined  in  footnote  25  that  male  labor  incomes  should
be taxed  more  heavily  than  female  labor  incomes  because  they  are  inelastically
supplied.  I  have  not  seen  an  endorsement  of  such  an  optimal  tax  policy.
SZThe  expected  years  of  education  reported  in  Table  5  is  a  synthetic  cohort
measure,  defined  as  the  sun  of  the  three  conmonly  reported  age-specific
enrollment  rates--associated  approximately  with  primary,  secondary,  and  higher
educational  levels--weighted  by  the  six  year  length  of  the  age  intervals  used
to compute  each  of the  enrollment  rates. Thus  it represents  the  number  of113
years an individual  would enroll  in school  if he or she enrolled  at the
average  rates  from  age  7  to  age  25  reported  in  a  particular  year. There  are
many  reasons  to  suspect  that  these  enrollment  rates  exceed  attendance  rates,
ant the  actual  time and  effort  applied  to schooling  undoubtedly  differs
greater  across  countries-  and  over  time  within  countries.  There  may  also  be
differences  in these  *real"  investmnt  rates  per  year  of enrollment  between
boys  and  girls,  but  they  are  not  reflected  ln  any  of  these  UNESCO  statistics.
T/There  are  few  quantitative  studies  that  seek  to  test  the  efficacy  of  public
policy  that  varies  (1)  the  mix  of  women  and  men  hired  to  extend  new  agricul-
tural  teb..ologies,  (2)  the sex  of the  agricultural  worker  these  personnel
have  contacted,  (3)  the  reported  source  of innovative  practices  or  now  pro-
ductive  inputs,  and finally  (4)  the effects  on the  hourly  productivity  of
male  and  female  workers  and  managers,  as  well  as  their  overall  earnings.  One
description  of  the  agricultural  extension  program  in  Malawi  (Spring  et al.,
1083)  shows  the  growing  predominance  of  women  full-time  and  part-time  workers
and  managers.  Female  headed  households  and  wives,  however,  benefit  from  rela-
tively  fewer  extension  visits  than  do oen. But  women attribute  to  extension
agents  their  sources  of  modern  agricultural  practices  more  than  do  men. One
interpretation  of  these  data  from  Lilongwe  Rural  Development  Project  is  that
women agricultural  workers  are  more  responsive  to  the  extension  inputs  they
received.  But  they  received  fever  such  inputs.  Unfortunately,  the  education
of the  male  and  foeale  farm  managers  and  their  size  of  holdings  are  not  re-
ported,  and  these  characteristics  of  the  farmers  might  help  to  explain  the
reported  patterns.  None  of  50  extension  evaluation  studies  reviewed  by
Evenson  (1988)  or  Birkhaeuser  et al.  (1988)  note  the  differential  effective-114
ness  of  male  and  famale  staff  or  the  gender  of  farm  contacts.
2 'VTh*re  are also  numerous  more  specialized  tasks .n  the  delivery  of  health
care  where  less  highly  trained  (and  less  costly)  parmedics  who  are  dedicated
to  performing  a  fey  functions  can  do  these  activities  better  than,  or  at  least
as  veil  as,  doctors. In  Thailand  midwives were  trained  to  insert  IUDs.  They
were  then  carefully  evaluated  against  doctors  providing  the  same sorvice.  The
midwives  vere  more  successful  in  delivering  this  single  service  than  were  the
doctors. Performance  was  measured  in  term of  the  incidence  of  a  variety  of
objective  complications  and  in  terms  of  patient  satisfaction  and  frequency  of
complaints  (Population  Council,  1972).REFERENCES
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Market  Labor  Supply  Estimates  for  Women,  Age  25 to 54:  Thailand  1981'
Depender.w  Variable:  Participation  Hours  per  Week  Sample  Meansb
Estimation  Method:  Probit  OLS  OLS
ExDlanatorv  Variables
Market  Opportunity  Wages:
(Ln  Baht/hour)
Womanc  .467  .114  -1.13  .771
(10.0)  (11.9)  (1.73)  (.673)
HusbandC  -. 408  -.111  -6.83  .934
(10.6)  (13.7)  (12.4)  (.987)
Husband  Present  (-1)  .215  .0583  3.47  .699
(2.75)  (3.83)  (3.36)
Unearned  Income:
(Baht/month  x 10-4)
Woman  -3.11  -. 580  -30.8  .0156
(10.8)  (13.0)  (10.2)  (.0856)
Husband  -.426  -.108  -4.20  .00987
(1.82)  (1.81)  (1.03)  (.0633)
Age  of Woman  .131  .0267  2.78  36.1
(5.87)  (5.53)  (8.49)  (8.13)
Age squared  (x  10.2)  -. 174  .0353  -3.49  13.73
(5.99)  (5.59)  (8.15)  (6.18)
Residential  Area:
Bangkok  -.550  -.137  -8.08  .267
(12.2)  (13.4)  (11.7)
Municipal  -.751  -.174  -3.82  .364
(10.9)  (11.6)  (3.75)
Sanitary  Dist.  -. 425  -. 0755  -2.29  .154
(7.06)  (5.92)  (2.65)
Northeast Region  -.261  -.0607  -2.94  .274
(5.36)  (6.20)  (4.43)
Intercept  -7.67  .467  3.35
(1.89)  (5.30)  (.56)
R2  .147  .145
x2  1146.3
Sample  Size  8380  8380  8380  8380
Dependent  Variable  .834  .834  46.0
Mean (S.D.)  (.372)  (.372)  (25.2)
Notes:
a t ratios  are  reported  beneath  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  regression
coefficients  in  parentheses,  and  asymptotic  t  ratios  are  reported  beneath  probit
coefficients  in  parentheses.
b Means  of  variables  with the  1981  SES  sample  used  for  estimation,  and  standard
deviations  reported  in  parentheses.
c  Endogenous  wage  variables  imputated  from  wage  equations  corrected  for  two
sample  selection  biases  of  persons  participating  in labor  force  and  reporting  a  wage
rate. See  Tables  A-  7 and  A-  6.Table A-3
Market  Labor  Supply  Estimates  for  Men.  Age 25  to 54:  Thailand  198la
Dependent  Variable:  Participation  Hours  per  Week  Sample  Meansb
Estimation  Method:  Probit  OLS  OLS
ExDlanatorv  Variablej
Market  Opportunity  Wages:
(Ln  Baht/hour)
Manc  .124  .0056  -9.75  1.39
(1.17)  (.81)  (12.9)  (.938)
Wifec  -. 160  .0042  -2.94  .58
(1.87)  (.81)  (5.19)  (.623)
Wife  Present  (-1)  1.03  .0672  7.70  .805
(8.90)  (9.90)  (10.3)
Unearned  Income:
(Baht/month  x 1(-4)
Man  -1.27  -.185  -9.57  .0127
(4.84)  7.17  (3.40)  (.0727)
Wife  -. 995  -. 0147  .495  .00342
(1.86)  (2.75)  (.0)  (.0349)
Age  of Man  .139  .00879  1.73  38.3
(3.49)  (3.64)  (6.53)  (8.41)
Age squared (x  10.2)  - .191  - .0116  -1.87  15.3
(3.77)  (3.83)  (5.63)  (6.57)
Residential  Area:
Bangkok  .101  - .0076  - .938  .268
(1.11)  (1.37)  (1.55)
Municipal  -.506  - .0331  11.3  .356
(2.89)  (3.06)  (9.56)
Sanitary  Dist.  -. 205  - .0102  4.90  .153
(1.50)  (1.39)  (6.08)
Northeast  Region  .0638  .0019  -2.69  .273
(.58)  (.33)  (4.21)  '
Intercept  -. 883  .769  23.9
(1.21)  (17.1)  (4.85)
R2  .0517  .1401
x2  287.5
Sample  Size  7278  7278  1278  7278
Dependent  Variable  .973  .973  56.0
Mean (S.D.)  (.162)  (.162)  (18.7)
Notes:
a t ratios  are  reported  beneath  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  regression
coefficients  in  parentheses,  and  asymptotic  t  ratios  are  reported  beneath  probit
coefficients  in  parentheses.
b Means  of  variables  with  the  1981  SES  sample  used  for  estimation,  and  standard
deviations  reported  in  parentheses.
c Endogenous  wage  variables  imputated  from  wage  equations  corrected  for  two
sample  selection  biases  of  persons  participating  in  labo:.  force  and  reporting  a  wage
rate. See  Tables  A-7  and  A-.Table  A, 4
Likelihood  That Spouse is Present in  Household,
Women and  Men, Age 25 to 54:
Thailand  l95la
Women  Men
Estimation  Method:  Probit  Probit
Explanatory  Variables:
Wage (In  Baht/hour)b  - .310  -.271
(8.65)  (4.39)
Unearned Income (individual's)  ,4.08  .8.61
(Baht/month  x 10'4)  (15.1)  (2.49)
Age  .310  .566
(16.7)  (25.3)
Age Squared (x 10-2)  - .406  -.653
(16.7)  (22.8)
Residential Area:
Bangkok  - .0306  -.0048
(.78)  (.09)
Municipal  .0375  .0176
(.74)  (.17)
Sanitary  Dist.  .0329  .0727
(.68)  (.98)
Northeast Region  .0214  0142
(.58)  (.24)
Intercept  -4.79  -10.3
(14.1)  (24.7)
x2  887.4  1554.9
Sample  Size  8380  7278
Dependent Variable  .699  .805
Mean (S.D.)
a Asymptotic t ratios are reported  beneath probit coefficients  in  parentheses.
b Endogenous  wage variables imputed  from  wage  equations  corrected  for two
sample selection  biases of persons in the labor force and in  a wage job.  See
Tables A-7 and A-!./U/1V/VWWcaIab7b  p.  2  7/01/88
hhble  A-5
SectoraL  Smm  of  Fema  Iwtjis  ar  Sre  in  amp  Dlaqpt
by  SmeIc  Pd
MM 21  Ele  worws  pwloed  in  ector  -share  F~Ie  tw  Uno Am w  bu  Erimn
Srctcw  of  Wold  Hi°hP  top  tatin  North  East  smi  World  H1g  ZOP  tocth  East  Smith
Apoymnt:  X  n  Alwri=a  Africa  Asia  West  Xmxm  Ime  Arica  Africa  Asia  st
Asia  Asia
(1)  M2  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (20)  (LI)  (12)  (13)  (14)
Aqriaalture  .404  .121  .663  .205  .673  .609  .821  .275  .13  .297  .297  .075  .195  .344
(.345)  (.149)  (.256)  (.156)  (.313)  (.166)  (.113)  (.211)  (.174)  (.207)  (.237)  (.167)  (.149)  (.207)
.003  .003  .002  .004  .001  .001  .003  .875  .966  .758  .831  .925  .535  .773
(.003)  (.004)  (.002)  (.003)  (.003)  (.000)  (.001)  (.139)  (.023)  (.137)  (.164)  (.145)  (.222)  (.047)
tburufacbworinI  .158  .229  .103  .177  .076  .109  .060  .771  .925  .471  .723  .486  .537  .266
(.O65j  f.056)  (.075)  (.065)  (.112)  (.076)  (.059)  (.276)  (.077)  (.276)  (.200)  (.285)  (.240)  (.170)
Utilities  .003  .04  .001  .003  .002  .000  .002  .914  .995  .696  .946  .971  .918  .567
(.002)  (.002)  .t(2)  (.003)  (.003)  (.001)  (.001)  (.171)  (.005)  (.207)  (.062)  (.133)  (.159)  (.134)
Contrdtmtion  .006  .013  .004  .005  .003  .003  .004  .808  .838  .716  .900  .863  .877  .595
(.007)  (.006)  (.003)  ( .0  (.005)  (.003)  (.003)  (.133)  (.095)  (.179)  (.092)  (.SM2)  (.078)  (.117)
Ct SfinD  .143  .213  .074  .128  uor  .158  .016  .627  .775  .231  .501  .342  .129  .155
(.Or$)  (.043)  (-077)  (.062)  (.021)  - .054)  (.013)  (-307)  (.175)  (.223)  (.206)  (.243)  (.116)  (.183)
ITrmprtation  .016  .029  .004  .011  .007  .003  .fl1  .952  .96W  .Z50  .943  .963  .881)  (.715)
(.014)  (.003)  (.006)  (.004)  (.010)  (.006)  (.003)  (.074)  (.026)  (.153)  (.074)  (.037)  (.136)  (.136)
Service  .26E  .393  .148  .469  .200  .116  .072  .863  .927  .773  .324  .965  .811  .624
(.90)  (.123)  (.162)'  (.142)  (.222)  (.069)  (,05?'  (.127)  (.056)  (.174)  (.o04)  (.040)  (.098)  (.249)
Nonk;rizbtxre  .596  .879  .337  .795  .327  .391  .179  .793  .889  .S61  .712  .780  .458  .427
(.345)  (.149)  (.258)  (.158)  (.313)  (.166,  (.113)  (.207)  (.068)  (.223)  (.109)  (.198)  (.169)  (.206)
Total  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.W  1.00  1.00  1.00  .583  .799  .385  .658  .306  .298  .359
(.286)  (.168)  (.213)  (.167)  (.342)  (.142)  (.188)
Participation  rateC  .349  .377  .326  .247  .124  .452  .328
(.135)  (.09)  (.158)  (.083)  (.143)  (.146)  (.145)
MNbzer  of  ctutri  o  61  22  39  17  6  6  10  61  22  39  17  6  6  10
(inp  sxt)  100  48  52  08  01  15  28  100  48  52  08  01  15  28
a  =AXY  aM  A  by  fa I_lt  ayt  in  sor  w  y,  a  detin  is  reported  in  PaZrntphe  beeath  mean.
b  Hg  inooms  c  Dtrh  S  p  Vp  M vith  the  mast"  category  in  Table  A-I  afd  iuclidi  Jnapa,  otarn  MEWSp  (  dr . US  Autralia  aid  New Zealand.
and  1ow Iloz  f  m  c  iludis  the  raonder.  See  Table  A-1  for  a  list  including  the rqinal  bemkdoxm  of  the  1low inooew  czutries.
c  Feae  lbr  fotn  PrtiClPmrw  for  fmle  pe  15 or  mroe.
Source:  Schultz  (1988:  Table  2).  Based  on  population  weighted  sample  of  61  countries  providing  two  or  more  censuses  vith  the  required
tabulations  of  the  labor  force  and  CGNP  series./u/1v/lvaA11ab  p.  1  7/01/38
Zable  A-6
S5taral  Sm  of  Ile  Womrs  wd  hme  in qW  U
by  Swttw  d  feoaghw
of  Latin~~W  o  Higwok  &  World  Scto  2  of  1ue  Wwkers  Wm  Are VWa Earners
Seto  of  Wold  HiqW  IMP  latin  North  East  Smuth L  llrld  lli*P  I  Latin  Nort  East  saOOh 
DWIWNt:  Dme  IncInc  ne  America  Africa  Asia  Rest  In  In=  Amwic  Africa  Asia  West
Asia  Asia
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (a)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)
Agrnalbtm  .445  13s  .623  .477  .547  .627  .666  .255  .289  .250  .367  .377  .161  .242
(.265)  (.112)  (.333)  (.127)  (.107)  (.147)  (.095)  (.117)  (.144)  (.111)  (.124)  (.172)  (.080)  (.061)
Nlniznq  .011  .019  .006  .016  .008  .004  .006  .941  .972  .862  .941  .969  .835  .857
(.011)  (.013)  (.006)  (.013)  (.010)  (.003)  (.002)  (.075)  (.036)  (.092)  (.063)  (.050)  (.170)  (.056)
IbidNfaturing  .174  .286  .109  .164  .105  .082  .101  .88  .923  .623  .625  .785  .702  .501
(.056)  (.056)  (.042)  (.036)  (.029)  (.059)  (.019)  (.193)  (.059)  (.180)  (.082)  (.116)  (.135)  (.109)
Utilities  .005  .016  .004  .007  .006  .002  .004  .974  .991  .935  .943  .964  .962  .922
(.007)  (.005)  (.003)  (.007)  (.004)  (.003)  (.002)  (.043)  (.012)  (.056)  (.049)  (.033)  (.055)  (.056)
Ctuctructign  .061  .110  .033  .066  .053  .031  .023  .805  .337  .742  .734  .839  .826  .666
(.047)  (.023)  (.032)  (.028)  (.047)  (.021)  (.026)  (.116)  (.062)  (.160)  (.093)  (.097)  (.123)  (.189)
Ct  "nve  .103  .21S  .073  .091  .062  .092  .061  .543  .735  .305  .463  .343  .234  .256
(.051)  (.041)  (.027)  (.026)  (.014)  (.035)  (.017)  (.254)  (.139)  (.13S)  (.-O9)  (.071)  (.134)  (.077)
Tzmi  3tstion  .051  .071  .035  .050  .044  .036  .029  .831  .925  .70S  .718  .818  .704  .692
(.026)  '012)  (.016)  (.015)  (.015)  (.020)  (.011)  (.131)  (.04)  (.100)  (.091)  (.052)  (.119)  (.091)
8iviockas  .149  .*01  .118  .137  .155  .123  .109  .316  .372.  .759  .756  .902  .855  .714
(.063)  (.061)  (.040)  (.056)  (.026)  (.031)  (.032)  (.107)  (.031)  (.123)  (.12S)  (.046)  (.053)  (.119)
0m0riouture  .555  .862  .377  .523  .453  .373  .332  .767  .870  .630  .734  .760  .651  .564
(.265)  (.112)  (.133)  (.127)  (.107)  (.147)  (.095)  (.146)  (.054)  (.114)  (.04)  (.056)  (.063)  (.099)
ItOa  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  .5.9  .790  .393  .559  .551  .344  .349
(.a2s)  (.113)  (.2W)  (.101)  (.150)  (.118)  (.064)
purthhWmt~i  ztac  .3*23  .754  .8S77  .834  .766  .831  .919
(.105)  (.030)  (.090)  (.091)  (.148)  (.067)  (.062)
mUt^N  of  Coultri  61  22  39  17  6  6  10  61  22  39  17  6  6  10
(in;p  out)  100  37  36  11  3  11  39  100  37  36  11  3  11  39
a  C  axm wr  _  i  W  mal  e1oplynt  in  setor  or  q,  ai  wmiWd  stanrd  dsviation  is  wptd.  taxethmsn  beneatb  wean.
b  High  Iz=  wO*riam  *vum  with  the  .Wet.  catagry  in  Tabl  A-1 and  Jincli4  j  Iotezn  &a  ps  Canada,  tM,  Australia  ard  New Zealand,
swl  low  izm  atri_e  includ  the  rwinimr.  .mS Tale  A-1  for  a  list  i-rludin  the  sqianal  btseidm  of  t  "1ow inme"  c=ntries.
c  Male  labor  fOKUs prttcipUts  to  ises age  1S or  mere.
Source:  (Schultz  (1966:  Table  1).  Soo Table  A-5  note  for  limitations  of  sample.Table A- 7
Sample  Selection Corrected  Wage Functions,
Women, Age 25-54:  Thailand,  1981&
Dependent  Variable  Participa-  Wage Earner  Log of  Log of Monthly  Sample
tion  Wage Rate  Earnings  Means
Estimation  Method  Probit  Probit  OLS  OLS  (S.D.'
Explanatory  Variables:
Schooling in  Years:
Primary  .00068  -. 0248  .100  .0903  4.13
(.06)  (2.34)  (5.00)  (4.56)  (1.75)
Secondary  .0982  .240  .247  .219  1.45
(7.45)  (20.7)  (6.77)  (6.09)  (2.45)
Higher  .163  .145  .108  .116  .232
(3.58)  (4.05)  (3.04)  (3.32)  (.925)
Post  School Experience  .1 46&  - .0046A  .0901  .0887  23.1
in  years  (7.36)  (.26)  (6.54)  (6.53)  (9.99)
Experience  Squared  - .191  - .0171  - .122  - .125  6.34
(x 10-2)  (7.49)  (.73)  (4.73)  (4.88)  (5.11)
Residential  Areas
Bangkok  -.489  - .0152  .242  .289  .304
(11.9)  (.39)  (2.97)  (3.59)
Municipal  - .699  -. 411  .742  .68&  .384
(16.3)  (10.4)  (6.22)  (5.84)
Sanitary  Dist.  - .364  -. 0205  .442  .400  . 70
(7.00)  (.47)  (5.76)  (5.28)
Northeast Region  - .166  .271  - .107  - .0648  .199
(3.66)  (7.07)  (1.43)  (.88)
Unearned Income  -1.33  - .657  .0153
(x  10-4)  (7.34)  (3.39)
Hectares at Land Owned:
Irrigated  Land  .0241  -.0158  1.94
(5.46)  (6.67)
Dry Land  .0187  -.0177  5.35
(7.61)  (10.5)
Participation  A  2.80  2.78  285b
(9.26)  (9.29)
Wage Earner A  -1.45  -1.35  1.05b
(7.69)  (7.24)
Intercept  -1.24  .0727  - .818  4.51
(3.33)  (.22)  (2.97)  (16.6)
-2/x2  1145.1  1278.3  .624  .597
Sample Size  8816  8816  2419  2419
Dependent  Variable Means  .829  .380  .970  6.26
(Standard  deviation)  (1.81)  (1.72)
a t ratios are reported  beneath ordinary least  squares (OLS)  regression
coefficients in parentheses, and asymptotic t ratios are reported  beneath probit
coefficients in parentheses.
b Means of variables with the 1981 SES sample used for estimation,  and standard
deviations  reported in parentheses.Table A-  8
Sample Selection  Corrected  Wage Functions,
Men, Age 25-54:  Thailand, 1981a
Dependent Variable  Participa-  Wage Earner  Log of  Log of Monthly  Sample.
tion  Wage Rate  Earnings  Means
Estimation  Method  Probit  Probit  OLS  OLS  (S.D.)
Explanatory  Variables:
Schooling in Years:
Primary  .0916  .0368  .143  .145  4.43
(3.78)  (3.16)  (8.95)  (9.22)  (1.49)
Secondary  - .0913  .115  .130  .0883  1.31
(4.64)  (10.6)  (9.04)  (6.24)  (2.25)
Higher  - .0126  . 0315  .0407  .0293  .159
(.31)  (1.06)  (1.66)  (1.22)  (.774)
Post School Experience  .232a  .0318&-  .0471  .0451  24.6
in years  (6.22)  (1.84)  (4..,'2)  (3.93)  (9.71)
Experience Squared  -. 295a  .0587&  - .0292  - .0297  6.97
(x 10- )  (6.17)  (2.64)  (1.35)  (1.40)  (5.08)
Residential  Area
Bangkok  - .0536  .236  .371  .370  .3.7
(.66)  (6.05)  (7.840  (7.99)
Municipal  - .333  - .231  1.28  1r27  .377
(3.79)  (5.89)  (25.6)  (25.9)
Sanitary Dist.  -.101  .0889  .675  .655
(.93)  (2.06)  (13.5)  (13.4)
Northeast Region  .0040  .0380  -.558  .487  .257
(.04)  (1.07)  (13.3)  (11.9)
Unearned Income  -1.18  - .303  .0124
(x  10-4)  (4.55)  (1.43)
Hectares of Land Owned:
Irrigated  Land  .00728  -.0201  1.91
(1.10)  (9.54)
Dry Land  .00490  - .0179  5.21
(1.29)  (13.1)
Participation  A  .454  .587  0546b
(.75)  (.996)
Wage Earner A  -1.87  -1.83  633b
(13.6)  (13.5)
Intercept  -2.36  -.272  .286  5.68
(3.34)  (.83)  (1.36)  (27.
R2/.y2  153.3  875.3  .552  .528
Sample Size  7986  7986  4525  4525
Dependent  Variable Means  .978  .568  1.46  6.80
(standard  deviation)  (1.68)  (1.60)
a t ratios are reported  beneath ordinary least  squares (OLS)  rebression
coefficients in  parentheses, and asymptotic t ratios are reported  beneath probit
coefficients in  parentheses.
b Means of variables with the 1981 SES sample  used for estimation,  and standard
deviations reported in parentheses./u1teis1TsbWPD*vAr  11/20998
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Algori  19'@-51  **  *§  .1
OMs-56  9  45  1.15
1969-70  so  54  1.09  1.00  .0  .53  .74  .09
|  9t0  53  54  1 .02
Egyrt  1948-52  40  41  1.03  1.01
1959-62  48  49  |  .02  .97
1963-67  *b  so  1.02  .91  .99  1.06  1.04  1.16
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1bt0-it  GI  65  1.07  1.26  .95  .§  1.30  .91
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Ruwsjt  1974-16  66  70  1.06  1.1'
LbAb"ten  -1970  62  66  1.06
Sri  Lonkit  1965-67  45  43  .ff  1-09
1962-64  62  63  |  .02
1970-12  64  61  1.05  .*
NUr.  1956  61  46  1.07
(urban)  1974  56  so  1.02  *"1
Iron  1973-76  St  SY  1.00  .*"  .80
Ilaq  1916-75  57  St  1.04  .5*
Afghsnistan  lAtt-13  34  36  1.06
Ibargidesb  1914  46  47  1.02  1.10  1.04
01#..,lemon  2§7)  41  43  1 .05
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1951-00  *2  *1  .98  1.11
1970-12  *9  *6  .96  1.01  .76
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197&-76  AS  :2  .93  1.04
'^'  isto  1  952-65  *7  *5  .95,  .66
1e  en  1975  50  39  1.03
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